Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 1, 2025 (Jessica Sobieski, Christina Harward, Jennie Olmsted, Justin Young, Olivia Gibson, and George Barros – Institute for the Study of War)

Kremlin officials continue to deny White House statements about the prospect of a bilateral Ukrainian-Russian or trilateral US-Ukrainian-Russian meeting in the near future.
Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to demonstrate his unwillingness to compromise on his unwavering demands for Ukraine’s full capitulation.
The Kremlin likely timed the publication of a video address by former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych to coincide with Putin’s SCO speech in order to lend legitimacy to Putin’s demand for regime change in Ukraine.
Putin’s demands for regime change in his SCO speech are not new, but rather the reiteration of his pre-war demands that he has been pursuing throughout the war.
The Russian military command reportedly redeployed relatively “elite” naval infantry and airborne (VDV) forces to Donetsk Oblast from northern Sumy Oblast and the Kherson direction.
The reported redeployments suggest that the Russian Fall 2025 offensive will focus on efforts to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast, particularly in the Dobropillya, Pokrovsk, and Kostyantynivka areas.
Likely Russian GPS jamming affected a plane carrying European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on September 1.
Ukraine reportedly conducted its first strike with its domestically produced FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile on August 30 against occupied Crimea.
Ukrainian authorities reportedly collected new evidence of Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov endorsing war crimes against Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs).
Ukrainian forces advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces advanced near Kupyansk and Novopavlivka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 1, 2025 | Institute for the Study of War

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