From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye.
Today’s about: COP30; Georgia; MENA Region; Russia; Sudan; UK-Germany; US; US-Central Asia; US-Saudi Arabia-Middle East
COP30
(The Soufan Center) The 30th United Nations climate conference (COP30) concludes tomorrow in Belém, Brazil, against a backdrop of increased global competition surrounding critical minerals, mounting climate-linked instability, and an erosion of collective security frameworks. The geography of many critical minerals intersects with some of the world’s most unstable and volatile regions, making illicit networks and conflict a central part of the critical mineral supply chain. Climate-security implications extend beyond critical mineral supply chains and are evident in conflict-ridden regions and countries such as the Sahel and Sudan. The absence of an official delegation from the United States — coupled with President Donald Trump’s decision to once again withdraw from the Paris Agreement — has further deepened the departure of multilateralism. – COP30 and the Climate-Security Paradox: Strategic Competition, Fragile States, and the Erosion of Collective Security – The Soufan Center
Georgia
(Nino Lezhava – The Jamestown Foundation) In October, Georgia hosted the fifth edition of the Silk Road Forum, bringing together officials, organizations, and business leaders under the slogan “Invest in Connectivity– Grow in Stability.”. Attendees largely avoided discussion about geopolitical shifts, Georgia’s democratic backsliding, and political crises, instead focusing on technical infrastructure issues. By stripping politics out of conversations on energy and connectivity, the forum overlooked the forces shaping the region’s future. Georgia risks drifting to the margins unless Tbilisi restores strategic alignment with its Western partners and acknowledges the political foundations of connectivity. – Georgian Rhetoric Attempts Connectivity Without Political Change – Jamestown
MENA Region
(Colby Connelly – Middle East Institute) Across the Middle East and North Africa region, events in Q3 point toward geopolitical factors continuing to play a larger role in regional energy trade dynamics, with varying impacts across specific areas. Ostensibly helped by US efforts, the Iraq-Turkey Pipeline (ITP) reopened after more than two years of inactivity, reenabling oil exports from the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq after a long suspension. Yet in Israel, pressure by the United States has done little to move the government closer to approving a $35 billon deal that would see Egypt import more Israeli natural gas. This raises the question of whether developments in the Middle East are now testing the limits of the “Trump factor” and its ability to direct certain outcomes in the sector. With energy demand across MENA continuing to rise — and set to increase by as much as 50% over the next decade in the electricity segment, according to one estimate — energy security will be top of mind for import-dependent countries looking to avoid shortfalls. In Q2, the MENA Energy Recap highlighted continued momentum behind Gulf national oil companies (NOCs) and their efforts to make strategic acquisitions across the global oil and gas value chain. This trajectory does not appear to have slowed in Q3, even with what would have been Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) subsidiary XRG’s largest liquefied natural gas (LNG) acquisition to date falling through. While Gulf NOCs are clearly seeking to become much larger stakeholders in the global industry, new risks will undoubtedly emerge as they continue to advance this strategy. – MENA Energy Recap, Q3-2025: Gulf Giants Abroad, Fragile Deals at Home | Middle East Institute
Russia
(Paul Globe – The Jamestown Foundation) Russian employers are falling behind in paying their workers—with wage arrears increasing by at least four times over the last year—sparking strikes in industries including those related to defense. The number of workers not paid on time is nowhere near what it was in the late 1990s, when as many as 60 percent of Russian workers were paid late, but the increase since Putin launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine is attracting attention. Wage arrears are likely to continue to increase and spark more strikes. They appear unlikely to threaten the regime, however, because Moscow provides targeted cash infusions to keep strikers in one place from uniting with those in others. – Russian Firms Rapidly Falling Behind in Paying Workers – Jamestown
Sudan
(Andrew McGregor – The Jamestown Foundation) The Rapid Support Forces’ (RSF) capture of al-Fashir, accompanied by exterminatory extrajudicial killings after an 18-month siege, represents the militia’s most significant territorial victory to date and accelerates the effective partition of Sudan. With control over most of Darfur and parts of Kordofan and Blue Nile, the RSF is consolidating a parallel “Tasis State,” seeking external legitimacy despite its reliance on predatory militias and systematic abuses. The Sudanese Armed Forces–Transitional Sovereignty Council (SAF–TSC) coalition remains internally divided and constrained by Islamist-aligned networks, leaving both major coalitions dependent on abusive partners and limiting prospects for a negotiated national political settlement. – RSF Establishes Rival Government as Sudan’s War Spirals – Jamestown
UK – Germany
(General Sir Richard Barrons KCB CBE – Chatham House) The UK is finding it hard to implement its 2025 Strategic Defence Review (SDR). The review set out the depth and breadth of transformation needed to account for the most profound change to how armed forces are conceived, built and operated for well over 100 years. But money will take much longer to arrive than the risks the SDR identified will allow. Meanwhile, Germany is spending its way to becoming the preeminent conventional military force in Europe over the next five years – but so far without the kind of transformative ambition the UK aspires to. Both countries could do better. – The UK and Germany should combine their strengths to address weaknesses in European defence | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
US
(Chatham House) 48th Vice President of the United States Mike Pence visited Chatham House on 19 November to discuss US foreign policy, isolationism and MAGA, the ‘special relationship’, and the recent visit of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to Washington DC. During the event, the former vice president expressed concern about the sale of F35 fighter aircraft announced following the US-Saudi summit this week. ‘That’s the most advanced aircraft platform that we have,’ he said, saying the US must ‘carefully consider a transfer of that technology’ and take steps to ensure it does not become accessible to China. This was ‘a very real concern’, he added. – Vice President Mike Pence on US-Saudi summit: ‘very real concern’ on F35 sales; criticizes Trump’s comment on Jamal Khashoggi killing | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
US – Central Asia
(Alexander Kim – The Jamestown Foundation) The upgraded C5+1 summit in Washington, D.C., marked a significant elevation of U.S. engagement with Central Asia, focusing on economic partnerships, business deals, and commitments to deepen diplomatic ties. The United States has established significant mining and rare earth agreements with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. These developments are expected to intensify competition with Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). While the summit emphasized vital economic diversification for Central Asian countries, the region continues to maintain strong geopolitical connections with neighboring powers, as shown by Kazakhstani President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s recent visit to Russia. – C5+1 Summit Elevates U.S. Engagement With Central Asia – Jamestown
US – Saudi Arabia – Middle East
(Middle East Institute) In this episode of Middle East Focus, hosts Alistair Taylor and Matthew Czekaj sit down with MEI Visiting Scholar F. Gregory Gause, III, to analyze the policy implications of Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud’s (MBS) first visit to the US in seven years. What do US and Saudi officials hope to achieve from MBS’s historic trip? Gause breaks down how the kingdom has changed under MBS’s leadership and the prospects for a bilateral defense agreement between the US and Saudi Arabia. Gause also examines the evolving US-Saudi relationship and how the turbulent regional landscape is affecting Riyadh’s foreign policy calculations. – MBS’s Visit and the Future of US-Saudi Relations | Middle East Institute
(Steven A. Cook – Council on Foreign Relations) The extraordinary pageantry surrounding the visit of Saudi Arabia’s de facto ruler, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, to the White House raised expectations that the pomp would be matched by some of the economic and security agreements announced during the trip. They include the elevation of Saudi Arabia to the status of “major non-NATO ally,” an agreement to sell F-35 fighter jets and Abrams tanks to the Kingdom, and the Saudis’ pledge to up their investments in the United States from $600 billion to nearly $1 trillion. U.S. President Donald Trump also offered strong personal support to the crown prince, including an assertion he had no role in the killing of Saudi dissident and Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi in October 2018. But signs of progress on a major Trump administration regional priority—the signing of a normalization agreement between Saudi Arabia and Israel—were unclear. – How Significant Is the Latest U.S.-Saudi Embrace? | Council on Foreign Relations
(Frederick Kempe – Atlantic Council) Most headlines about Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s visit to Washington this week have focused on the obvious: cooperation on advanced chips, the Saudi purchase of F-35 jet fighters, one trillion dollars of promised Saudi investments in the United States, and President Donald Trump’s claim that his visitor knew nothing about the 2018 murder of Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi (contrary to US intelligence assessments). The more significant story, however, is whether the visit signals an enduring shift in bilateral US-Saudi relations and, over time, the Middle East’s regional architecture. Could a more robust US-Saudi strategic partnership provide scaffolding for a dramatic advance in Middle Eastern economic and security integration? If so, that would be a towering accomplishment built on the foundation Trump set down in 2020 with the Abraham Accords, which normalized relations between Israel and several Arab nations. If that possibility now exists, it’s in no small part because of the ambitions of two men: the seventy-nine-year-old US president, who has only three years left of his term, and the forty-year-old Saudi leader known as MBS, who came to Washington with a sense of urgency, though he may have decades of leadership yet before him. – Trump and MBS have big ambitions for the Middle East. Bold action must follow. – Atlantic Council
