From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye.
Today’s about: AFRICOM; Australia-Indonesia; China; COP30; India-European Union; India-US; Japan-China-Taiwan; South Korea-Australia; Sudan; US-Asia Pacific; US-Pakistan
AFRICOM
(Gurjit Singh – Observer Research Foundation) Established in 2007, the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) was mandated to coordinate the United States (US) military engagement across Africa by strengthening local defence capabilities, countering terrorism, protecting its interests, and supporting peacekeeping efforts. Traditionally, AFRICOM has worked alongside US civilian agencies such as USAID and the Voice of America and supported multilateral missions conducted by the United Nations, European Union, African Union, and regional organisations. Its operational focus included counterterrorism training, maritime security, intelligence sharing, humanitarian relief, and stabilisation efforts. However, under President Trump’s second administration, AFRICOM’s role is coming under significant reassessment. USAID operations in Africa were effectively discontinued in September 2025, leaving a major vacuum in development, humanitarian assistance, and governance support that had complemented AFRICOM’s security mandate. Much of USAID’s US$48 billion budget has either been terminated or transferred to the State Department, with limited clarity on implementation mechanisms. Although some global health programmes, including HIV/AIDS initiatives, have been restored, there remains uncertainty over who will execute and monitor them on the ground. This has diminished the US’s soft power, reduced its leadership in humanitarian and Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) initiatives, and placed greater emphasis on hard security tools such as AFRICOM. – AFRICOM under the Trump administration
Australia – Indonesia
(Emirza Adi Syailendra – Lowy The Interpreter) The last time Australia and Indonesia celebrated a security pact – the 1995 Agreement on Maintaining Security (AMS) – it ended poorly. The new Treaty of Common Security echoes that moment, but history reminds us: shared optimism can mask diverging interests. The AMS wasn’t born of strategic necessity; it was designed for optics. For Australia, then prime minister Paul Keating pushed it as an election-year gambit, a bid to look statesmanlike and cement his legacy. It failed. Indonesia’s president Suharto framed his approval as helping a friend, but it sidelined the Foreign Ministry. Implementation lagged, trust never solidified, and by the late 1990s, it was effectively dead. – Agency preservation drives the Indonesia–Australia security treaty | Lowy Institute
(Susannah Patton – Lowy The Interpreter) In the sunlit uplands of Australia’s strategic imagination, Canberra and Jakarta work together in pursuit of shared security goals, giving Canberra greater knowledge of and ability to influence security developments in the Indonesian archipelago. In a nightmare scenario, Indonesia is hostile, or collaborates with hostile powers, and disregards Australian interests. The reality, of course, will lie somewhere in between. – The Australia-Indonesia pact won’t shift the regional balance | Lowy Institute
China
(Kalpit A Mankikar, Amit Ranjan Alok – Observer Research Foundation) The 20th Central Committee’s Fourth Plenary Session, an important conclave of the Communist Party of China, was held in October 2025 amid palpable tension with the United States over trade and technology issues, economic challenges in China, and global conflicts. The plenum served as a political and strategic platform to assess the implementation of the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–2025) and to outline the vision for the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030). The communique released by the Party after the session reiterated that economic development remains the Party’s central task. Still, the quality, sustainability, and security of that development have become the principal guiding force. The communique also suggests the CPC leadership’s renewed focus on technological innovation and boosting self-reliance in line with the 14th Five-Year Plan, which is set to culminate this year. – Xi’s Blueprint for China’s High-Quality, Secure Growth
COP30
(Anusha Kesarkar Gavankar – Observer Research Foundation) COP30 marks a milestone for the ocean in global climate discourse. The Brazilian Presidency’s appointment of Marinez Scherer as a Special Envoy for Oceans and the adoption of the Mutirão approach, which emphasises “let’s all work together,” signal that the ocean is no longer a passive backdrop but a central actor in stabilising planetary systems. COP30 underscores that recognising the ocean as a partner in mitigation and adaptation is essential to safeguarding vulnerable coastal and island communities. Advancing the ocean-climate nexus has cross-cutting implications across multiple Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), including SDG 1 (No Poverty), SDG 2 (Zero Hunger), SDG 5 (Gender Equality), SDG 11 (Sustainable Cities and Communities), SDG 13 (Climate Action), and SDG 14 (Life Below Water). – Anchoring Climate Ambition in the Ocean: Lessons from COP30
India – European Union
(Shruti Jain – Observer Research Foundation) The European Union’s Deforestation Regulation, aimed at combating global deforestation, is set to commence in December 2025. It is likely to have a significant impact on trade and value chains across sectors such as agriculture, textiles and automobiles, especially for low- and middle-income economies. Under the regulation, traders of cattle, cocoa, coffee, palm oil, rubber, soy, and wood must clearly demonstrate that the commodities were not sourced from recently deforested land or contribute to forest degradation. Non-compliance with the regulation could lead to the confiscation of goods, bans on placing products in the EU market, and other monetary penalties. The regulation’s impact will be felt not only across Asia but also in Latin America and Africa. Some countries that would be hit hardest include São Tomé and Príncipe, Grenada, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ukraine, and Uganda. For India, its US$1.3 billion worth of agricultural exports to the EU is at risk of taking a significant hit. India’s exported products, such as coffee, oil cake, and leather, account for exports worth US$435.4 million, US$174.5 million and US$83.5 million, respectively. India faces a higher comparative market risk as it records a higher rate of deforestation compared to competing countries. India has experienced about 668,400 hectares of deforestation in recent years and ranks second-highest globally, after Brazil. – Tracing Sustainable Value Chains: Is India Ready for the EU’s Deforestation Regulation?
India – US
(Abhishek Sharma – Observer Research Foundation) In October, US President Donald Trump made his maiden visit to Asia, attending the ASEAN summit in Malaysia, followed by bilateral visits to Japan and South Korea for the APEC summit. His visit to Asia came at a crucial time, when many were questioning the Trump administration’s commitment to its Asian allies and partners. As the trip ended on a positive note for the allies, it left some lessons that may help partners like India, which want to strike a deal with the US. The initial US response towards Indo-Pacific allies and partners was quite similar, with no distinction between the two. However, after protracted renegotiations and increased pressure from China, US negotiators reached a deal. The agreement, concluded on the terms of the US, was a win-win deal for both sides. The US secured economic and security deals from allies, and in reciprocity, the allies received the US commitment to their alliance. This agreement reached between the US and its allies can be attributed to three primary factors. First, the allies’ contribution to the US manufacturing revival; second, enhancing the US’s mineral security; and third, deepening defence cooperation with the US to strengthen the regional security architecture. – Trump’s Asia Visit: Key lessons for India in securing a fair deal with the US
Japan – China – Taiwan
(Pratnashree Basu – Observer Research Foundation) The recent row between Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s new government and Taiwan-obsessed messaging from Beijing marks more than a diplomatic spat. In early November 2025, PM Takaichi told Japan’s parliament that a Chinese military blockade or use of force around Taiwan “could by all means become a situation threatening [Japan’s] survival,” thereby invoking the legal standard in Japan’s 2015 security legislation that would allow the Japan Self-Defence Forces (JSDF) to act in “collective self-defence.” Beijing’s response unsurprisingly was sharp but unreasonably crude. The Chinese consul-general in Osaka posted (and later deleted) a social media message stating roughly: “the dirty neck that sticks itself in must be cut off,” prompting Tokyo to file a formal protest. Beijing’s undiplomatic language underscores its reactiveness to any external commentary on what it deems a core strategic interest. China’s foreign ministry accused Japan of violating the 1972 Communique and demanded Tokyo cease interfering in China’s “internal affairs.” – Tokyo’s Taiwan Tightrope
South Korea – Australia
(Yeonsoo Kim – ASPI The Strategist) For South Korea and Australia, collaboration in advanced defence technologies offers strategic complementarity that enhances shared capability development. Such partnership could generate synergies to build a stronger regional security architecture and enhance deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. Defence-industrial cooperation among Indo-Pacific partners is gaining momentum as countries seek to strengthen collective deterrence and resilience. India and Japan provide a useful precedent: in November 2024, they signed a memorandum of implementation on the joint development and production of the Unicorn Mast for Indian naval vessels, their first co-development project. This tangible example of regional defence cooperation illustrates shared priorities and a collective determination to strengthen maritime deterrence and information superiority. – South Korea–Australia cooperation can fill defence technology gaps | The Strategist
Sudan
(Shravishtha Ajaykumar – Observer Research Foundation) In response to ongoing humanitarian crimes in Sudan, the United States (US), in January 2025, imposed sanctions on Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) leader Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan. The European Union (EU) followed suit by imposing sanctions on two entities and two individuals from Sudan —– Alkhaleej Bank [a bank owned by companies linked to Rapid Support Forces (RSF) affiliates], Red Rock Mining Company (a mining company that allegedly exploits Sudanese individuals), along with two RSF-affiliated individuals, Abu Aqla Mohamed Kaikal and Hussein Barsham—in July 2025. In this “war of atrocities,” where the RSF has been accused of murder, rape, and other war crimes, the US also alleged the SAF’s use of chemical weapons, particularly chlorine gas, against the RSF in conflict areas hosting civilians in 2024. The conflict in Sudan illustrates how war crimes, political accounts, and humanitarian crises can often overlap. The use of a taboo weapon, such as chemical toxins, is gross misconduct against the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). However, if verified, the denial of such chemical attacks can affect civilian trust in treatment and impede medical relief. – Chemical Weapons Allegations in Sudan’s Escalating Conflict
US – Asia Pacific
(Denny Roy – Lowy The Interpreter) As the prospect of a US-China military conflict hangs over the Asia-Pacific region, some analysts call for the American military to pull back. These include Jennifer Kavanagh, who advocated this position in The Interpreter last month. While not without its merits, this idea has some problems. Immediately at issue is where to delineate the new US defence perimeter. A complete abandonment of US forward deployment in the Asia-Pacific region – no more US bases, alliances, or “freedom of navigation” patrols – would remove the single greatest obstacle to expansionism by the People’s Republic of China, inviting increased Chinese bullying and likely raising the risk of multiple military conflicts breaking out due to China’s many disputes with its regional neighbours. – The paradox of US military retrenchment in the Asia-Pacific | Lowy Institute
US – Pakistan
(Vinay Kaura – Observer Research Foundation) United States (US) President Donald Trump’s two high-profile meetings with Pakistan’s Field Marshal Asim Munir in the White House in a short span of three months have attracted worldwide attention and raised many questions about the real motives behind this growing bonhomie. Indeed, the love-hate relationship between the US and Pakistan has been a characteristic feature of South Asian geopolitics. Although Washington’s latest engagement with Islamabad may be as cyclical, erratic, and transactional as the earlier ones, Pakistan’s westernised military, political, and economic elites appear elated with the sudden turn of events in their favour. While observers describe US actions as whimsical, it is evident that Washington—scrambling to construct a viable security architecture in West Asia—is hoping to use Pakistan to fulfil its tactical objectives in the region. – Trump and Munir’s Bonhomie and the Revival of U.S.-Pakistan Transactional Engagement
