From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye.
Today’s about: ASEAN; ASEAN-Myanmar; Asia; Australia; China; China-Indonesia; G20; Gulf; Humanitarian Aid-Gaza; India; India-Russia; Indonesia; Koreas; Libya; Pakistan-Afghanistan-China; South Korea
ASEAN
(Yanitha Meena Louis – Observer Research Foundation) Malaysia’s ASEAN chairmanship in 2025 culminated in the 47th ASEAN Summit and related meetings at the end of October. While the Summit has, as such, received plenty of recognition for its sheer scale and “star presence” — with the likes of US President Donald Trump, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Japanese PM Sanae Takaichi attending — Malaysia’s time as chair has also, without a doubt, reaffirmed with conviction ASEAN’s convening power and commitment to strengthening its mechanisms. This comes against the backdrop of acute geopolitical and geoeconomic flux, major power rivalry, and the rise of regional powers and minilateralism. – Malaysia’s 2025 ASEAN Chairmanship: Advancing Inclusive, Sustainable Partnerships
ASEAN-Myanmar
(Sreeparna Banerjee, Asmita Bhattasali – Observer Research Foundation) Four years after Myanmar’s 2021 military coup, the crisis has become a stark test of the credibility of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—and one that the bloc continues to struggle with. In Myanmar, despite more than 7,000 civilians killed, over 3.6 million displaced, and a collapsing economy, ASEAN’s diplomacy remains caught between its aspirations and its structural limitations. The 47th ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur from 26-28 October offered a fresh stage but not a new script: strong statements, renewed pledges on ceasefire support and humanitarian access, yet no real enforcement tools capable of changing conditions on the ground for Myanmar. What emerged instead was a revealing snapshot of ASEAN’s dilemma. Its long-held principles of consensus and non-interference, once seen as the foundation of regional stability, now act as constraints on decisive action. As violence intensifies, governance structures unravel, and cross-border spillovers grow, the bloc finds itself relying on diplomatic methods that are increasingly outpaced by the crisis unfolding in its neighbourhood. – Promises, Principles, and Paralysis: ASEAN’s Myanmar Conundrum
Asia
(East Asia Forum) The use of industrial policy has surged across Asia and the world as governments deploy vast subsidies to stimulate favoured sectors, especially in low-carbon and high end technologies. While some subsidies can have positive social effects by accelerating decarbonisation, the broader shift towards supporting capital-intensive industries for strategic purposes risks triggering a costly subsidies race that emerging economies are ill equipped to sustain. With WTO disciplines weakened, stronger regional coordination and transparent reporting are essential to prevent economic fragmentation, maintain a level playing field and manage the geopolitical fallout of unrestrained industrial policy. – Why Asia must steer the industrial policy debate | East Asia Forum
Australia
(Zane Goebel – Lowy The Interpreter) Australia’s future prosperity and security will be shaped in the Indo-Pacific. Yet, despite decades of warnings, our national Asia capability – knowledge of languages, cultures, and regional dynamics – has been in sustained decline. The current parliamentary inquiry into “Building Asia capability in Australia through the education system and beyond” is a timely attempt to confront this challenge. – Australians risk becoming “strangers in our own region” | Lowy Institute
(John Coyne – ASPI The Strategist) Australia lacks secure, onshore computing power capable of training defence algorithms, running classified simulations or supporting the advanced capability agenda under the AUKUS partnership. Addressing this shortfall requires the government and industry to move decisively to establish a sovereign computing zone linked to Northern Australia’s emerging energy capacity, new digital corridors and national fibre upgrades. – Needed: massive computing power in the Northern Territory | The Strategist
(Jennifer Parker – ASPI The Strategist) Rumours suggest another Chinese naval task group may be heading towards Australia. While such a deployment poses no direct threat, and warships are entitled under international law to operate in international waters, it inevitably recalls the Chinese task group that circumnavigated Australia in February and March. That voyage, while overblown by some, was a deliberate show of maritime coercion in a shifting strategic environment. China’s growing aggression in the Indo-Pacific, along with Russia’s assault on Ukraine and the war in the Middle East, have made one thing clear: military force has returned as a normal tool of coercion. For Australia, the question is how we reduce our vulnerability to military coercion, and that conversation begins with defence spending. – Facing Chinese military coercion, Australian defence spending is insufficient | The Strategist
China
(Atul Kumar – Observer Research Foundation) China’s aircraft carrier programme anchors its transformation from a continental to a maritime power. The Liaoning, Shandong, and EMALS-equipped Fujian together underscore Beijing’s intent to operate far from its shores, blending audacious innovation with disciplined, experience-driven learning. Unlike the United States’ (US) mature carrier operations model, China’s EMALS effort remains exploratory yet strategically purposeful, aimed at deterrence, coercion, and influence, amid a possible US naval retrenchment from East Asia. This paper argues that China’s carrier programme embodies both technological ambition and strategic recalibration, reshaping the Indo-Pacific’s maritime equilibrium. For India, the PLAN’s growing footprints and prospective carrier deployments in the Indian Ocean are both a structural challenge and an impetus for naval renewal. – China’s Expanding Aircraft Carrier Capabilities: From a Carrier Gap to the Electric-Catapult Age
China-Indonesia
(Alexander R. Arifianto, Virdika Rizky Utama – Lowy The Interpreter) In 2025, Indonesia and China marked the 75th anniversary of their diplomatic ties, highlighting how the relationship has matured into one of the Indo-Pacific’s most consequential. The commemoration signals not merely symbolism but the growing weight of a partnership that is expanding in trade, investment, and defence. At the same time, both states navigate cooperation alongside the imperative of maintaining autonomy. – How China views its economic relations with Indonesia | Lowy Institute
G20
(Nilanjan Ghosh, Malancha Chakrabarty, Swati Prabhu – Observer Research Foundation) South Africa’s G-20 presidency offers a real opportunity to set the agenda and shape global outcomes in a world marred by conflicts, and a massive climate and development crisis. The pandemic has undone years of progress in poverty and hunger eradication and pushed an additional 93 million people into poverty. South Africa’s predecessors, Brazil, and India reoriented the G20’s priorities towards development concerns centred on implementing the SDGs, finance for development, prioritising food security, digital public infrastructure, and climate action. It is amply clear that without plugging the massive SDG financing gap, SDGs cannot be redeemed. – A bank for G-20
(Harsh V. Pant, Samir Bhattacharya – Observer Research Foundation) South Africa’s 2025 G20 presidency unfolded against one of the most turbulent periods in global politics. With the global order strained by intensifying great-power rivalry, multiplying conflicts, and a growing crisis of trust in multilateral institutions, Pretoria stepped into a role that demanded both delicate diplomacy and strong leadership. The Johannesburg summit was not just a symbolic moment for Africa. It became a test of whether the developing world could uphold multilateralism even as some developed nations chose disengagement. It also became a stage on which India’s quiet but decisive support made a clear difference. – South Africa’s G20 Presidency, India and the Global South
(Abhinandan Kumar – Lowy The Interpreter) When the G20 was elevated to the leaders’ level in 2008, it was hailed as the world’s most promising experiment in minilateralism. Unlike the cumbersome United Nations or the Western-dominated Bretton Woods institutions, the G20 was supposed to be small enough to act, big enough to matter, and flexible enough to solve global financial problems. However, almost two decades later, the G20 has begun to resemble the very institutions it was created to circumvent. Its meetings have become more symbolic than substantive, its communiques diluted by tensions among major powers, and its agenda expanded to include everything and anything under the sun. A forum designed for agility is turning into a sprawling talk shop. – Is G20 becoming what it sought to replace? | Lowy Institute
Gulf
(Leigh Mante – Observer Research Foundation) The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is projected to experience exponential population growth in the coming years, which will undoubtedly compound waste generation. In parallel, the region is accelerating domestic food production efforts to meet growing demand and enhance food security, resulting in increases in agricultural residues and food waste. These trends are driven by factors such as rising affluence, cultural preferences towards consuming new goods, and the short shelf-lives of imported food. To illustrate, in 2023, the amount of agricultural waste collected in GCC countries increased by 44 percent, while the amount of food waste in 2022 averaged 150kg per capita annually, surpassing the global average by 14 percent. – Catalysing the GCC’s Waste-to-Energy Prospects for Agriculture
(Kabir Taneja – Observer Research Foundation) The 2025 Dubai Air Show, while a cornerstone event of the Middle East’s aviation sector, was once again a key venue showcasing how the region’s defence sector reflects a shifting strategic culture—one in which Gulf states are increasingly factoring a more distracted United States (US) into their calculations. Between Hamas’s terror strike against Israel in 2023, followed by a relentless war in Gaza and US strikes against Iran’s nuclear programme in June, the region’s security paradigm is in flux. Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman (MbS), has recently visited Washington D.C. for the first time since 2018. On the agenda were a slew of deliverables, including seeking a renewed security arrangement with the US and onboarding top-of-the-line defence technologies. Since 1945, when the Kingdom’s King Abdulaziz Ibn Saud met then US President Franklin D. Roosevelt on board American warship USS Quincy in the Suez Canal—marking a new chapter of US security guarantees in the Middle East—the post-9/11 era led by the Iraq war has changed both demands and requirements of and from American geopolitics. However, arguably, the core security demands for Saudi Arabia, from King Abdulaziz to now heir apparent MbS, have remained the same over the past 80 years. – F-35 at the Heart of Gulf Deterrence
Humanitarian Aid-Gaza
(Heena Makhija – Observer Research Foundation) The 20-point Gaza peace plan and the fragile ceasefire deal brokered by the United States (US) seek to put an end to two years of conflict. In the aftermath of the 7 October 2023 attack by Hamas, the military offensive had incited a distressing humanitarian crisis in Gaza, with allegations of the blockage of aid in the region. According to the United Nations (UN), its agencies — especially the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) — were barred from bringing in medical supplies and at its worst, the population of over two million was reported to be food insecure, with chances of it turning into mass starvation. Restricting emergency humanitarian aid as a ‘pressure building’ tactic, despite the UN’s characteristic neutrality, risks setting a dangerous precedent for norms of conflict and the international order. – The Precarity of Humanitarian Aid and Its Restriction as a Tactic
India
(Harsh V. Pant, Ayjaz Wani – Observer Research Foundation) India quietly ended its only overseas military presence by relinquishing the strategic Ayni airbase in Tajikistan upon the expiry of the bilateral agreement. Ayni airbase, also known as Gissar Military Aerodrome, was a former Soviet military facility that fell into disrepair after the Soviet Union’s dissolution. After 1991, Russia faced economic difficulties and struggled to pay soldiers’ salaries. Meanwhile, New Delhi, considered a trusted friend of Moscow, was permitted to develop the Ayni airbase. Moscow supports India’s role in the security framework of Central Asia, particularly in Tajikistan, due to its vulnerable borders with Afghanistan and China as well as the influx of drugs and extremists into the region. Additionally, the 1999 Kargil War heightened New Delhi’s strategic and security interests, making Ayni airbase critical for boosting India’s deterrence and strategic depth against Pakistan. India began developing the airbase, located 20 km from the Wakhan Corridor and bordering Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and China’s Xinjiang province, in the late 1990s. With an investment of $70 million, the Indian Air Force and Border Roads Organisation upgraded its 3,200-metre runway, air traffic control systems, and fuel depots. At one point, India also deployed Su-30MKI fighter jets and helicopters for strategic deterrence. – Ayni exit may limit regional outreach
(Lakshmy Ramakrishnan – Observer Research Foundation) Marking a significant leap forward in medical innovation, India has developed its own CRISPR (clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats)-based therapy — Birsa-101 — to treat Sickle-cell Disease. Named after the notable tribal leader, Bhagwan Birsa Munda, Birsa-101 offers promise as an affordable therapy for a genetic condition that primarily affects vulnerable communities in India. Clinical trials are set to commence next year, with participants likely to be from central and eastern India. – Birsa-101: India’s Path Towards Affordable CRISPR Therapies
India-Russia
(Aleksei Zakharov – Observer Research Foundation) Russian President Vladimir Putin is scheduled to visit New Delhi on 4-5 December for the 23rd India-Russia Annual Summit. This will be his first visit to India since December 2021. The agenda of the upcoming summit is extensive, covering an array of topics from energy and defence to trade and investment, as well as rising grassroots engagement. Beyond pushing forward a number of joint projects, the talks will also seek to tackle the pressing challenges that are holding back trade and economic cooperation between the two countries. – Key Policy Outcomes Expected at the India-Russia Summit
Indonesia
(Jennifer Williams, Nava Nuraniyah, Julian Droogan – Lowy The Interpreter) In July this year, we published an article in The Interpreter that identified an information operation in the Indonesian social media environment centred around Pakistan using their J-10 fighter jets to shoot down at least one Indian Dassault Rafale. Narratives portrayed the Chinese-made J-10s as superior to the French jets, alleged corruption in India’s Rafale acquisition, and falsely suggested Indonesia was cancelling its own Rafale order. A portion of this disinformation was circulated on X with the hashtag #HentikanRafaleDeal (#StopRafaleDeal) and echoed pro-Chinese narratives. While Indonesia’s Rafale procurement is proceeding, the country did ultimately purchase 42 J-10s in October. – Foreign interference and Indonesia’s buzzer networks | Lowy Institute
Koreas
(Jane Hardy – Lowy The Interpreter) The leaders of the two Koreas – South Korea’s President Lee Jae-myung and North Korea’s Chairman-Comrade-Secretary-General (take your pick from his many titles) Kim Jong-un – have each chalked up impressive gains in 2025. Elected in a landslide after the debacle of his predecessor’s ill-fated move to impose martial law and a downturn in the economy, Lee moved quickly to shore up democratic structures and the high tech industry and trade that underpin South Korea’s powerhouse economy. – The two Koreas: Could a North-South summit be in the works? | Lowy Institute
Libya
(Samriddhi Vij – Observer Research Foundation) Over a year has passed since Libya’s acute institutional rupture of August 2024, when the struggle for control of the Central Bank of Libya (CBL) nearly severed the nation’s financial lifeline. The subsequent appointment of Naji Mohamed Issa Belqasem as Governor was hailed as a technocratic triumph, but is it a diplomatic containment strategy designed to freeze the conflict or resolve it? The most serious issue remains the large-scale circulation of counterfeit currency that threatens the Dinar. As of November 2025, the macroeconomic data suggest a resounding recovery. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth at a staggering 15.6 percent, and oil production has stabilised to approximately 1.3 million barrels per day (bpd). Yet, the subtext reveals a far more fragile reality. While Libya’s spreadsheets show a boom, its streets tell a different story. This growth is entirely rent seeking. The non-oil economy remains dormant, with hydrocarbons driving 90 percent of government fiscal revenue. Furthermore, the lack of liquidity has led to long queues outside banks, and the central bank has printed US$11 billion in currency to address the cash shortages. However, the most serious issue remains the large-scale circulation of counterfeit currency that threatens the Dinar. – The Zombie Rentier: Is Libya’s Central Bank Crisis Recovery a Statistical Fallacy?
Pakistan-Afghanistan-China
(Shaheli Das – East Asia Forum) Calls by China for Pakistan and Afghanistan to abide by their ceasefire agreement reflect China’s concerns about its own interests in South Asia. With the flagship China–Pakistan Economic Corridor and China’s western provinces, notably Xinjiang, exposed to the threat of Afghan–Pakistani conflict, Beijing has sought to improve ties between the two. But Chinese efforts have been complicated by signs of regional realignment — Pakistan is pursuing stronger ties with the United States while India attempts rapprochement with the Afghan Taliban. – Pakistan–Afghanistan conflict tests China’s regional influence | East Asia Forum
South Korea
(Abhishek Sharma, Shreya Mishra – Observer Research Foundation) Amidst increasing global uncertainties surrounding trade and commerce, South Korea is exploring new markets beyond its traditional exporting partners—the US and China. In this quest, Southeast Asia has emerged as a viable partner capable of resolving Seoul’s strategic conundrums. While Seoul’s move towards trade diversification began a decade ago following a geopolitical tussle with Beijing, two notable developments have accelerated the shift: Washington’s imposition of ‘reciprocal tariffs’ and Beijing’s growing industrial capacity. Given this context, this piece examines South Korea’s trade relationships and the prospects of Southeast Asia as a sustainable alternative to the US and Chinese markets. – South Korea’s Trade Reset: Diversifying Beyond the US and China
