From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye.
Today’s about: Australia; China; G20-Global South; India; India-European Union; India-Russia-US; Indo Pacific; Kosovo-Türkiye-European Union; US-China; US-South Korea-Russia; Vietnam; Warfare
Australia
(East Asia Forum) Despite the trend of rising nationalism and insularity in many advanced economies, Australia continues to enjoy broad political support for globalisation and migration. With institutional, economic and political alignments that insulate trade from populist backlash, Australian leaders, should they so choose, have space to champion further regional integration through agreements like RCEP and the CPTPP. – The Washington Consensus may be gone in Washington, but it lives on in Canberra for now | East Asia Forum
(Anna Alexander – ASPI The Strategist) Australia’s Pacific ambitions will only be credible when proximity becomes part of policy design. Northern Australia sits at the centre of the Pacific, not at its edge. Yet, much of our national machinery for Pacific cooperation still operates thousands of kilometres away. The government has begun to recognise this geography. The appointment of Senator Nita Green, based in Cairns, as assistant minister for the Pacific and for northern Australia signals an understanding that these portfolios are intrinsically connected and belong in the north. Locating ministerial responsibility in Cairns is a start, but attention alone cannot shift the policy centre of gravity. Turning that signal into substance demands coordination across departments, institutions and delivery systems, not just political presence. – Northern Australia is central to Australia’s Pacific policy | The Strategist
(Marc Ablong – ASPI The Strategist) Despite our famed resilience against natural disasters, Australia still struggles to take catastrophic risk seriously. In this volatile security environment, the divide between short-term comfort and meaningful long-term preparedness remains worryingly wide. We must confront the ‘lucky country’ complacency if we are to be fit for an uncertain future. National disaster-preparedness documents, such as those in the Australian Disaster Resilience Handbook collection, acknowledge scenarios that ‘exceed our current arrangements, thinking, experience and imagination’. Catastrophes still overwhelm our operational and governance systems, and Australia’s responses remain reactive and fragmented. For example, while the government has many emergency response plans, they remain siloed, focusing on everyday emergencies rather than truly existential and catastrophic shocks. – Burying its head in the sand, Australia is worryingly complacent to catastrophic risk | The Strategist
China
(Mayuri Banerjee – Manohar Parikkar Institute) In a speech at the 60th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations (UN) in 2005, Chinese Premier Hu Jintao outlined, for the first time, China’s vision for global governance. Premier Hu’s speech titled, ‘Build Towards a Harmonious World for Lasting Peace and Common Prosperity’ had called for strengthening global governance to ensure world peace and common development. Two decades later, on the 80th anniversary of the UN’s founding, China, in a bid to “improve” global governance, released a concept paper for the Global Governance Initiative (GGI) on 1 September 2025. – China’s Ambition to Reform Global Governance – MP-IDSA
G20 – Global South
(Ruchita Beri – Vivekananda International Foundation) South Africa has hosted the G 20 summit at Johannesburg on November 22-23, 2025. The country took over the Presidency of Group of Twenty (G20) comprising of 19 large economies and two regional organisations, European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU) on 1st December 2024. This summit provides South Africa to carry forward the agenda for Global South as projected during the earlier presidencies of Indonesia (2022), India (2023) Brazil (2024). With South Africa hosting the first G20 summit on the African continent, it provided the country a platform to mainstream African priorities. However, the global geopolitical crises, downturn in United States- South Africa relations and absence of representation from United States at the Johannesburg summit presented a challenge. South Africa had to carefully work with the G20 partner countries towards a consensus to push the priorities of the African continent and the larger Global South. – South Africa’s G 20 summit: Another Opportunity for the Global South? | Vivekananda International Foundation
India
(Shailendra Gavade – Manohar Parrikar Institute) Major powers are increasingly employing sanctions and financial controls to advance strategic objectives. India must incorporate economic statecraft into its national security strategy and boost domestic capabilities to protect sovereignty in an increasingly contested global order. – Economic Warfare and National Security Strategy – MP-IDSA
(Gourav Yadav – Manohar Parrikar Institute) India’s semiconductor ecosystem faces systemic challenges that undermine defence modernisation and strategic autonomy. A defence semiconductor roadmap is required for India to address technological dependence and plug strategic vulnerabilities. – India’s Semiconductor Push: Defence Implications – MP-IDSA
India – European Union
(Amb Anil Wadhwa – Vivekananda International Foundation) The India–EU Free Trade Agreement (FTA), formally called the India–EU Broad-based Trade and Investment Agreement (BTIA), has re-emerged as one of the most significant trade negotiations in the global economic landscape. After years of suspension since 2013, the negotiations resumed in 2022, driven by mutual strategic necessity: India’s search for high-quality export markets and technology partnerships, and the EU’s pursuit of a resilient, democratic, and sustainable partner in Asia. By 2025, both sides have intensified their engagement, with the FTA seen not merely as a trade deal but as a strategic compact shaping global supply chains, green transition, and geopolitical balance. – The India EU FTA- Current State of Play; the Remaining Issues and Possible Solutions | Vivekananda International Foundation
India – Russia – US
(Shanthie Mariet D’Souza – Lowy The Interpreter) It may be no more than an annual ritual: the Indian Prime Minister and the Russian President meeting each other alternately in either country. However, the current geopolitical churn creates a special interest in Vladimir Putin’s impending visit to India, tentatively planned for the first week of December 2025, to attend the 23rd India-Russia Summit. He is expected to devote a large part of his meeting with Narendra Modi to finding ways to keep the strategic relationship alive amid New Delhi’s continuing attempts to arrive at a compromise trade deal with Donald Trump’s America. – Modi courts Putin with an eye on Trump’s disapproval | Lowy Institute
Indo Pacific
(Lisa Singh – Lowy The Interpreter) Much has been made of the ongoing demise of multilateralism. The rules-based international order is under strain and regional actors face no choice but to find solutions to respond to this contestation and uncertainty. They seek stronger collaboration with partners they can rely on who share the same commitment of peace and progress for the region. This was the focus of the recent ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) Forum led by Malaysia’s Institute of Strategic and International Studies, where I had the opportunity to discuss alternative ways of building convergence and collaboration to address shared challenges in the Indo-Pacific. – Quiet strength? Regional friends pitch for issues-based coalitions | Lowy Institute
Kosovo – Türkiye – European Union
(Elona Zhana – Lowy The Interpreter) The Western Balkans are often viewed through the prism of unfinished enlargement and frozen disputes, yet the region is increasingly shaped by middle-power activism. As institutions move slowly and the European Union’s focus fluctuates, regional actors with political agility are stepping into spaces where larger powers hesitate. Kosovo illustrates this shift: a small state navigating uncertainty by widening the circle of partners that can deliver visible, immediate support. By way of example, Kosovo’s president Vjosa Osmani this month described Türkiye as a “strategic partner and close friend” during a meeting with the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, TIKA. Taken in isolation, the phrase sounds like standard diplomatic courtesy. Placed alongside Ankara’s development projects, its operational role in Kosovo Force (KFOR) – the NATO-led peacekeeping mission operating in Kosovo since 1999 – and its increasingly confident regional diplomacy, the statement signals something more durable: Türkiye has become one of Kosovo’s most consistent partners. This is not a change in Kosovo’s identity or long-term aspirations but a pragmatic adjustment to evolving conditions. – EU processes move in years. Kosovo also needs partners who move in months | Lowy Institute
US – China
(Samir Tata – ASPI The Strategist) The United States should not kid itself. It will not recover its manufacturing position from China in any foreseeable future. According to World Bank data, in 2024 the US’s GDP of US$29.2 trillion was 60 percent larger than China’s US$18.7 trillion. But China’s manufacturing sector, worth US$4.7 trillion and representing 25 percent of the country’s GDP, was 60 percent larger than the US’s, worth US$2.9 trillion and representing 10 percent of GDP. Simply put, the economic calculus is daunting. – US can’t overcome manufacturing gap with China | The Strategist
US – South Korea – Russia
(Anthony V Rinna – East Asia Forum) Differing strategic visions in Washington and Seoul are reshaping debate over the US–South Korea alliance as Russia’s growing security ties with North Korea add new complexity to the Indo-Pacific order. With Moscow reasserting itself as a strategic player on the Korean Peninsula through a 2024 mutual defence treaty with North Korea, the allies must reconcile differing priorities on deterring North Korea, containing China and managing Russia’s long-term role in regional security. – The Russia factor in US–South Korea alliance planning | East Asia Forum
Vietnam
(Edward Park – East Asia Forum) The Mekong Delta faces a slow-burning crisis as salinity spreads inland, damaging crops and eroding Vietnam’s food-production base. Fragmented policy responses lack a clear understanding of what drives the crisis. Scientific clarity and basin-wide coordination are prerequisites for sustaining agricultural exports and preventing irreversible ecological decline. – Salinity intrusion threatens Vietnam’s rice bowl | East Asia Forum
Warfare
(R. N. Prasher – Lowy The Interpreter) The protracted and apparently intractable Ukraine war has given a clear lesson to weapon strategists worldwide – missiles in their present form as offensive and defensive weapons serve as a deterrent only when tipped with nuclear weapons. When these carry conventional warheads, their cost as mere delivery systems is prohibitive and unsustainable in a long-drawn war. Both Russia and Ukraine have been sustaining the hostilities mainly with drones, while missiles have made only occasional appearances. Ballistic and cruise missiles have been used, but the frequency of use has been falling due to high cost of replacements. Instead, drones have been rapidly repurposed to meet the needs of air and marine assault. Comically, expensive missiles have been used at times to neutralise these inexpensive drones. – Cheap weapons reshape the character of war | Lowy Institute
