From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye.
Today’s about: Afghanistan-Central Asia-Water Shortage; China; China-Taiwan; Europe; Georgia-Europe; India-US-China-Russia; Indonesia; Japan; Russia-Ukraine; Shanghai Cooperation Organization; Syria-China; Syria-Russia; UK; US
Afghanistan – Central Asia – Water Shortage
(Galiya Ibragimova – Carnegie Russia Eurasia) Water shortages have long been a serious problem in Central Asia. They will become even worse when Afghanistan completes a canal diverting significant volumes of water from the Amu Darya River for irrigation purposes. The lack of a water use agreement with the countries of Central Asia—particularly Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan—could end up increasing regional tensions. The Taliban government in Afghanistan began work on the Qosh Tepa Canal, one of its most ambitious infrastructure projects, immediately upon regaining power in 2021. Construction has progressed remarkably quickly since then, with almost half the planned 285 kilometers complete. The canal is due to be fully operational by 2028, when it will take as much as 10 cubic kilometers of water every year from the Amu Darya—about a third of its flow. – Afghanistan’s Qosh Tepa Canal Could Trigger a Central Asian Water Crisis | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
China
(Erik R. Quam – The Jamestown Foundation) Comprehensive national power (CNP) is a central framework through which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) measures its progress toward key strategic objectives. The ends the CCP is pursuing through building its CNP is a dominant position in a reshaped international order in which it has prevailed in an ideological competition with the West. The effort to establish a theoretical framework to understand CNP began in the 1980s under Deng Xiaoping, Considerable attention and resources were devoted to developing CNP theory from 1990–2015, especially under leading scholars such as Huang Shuofeng and Wu Chunqiu. This work initially took place outside of government, at the National Defense University and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, but today official measurements are likely conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics. Influenced by cybernetics and systems-of-systems engineering, PRC CNP theory frames CNP as a complex system with a large number of measurable indices. To this day, the Party-state appears to make precise calculations of CNP, including ranking the CNP of different countries. – PRC Conceptions of Comprehensive National Power: Part 1 – Jamestown
(Scott Singer – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) Last week, Beijing debuted its latest strategy for winning the AI race. China’s powerful State Council laid out an ambitious vision to rapidly diffuse AI into six key areas, ranging from accelerating scientific research and development to improving governance capacity. The plan sets striking, concrete targets that include deploying a range of applications across 90 percent of wide swaths of its economy in just five years. Think pervasive AI assistants embedded in most aspects of life, from manufacturing equipment to municipal services, or smart city infrastructure that can optimize traffic flows and energy usage in real time. China’s latest plan is part of a broader strategic bet. The PRC thinks it can integrate AI throughout its society to turbocharge its economy and secure AI leadership. It’s a playbook the country has used before. During the mid-2010s, China transformed its digital economy by diffusing internet applications throughout what Beijing calls the “real economy.”. But this time could be very different. Chinese leadership is confident in its AI development, but—perhaps counterintuitively—investors are not. China’s venture capital ecosystem is dry at this critical moment for AI, and as a result, Beijing’s aspirations are likely to fall short of the whole-of-society economic transformation the party wants. U.S. policymakers should mostly ignore China’s aspirational rhetoric and focus on what it can achieve in practice. – China Wants to Integrate AI Into 90 Percent of Its Economy by 2030. It Won’t Work. | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
China – Taiwan
(Martin Purbrick – The Jamestown Foundation) The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has increasingly co-opted Taiwanese organized crime groups—most notably the Bamboo Union—for its united front efforts, using them to promote unification with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and undermine Taiwan’s democratic institutions. Through figures like Chang An-lo and affiliated groups such as the Chinese Unification Promotion Party (CUPP), criminal networks are being leveraged for political influence, intelligence gathering, and psychological operations, often with tacit support or direction from PRC intelligence and propaganda arms. In response, Taiwanese authorities have intensified crackdowns on gang activity and pro-PRC influence networks, including efforts to dissolve CUPP and prosecute members linked to espionage, demonstrating a growing recognition of the hybrid threat posed by criminal-political collaboration. – Criminal Organizations as Vectors of Influence in Taiwan – Jamestown
Europe
(Emil Sondaj Hansen – Carnegie Europe) Just two days into the Danish presidency of the Council of the EU, the European Commission released its proposal to reduce the EU’s greenhouse gas emissions by 90 percent by 2040. While Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen has sought to manage expectations and declared that there will be no signature project of the Danish presidency, getting commitments that preserve the European climate transition goals would be a significant geopolitical achievement. With global turmoil, the U.S. President Donald Trump administration’s spoiling of the climate transition agenda, and increasing European domestic tensions crystallizing in part against the costs of the climate transition, the context isn’t helping. But if the EU were to cede its global leadership role on climate, it would be ceding one of its few levers to set itself apart from the United States as a different kind of global player. – The EU’s 2040 Target Is About Much More Than Just Climate | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Georgia – Europe
(Thomas de Waal – Carnegie Europe) Away from the daily headlines, Georgia’s rapid retreat from democracy continues apace. This fall could be crucial in determining whether and how Europe can push back and impose costs on those who are taking the country backward. Simply put, in what used to be a flawed but lively democracy, the ruling Georgian Dream party is entering full authoritarian mode and deliberately sabotaging the EU accession track Georgia embarked on a decade ago. Georgian Dream is getting away with it, in part because it is dismantling Georgian democracy, steadily but carefully. To deter pro-European antigovernment protests, the authorities have refined a new tactic that eschews a public display of force. Using Chinese facial-recognition technology, police identify demonstrators and hand out crippling fines of up to 5,000 laris, around €1,600 or $1,800, which is more than twice the average monthly salary in Georgia. – Time for EU Decisions on Georgia | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
India – US – China – Russia
(Michael Froman – Council on Foreign Relations) Over the weekend, Chinese President Xi Jinping played host to a leader-level meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)—a confab of leading autocrats and those they seek to draw close to them. Since its establishment in 2001, the SCO has not been a particularly impactful enterprise. Much like the BRICS, its convenings often strike me as grand salons for the axis of the aggrieved to make symbolic progress towards undermining various pillars of what has been the U.S.-led international system. This year was different: it appeared to mark a major step forward in Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s courtship of India and Prime Minister Narendra Modi—a symbolic if not a meaningful win, made all the more striking because they had the United States to thank for doing the heavy lifting. – Xi, Modi, Putin, and the New Geopolitics | Council on Foreign Relations
Indonesia
(The Soufan Center) Demonstrators protesting government corruption, economic inequality and creeping authoritarianism are rocking Indonesia, even as these are long-contested issues among the population. The police killing of Affan Kurniawan, a motorcycle delivery driver, while he was crossing the street, sparked this round of protests, bringing new elements into the protest coalition, including women and gig economy workers. Protests have spread across Indonesia, and some have turned violent, resulting in the deaths of 10 protestors. President Prabowo Subianto has labeled the violence “treason” and “terrorism” but has offered no clarity as to who is behind it. – Are Anti-Government Protests in Indonesia Gaining Momentum? – The Soufan Center
Japan
(Kazuto Suzuki – Chatham House) Japanese politics has entered uncharted territory. Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba shows no sign of resigning. That is despite suffering three significant consecutive electoral defeats: in October 2024’s general election, June 2025’s Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election, and the July 2025 House of Councillors election. The last result meant the ruling coalition lost its majority in both houses. This was a serious series of setbacks for his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). In late July many thought the prime minister would be forced to quit. But more than a month later, Ishiba shows no sign of taking responsibility and stepping down. Instead, the prime minister remains largely unchallenged. Leaders like Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, visiting Japan at the weekend, likely see Ishiba as a vital partner for the foreseeable future. Ishiba’s position rests in part on continuing public support for him personally. An August NHK survey found 49 per cent want Ishiba to stay as prime minister. A Mainichi Shimbun poll shortly after showed 43 per cent support his continuation. Why do so many Japanese citizens want Ishiba to remain in office, after presiding over so much failure? And how effective can such a weakened leader be, in a dramatically shifting international landscape? – Ishiba will likely hold on as Japan’s prime minister, despite his repeated failures | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
Russia – Ukraine
(Anna J. Davis – The Jamestown Foundation) Russian President Vladimir Putin has seemingly reversed the Kremlin’s position toward cooperation with the United States and Ukraine at the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant (NPP) on September 2 on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit. The Kremlin, until now, has been claiming that cooperation is not possible and the status of the plant is non-negotiable. Russian state nuclear corporation Rosatom, in the meantime, has been requesting cooperation with the United States since at least 2023 and has been waiting for Moscow to make the “political decision.”. While Putin’s new alignment with Rosatom may be a tactical move to strengthen Moscow’s position ahead of any potential talks or negotiations, Rosatom may have been influential in changing Putin’s mind, a possible indication of new influence on Russian nuclear foreign policy. – Putin Pivots Kremlin’s Stance Following Rosatom’s Requests on Cooperation with the United States and Ukraine – Jamestown
(Darya Dolzikova – RUSI) The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) remains on the front line between Russian-occupied and Ukrainian-held territory. As part of any peace agreement or cease-fire, the plant and the satellite town of Enerhodar need to be transferred out of Russian control. Leaving the ZNPP under Russian occupation will ensure that the plant remains an increasingly salient radiological threat to Ukraine and to Europe and will allow Russia to continue using the nuclear power plant to house military equipment and personnel. At the same time, ensuring the safety of the plant following a hand-over from Russian occupation will be a major undertaking; Ukrainian partners should be ready to assist. – Peace Negotiations and Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant | Royal United Services Institute
Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(Arran Hope – The Jamestown Foundation) The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is an increasingly important vehicle through which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) seeks to drive changes to the international system. This year’s summit focused on seizing the current moment to shape rules and standards in emerging frontiers, such as artificial intelligence (AI), cyberspace, and outer space. CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping used the summit to unveil the Global Governance Initiative—the fourth such initiative he has announced in recent years. While currently short on substance, it is symbolic as a statement of intent for shaping an international order in the Party’s own image. The SCO claims that it is not an anti-Western organization that seeks reform, not revision, of the international system. The Tianjin Declaration’s explicit and implicit criticisms of the United States, as well as SCO member states’ ongoing violations of international law in ways that undermine the current system, suggests that such claims are largely rhetorical. – SCO Summit Focuses on Shaping Emerging Frontiers – Jamestown
Syria – China
(Ahmed Aboudouh – Chatham House) Nine months on since the fall of Bashar Al Assad in Syria, China is yet to formally recognize the country’s new government, led by President Ahmed al-Sharaa. Beijing, a ‘strategic partner’ of the former regime, is particularly concerned about the prominence of Uighur foreign fighters within Syria’s security and defence structures. While Beijing has engaged with the new Syrian government via its ambassador, its concerns mean it will likely continue to act with restraint and may be hesitant to support any moves to lift the remaining UN sanctions on al-Sharaa and other officials. In turn, al-Sharaa is unlikely to clamp down on foreign fighters that make up an important part of his support base amid ongoing instability and conflict with other groups. This deadlock comes during a crucial month for al-Sharaa, with elections scheduled for mid-September before the new Syrian leader is set to address the UN General Assembly for the first time. In the long-term, it could also undermine Damascus’s hedging policy, aimed at avoiding over-reliance on the US. – Why China is hesitant to support Syria’s new government as al-Sharaa faces a crucial month | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
Syria – Russia
(Nikita Smagin – Carnegie Russia Eurasia) Clashes between Syria’s new Islamist authorities and the Druze minority in the southern Sweida province, coupled with Israeli strikes against Syrian government forces, have forced Damascus to reconsider its relations with Moscow once again. Back in the spring, the Syrian authorities were trying to push Russia out of the country. Now, while they still don’t trust Moscow, they are prepared to entertain the notion of expanding the Russian presence to counterbalance the Israeli forces. The large-scale clashes that broke out this summer between Islamists and Druze in Sweida demonstrated once again how precarious the position of the new Syrian authorities remains. This was the second major rebellion by an ethno-religious minority, following the Alawite uprising in Latakia this spring. The most recent escalation prompted an intervention from Israel, which came to the defense of the Druze and launched attacks against Syrian government forces. – The Rapprochement Between Russia and Syria Is a Temporary Necessity | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
UK
(William Dixon – RUSI) In 2015, the UK made the bold decision to establish a dedicated public-facing National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), bringing a fragmented response together under one single, empowered organization. This was a radical but necessary step, and now the 2025 Strategic Defence Review has identified a new top-tier threat: disinformation, a core part of state-sponsored hybrid warfare that requires the same ‘whole-of-society’ institutional response, which – as of yet – is absent. – Why the UK Now Needs a National Disinformation Agency | Royal United Services Institute
US
(Thomas J. Bollyky – Council on Foreign Relations) Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr. faced intense scrutiny during a Senate Finance Committee hearing (…), which was ostensibly convened to discuss President Donald Trump’s 2026 health-care agenda. However, the hearing quickly turned to concerns Republican and Democratic senators had with Kennedy’s vaccine policies and the recent turmoil at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). The abrupt firing of Susan Monarez as the CDC director last week, just a month after her confirmation, served as one of the focuses of the hearing, leading to allegations that politicization of HHS efforts had undermined scientific consensus. Concerns at the hearing also encompassed Kennedy’s broader overhaul of vaccine policy, which includes his decision to replace all members on the CDC’s Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP). – Why Stakes Are High in the U.S. Vaccine Debate | Council on Foreign Relations
(Walter Ladwig – RUSI) With the stroke of a pen, President Trump has ordered the Pentagon to be renamed the Department of War. It is a dramatic gesture, but one that leaves the US looking smaller, not stronger. He defended the change by noting America ‘won World War I and World War II’ under the old name and insisting that ‘we want offense too.’ But that outlook is precisely what alarms allies and emboldens adversaries: it signals that Washington defines itself by fighting wars, not by preventing them. The Department of War was a narrow institution, abolished more than seventy-five years ago because it was inadequate for America’s global responsibilities. Rebranding the Department of Defense under that name again does nothing to upgrade US capabilities, strengthen alliances, or dissuade adversaries. It is symbolism masquerading as strategy. At a time when America faces real defence challenges – from modernising its nuclear arsenal to deterring Russia and China – choosing to rename the Pentagon is a distraction that confuses rhetoric with readiness. – The Department of War Makes America Look Weak | Royal United Services Institute
