Complex research (by Marco Emanuele):
Pensiero complesso, nel dubbio / Complex thinking, in doubt | The Global Eye
Laboratori di pensiero complesso / Complex thinking laboratories | The Global Eye
La (vera) politica è umano-planetaria / (True) politics is human-planetary | The Global Eye
I futuri che ci aspettano / The futures that await us | The Global Eye
Tempi duri per il pensiero / Hard times for thinking | The Global Eye
Distinzioni fondamentali / Fundamental distinctions | The Global Eye
L’assoluto della sicurezza lineare / Absolute linear security | The Global Eye
Disumanità / Inhumanity | The Global Eye
From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye.
Today’s about: Afghanistan-Russia; Armenia-Azerbaijan; Australia-Antarctic Region; Gaza-Israel; India; India-Africa; India-Brazil; Iran; Iraq; Middle East; Russia-Ukraine; Saudi Arabia; Sri Lanka; Sudan; Syria; US; US-China; US-India; US-Russia
Afghanistan – Russia
(Puspa Kumari – Vivekananda International Foundation) In a significant development in the diplomatic scenario surrounding Afghanistan, the Taliban has officially been recognised by the first country in the world, despite the fact that they continue to be surrounded by ongoing humanitarian crises, widespread poverty, lack of financial resources, and severe restrictions being placed on women in their country. In April 2025, the Russian Supreme Court decided to remove the Taliban from its list of ‘terrorist organisations’, a designation that had been in place since 2003. When the Taliban envoy Gul Hasan was appointed as the Taliban’s Ambassador to Moscow, this marked a complete shift in the relationship. It formalised the relations from intense informal engagement to a complete establishment of diplomatic relations, essentially endorsing the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The pragmatic and interest-driven approach that prioritises security, economic opportunity, and geopolitical influence over ideological considerations is evident in Russia’s changing policy towards Afghanistan. This bold policy shift may trigger a ‘domino effect’ globally, affecting at least 14 countries that already have diplomatic ties with Afghanistan. The Taliban seem to be ready to increase their economic and diplomatic relations with the rest of the world. – From Pariah to Partner: The Strategic Advantages for the Taliban After Russia’s Recognition | Vivekananda International Foundation
Armenia – Azerbaijan
(Narek Sukiasyan – German Marshall Fund of the United States) On August 8, Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev agreed in Washington on a breakthrough in the conflict-resolution process between their countries. Now, further diplomacy and mutual goodwill are needed to turn it into a lasting and sustainable peace for both countries. The joint declaration Aliyev and Pashinyan signed commits them to “continue further actions” toward signing a final peace agreement. On August 11, the two governments published its draft, which they also initialed in Washington. – A TRIPP Toward Peace Through Armenia’s Highlands? | German Marshall Fund of the United States
(Laurence Broers – Chatham House) The Armenia–Azerbaijan peace process has turned a new page following a trilateral summit between Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and US President Donald Trump on 8 August. Several documents – although not an actual peace treaty – were signed during the meeting in the Oval Office, hailed as a landmark in the convoluted negotiations between the two states. Their last war ended in an incomplete Azerbaijani victory in 2020, followed by a series of escalations culminating in Azerbaijan’s military takeover of Mountainous Karabakh in 2023 and the mass displacement of its entire Armenian population. Geo-strategic optics dominate discussions of the White House summit and its implications. Yet ultimately the de-securitization of Armenia–Azerbaijan relations will depend more on domestic political shifts away from ingrained conflict narratives. – US intervention opens new page in Armenia–Azerbaijan peace talks but challenges remain | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
Australia – Antarctic Region
(Enzo Nicolás Cardone – Australian Institute of International Affairs) Australia’s Antarctic presence—vital for science and climate security—has been overshadowed by other strategic priorities, leaving influence at risk. Without sustained investment and coordinated policy, Canberra risks ceding leadership in a region where geopolitical competition is rapidly intensifying. – The Forgotten Frontier: Why Australia Must Rethink Its Antarctic Commitment – Australian Institute of International Affairs
Gaza – Israel
(UN News) At least 100 children in Gaza have died from malnutrition and hunger, prompting humanitarians to underscore the need to speed up medical evacuations from the enclave while also allowing more food to enter. These young deaths are “the latest in the war on children and childhood in Gaza,” Philippe Lazzarini, head of UN Palestine refugee agency UNRWA, said in a tweet on Wednesday. The toll also includes some 40,000 boys and girls reported killed or injured due to bombardment and airstrikes, at least 17,000 unaccompanied and separated children, and one million deeply traumatised youngsters who are not getting an education. “Children are children,” he said. “No one should stay silent when children die, or are brutally deprived of a future, wherever these children are, including in Gaza.” – Malnutrition deaths mark ‘latest in the war on children’ in Gaza: UNRWA chief | UN News
(James Jeffrey – The Washington Institute for Near East Policy) In announcing their August 8 decision to temporarily “take over” all of Gaza, Israeli officials issued a set of principles for how Arab states could oversee governance of the Strip after Israel’s presence ends. Although these principles provided few details and no timeline, they clarified several important points, such as Israel’s desire to exercise some sort of security oversight, bar Hamas or the Palestinian Authority from governing Gaza, and demilitarize the territory. These conditions are not new, of course—Israelis have worked with Arab and American interlocutors on various “day after” models for over eighteen months, and some of these models have been discussed with Palestinian officials. Yet this is the first time that the Israeli government has taken a formal position on governance and linked it to a commitment to withdraw all of its forces. – How “Day After” Governance of Gaza Can Draw from Existing Plans | The Washington Institute
India
(Alisha Mehra – Observer Research Foundation) India is experiencing increasingly frequent and intense heat waves driven by climate change. A study released earlier this year identified a “high to very high” heat risk faced by 57 per cent of Indian districts, which house approximately 76 per cent of India’s population. In 2024 alone, over 40,000 heatstroke cases and 110 confirmed deaths were reported. The growing frequency and severity of heat disasters first prompted cities like Ahmedabad — and eventually other states and cities — to develop comprehensive Heat Action Plans (HAPs) as their frontline policy response. These were aimed at reducing heat-related illnesses and deaths through a mix of early warnings, public awareness, and emergency response protocols. While India now has over 100 HAPs, most still overlook the structural social vulnerabilities that shape heat risk. – Rethinking Vulnerability in India’s Heat Action Plans
India – Africa
(Ananyaa Mehta – Observer Research Foundation) In recent years, Africa has shown a growing interest in the development of Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) through continental-level efforts, such as the Digital Transformation Strategy for Africa (2020-2030), as well as numerous national-level initiatives. However, Africa faces a wide range of challenges that must be tackled efficiently and upfront. With India making substantial progress in DPI, this piece discusses how India can serve as a model for African countries for the successful large-scale implementation of such systems. Effective DPI implementation begins with a clear grasp of its three core pillars – digital identity, digital payments and data exchange systems – which act as a backbone for digital societies. The development of such infrastructure is important to Africa as it can facilitate sustainable development, economic growth, and job creation. Moreover, research suggests that the proper implementation of DPI can lead to a GDP growth of 20-33 percent by 2030 in low- and middle-income countries, making it an attractive investment. – India as a Blueprint for Africa’s Digital Public Infrastructure
India – Brazil
(Marco Antonio Rocha – Observer Research Foundation) The timing of Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi’s visit to Brazil for the 17th BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) Summit in July 2025 marked a critical juncture for a variety of reasons. Primarily, weaving in another Latin American country—Argentina—it signalled New Delhi’s intent to deepen strategic ties with the key Global South actors, aligning with its broader interests in advancing South-South cooperation. Second, the visit may have gained even more significance post-facto, given the 50 percent tariffs announced by the United States (US) on Brazil and its consequent desire to diversify. Finally, India and Brazil find themselves similarly positioned on most global issues, including the most urgent reforms of the global institutions. Given the intensification of conflicts around the world, the strain in the international order, which is marked by instability and a breakdown of multilateral consensus, perhaps it is the best time to strengthen the India-Brazil axis. The visit itself was a step in the right direction to achieve that goal. Keeping in line with the tradition, PM Modi engaged with members of the Indian diaspora upon his arrival, underscoring the importance of cultural and people-to-people ties in India’s foreign policy outreach. – India-Brazil Compact: A Guidelight for the Global South?
Iran
(Annika Ganzeveld – Institute for the Study of War) Iranian leaders face fundamental questions about their strategy and military priorities in the aftermath of the Israel-Iran war. They failed to deter US and Israeli strikes and to defend their airspace, giving Israeli forces the freedom to strike a wide range of critical targets across Iran. Iranian missile forces failed to penetrate Israeli air defenses at any significant scale, preventing Iran from imposing a serious cost on Israel for its strike campaign. These events represent a complete failure of Iranian security policy, which has long focused on deterring and defending against a conventional attack by the United States and Israel. Iranian leaders must now fundamentally rethink their military strategy, which could alter how they utilize the forces at their disposal. They could, among other things, reconsider the division of responsibilities between their two military institutions: the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and the conventional military known as the Artesh. Tehran has traditionally assigned its most critical missions to the IRGC, but could increasingly look to the Artesh in the months and years ahead, especially given how poorly the IRGC fared in the recent fighting. This report examines the order of battle of the Artesh Ground Forces to inform the public discourse ahead of any major changes to Iranian security policy. – Order of Battle of the Iranian Artesh Ground Forces | Institute for the Study of War
Iraq
(Hayder Al-Shakeri – Chatham House) While wars dominate headlines elsewhere in the region, Iraqis are battling a quieter but equally destabilising crisis. Climate change is drying rivers, upstream neighbours are cutting water flows, and the leaders of the country historically known as the ‘Land of the Two Rivers’ have failed to manage its most vital resource. This water scarcity is not only a national crisis but a growing driver of internal tension, fuelling displacement, deepening rural poverty, triggering major public health problems, and stoking unrest in already fragile communities. Iraq is facing its lowest water reserves in over 80 years, dropping from approximately 18 billion cubic meters last year to around 10 billion today. The impacts are visible across the country in different but equally damaging ways. In Dhi Qar along the southern Euphrates, more than 10,000 families have been displaced because of shrinking rivers and drying marshes. – Iraq’s water crisis: Dammed by neighbours, failed by leaders | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
Middle East
(The Washington Institute for Near East Policy) Weapons purchases featured prominently among the many deals announced during President Trump’s May visit to the Gulf, aligning with the U.S. leader’s approach to the region during his first term, when he eased existing restrictions on arms sales. In the interim, during the Biden administration, U.S. arms exports hit record numbers as wars raged in the region and beyond. The rising worldwide demand for weapons has been accompanied by competition among the major suppliers in the United States, Europe, Russia, and China. In the Middle East—home to some of the world’s largest arms importers—the jostling has only intensified, creating pressures and opportunities for Washington and its competitors. – Arms Sales and the Middle East: Another Arena for Great Power Competition? | The Washington Institute
(Avery Borens, Andie Parry, Ben Rezaei, Katherine Wells, Carolyn Moorman, Adham Fattah, Kelly Campa, and Brian Carter – Institute for The Study of War) Iranian Regional Influence: Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani’s visit to Beirut likely reflects Iranian efforts to recover Iranian influence in Lebanon and in the Levant after Hezbollah’s degradation and the collapse of the Assad regime. Larijani reaffirmed Iranian support for Hezbollah during his visit, likely in an attempt to bolster Iran’s declining credibility as a reliable partner. Larijani’s statements vowing support for Hezbollah are largely performative, given that Iran’s current constraints will likely limit any Iranian effort to meaningfully support Hezbollah.
Turkey and Syria: Turkey is likely encouraging the Syrian government to increase military and political pressure on the Kurdish-dominated SDF to integrate into Syria. The Syrian transitional government aims to bring all of Syria under its control and has its own motives to integrate the SDF—militarily or diplomatically—regardless of Turkish encouragement.
Iranian Nuclear Program: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told Israeli media on August 12 that Iran still holds about 400 kilograms of enriched uranium, though Iran may still be unable to access this stockpile. Iran cannot begin further enrichment or weaponization until it regains physical access to it. – Iran Update, August 13, 2025 | Institute for the Study of War
(Mohammed Baharoon, Alex Vatanka – Middle East Institute) As the Trump administration pushes to expand the Abraham Accords in the Middle East and into the Caucasus and Central Asia, it overlooks a dramatic shift in perception across the Arab and Muslim world. Where once Israel might have been viewed as David battling a Goliath-like Arab world, today the roles appear reversed. Israel, empowered by unchecked military might and unwavering US support, is increasingly seen not just as a regional power but as a US-backed regional hegemon. For Gulf Arab states, this transformation presents a dilemma: Can a Goliath be a partner in peace? The post-Oct. 7 military campaigns — spanning Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and culminating in Israel’s historic direct strike on Iran — have led many Gulf officials to conclude that Israel no longer seeks mere deterrence, but rather dominance. In their view, Israel has gone from acting like a status quo power in the Middle East to using its military might to overturn the regional order. If the Abraham Accords were in part about creating a unified front among status quo powers against the threat of a revisionist Iran and its so-called “Axis of Resistance,” key variables in that equation have now changed. The Iranian threat has been greatly diminished while Israel presents a new challenge of its own to regional stability, raising fundamental questions about the accords. – Gulf Arabs fear Israel is becoming Goliath | Middle East Institute
Russia – Ukraine
(Christina Harward, Olivia Gibson, Daria Novikov, Kateryna Stepanenko, Justin Young, and Frederick W. Kagan with Nate Trotter – Institute for the Study of War) Russian officials reiterated that Russia’s objectives in Ukraine remain unchanged ahead of the Alaska summit on August 15, once again demonstrating that the Kremlin remains uninterested in pursuing serious peace negotiations.
The Trump administration clarified that the United States will not pursue any agreements with Russia regarding a peace settlement in Ukraine without an immediate ceasefire and without Ukraine’s formal involvement in peace negotiations.
Trump reiterated US interest in facilitating future Ukraine-Russia peace negotiations and warned that Russia would face “very severe consequences” if Putin fails to engage in serious peace talks with Ukraine after the Alaska summit.
The Kremlin is using the Alaska summit to portray Russia as a world power equal to the United States and to posture Putin as an equal to US President Donald Trump.
Russia is reportedly preparing to conduct further offensive operations in priority sectors of the frontline and to resume limited offensives in southern Ukraine, particularly in Kherson Oblast.
Russia is simultaneously preparing to continue its long-range drone strike campaign against Ukrainian rear areas, which will likely result in further civilian casualties.
Russian forces have yet to reinforce and consolidate positions east and northeast of Dobropillya, and Russian and Ukrainian sources continued on August 13 to characterize the Russian penetration as consisting of limited, dismounted sabotage and reconnaissance groups.
ISW continues to assess that Russian forces do not control the territory east and northeast of Dobropillya where Russian forces recently infiltrated. ISW’s Assessed Russian Advances map layer does not differentiate between enduring Russian positions and limited infiltration missions.
Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups continue attempts to infiltrate Pokrovsk as Russian forces heavily strike the town.
The Kremlin is likely using the upcoming Zapad-2025 joint Russian-Belarusian military exercises to facilitate its nuclear saber-rattling campaign ahead of the Alaska summit.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and western Zaporizhia Oblast and near Lyman and Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Toretsk. – Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 13, 2025 | Institute for the Study of War
(Paul Conroy, Eloise Herdegen, Nate Trotter, Tetiana Trach, Sofia Walsh, Jennie Olmsted, Justin Young, and Kateryna Stepanenko – Institute for the Study of War) Russian law enforcement and the Ministry of Defense (MoD) may have coerced at least 20,000 Central Asian migrants to fight in Ukraine within the Russian military. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on August 1 that various estimates suggest that at least 20,000 Central Asia migrants are fighting in Ukraine. Russian and international human rights activists told Verstka that Russian law enforcement and the MoD are recruiting Central Asian migrants by threatening to annul naturalized Russians’ citizenship and deport their families; coercing migrants in prison to sign military service contracts; and fabricating criminal cases against migrants, such as accusing them of illegal drug trafficking and extremism. Russian federal subjects reportedly have been recruiting naturalized citizens by conducting raids on migrant communities and identifying naturalized citizens who have not completed mandatory military registration with the state. Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin notably stated on May 19 that Russian law enforcement detained 80,000 naturalized Russian citizens who did not register for military service and claimed that around 20,000 of these detainees are now fighting for Russia in Ukraine. Verstka reported that police have conducted raids in Krasnodar Krai and Moscow and Saratov oblasts to identify naturalized citizens who have not registered for military service, and that police coerced these citizens to sign military contracts and serve at the front using physical force. Russian officials and military commanders often mistreat Central Asian migrants and naturalized citizens without facing societal backlash, as these groups are legally and socially vulnerable in Russia. Verstka reported that Russian commanders send migrants to deadly assaults immediately upon their arrival on the frontlines and do not pay them as stipulated in contracts. Verstka noted that Russian legal services are often unwilling to help migrants and that migrants’ countries of origin also consider the migrants to be illegal mercenaries for their participation in combat operations in Ukraine. Recent Kremlin anti-migrant, military registration, and extremism laws likely enable the Kremlin to coerce Central Asian migrants into fighting in Ukraine at scale on false premises. Verstka reported that Russian law enforcement has unrestricted authority to coerce migrants into contract military service since the adoption of anti-migrant laws. Russian human rights activists told Verstka that the typical bribes to avoid military service increased from 5,000 to 10,000 rubles ($63 to $126) to around 50,000 to 100,000 rubles ($625 to $1,261). Russian human rights activists say that typical fines for failing to undergo military registration increased to at least 40,000 rubles ($501), though Putin signed a law on July 7 that increased such fines up to 20,000 rubles ($250). Putin recently signed a law on July 31 that expands the offenses for which Russian authorities can revoke acquired Russian citizenship, including extremism and “unlawful influence” on Russia’s information space. The Russian State Duma is actively expanding the conditions under which the Kremlin may revoke acquired Russian citizenship. The Russian State Duma adopted a law in July 2024 that forces recently naturalized citizens to register for military service immediately after receiving a passport. The 2024 law also specified that the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) will inform military registration offices about naturalized citizens who will soon be issued a Russian passport, and Russian officials have the power to revoke Russian citizenship from individuals who do not register. These laws are likely enabling Russia to intensify coercive recruitment of Central Asian migrants under threat of arrest and deprivation of Russian citizenship. – Russian Force Generation and Technological Adaptations Update August 13, 2025 | Institute for the Study of War
Saudi Arabia
(The Washington Institute for Near East Policy) Recent polling in Saudi Arabia offers reasons for concern as well as optimism regarding U.S. interests. On the downside, Saudi respondents are more likely to prioritize good relations with China or Russia as opposed to America, despite a history of U.S.-Saudi strategic ties. Likewise, enthusiasm for Israel-Saudi normalization has fallen from already-low levels amid the Gaza war, although support is slightly higher for business links. More encouragingly, respondents express negative views about Hamas, growing support for an Arab role in Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking, and increasing sympathy for moderate interpretations of Islam, mirroring the trajectory of Riyadh’s official rhetoric. In this Policy Note, polling expert Catherine Cleveland offers thought-provoking analysis of surveys taken shortly before Israel’s twelve-day war with Iran. U.S. policymakers can chart a productive course, she explains, by first taking an honest look at Saudi public skepticism of bilateral ties and then promoting initiatives more likely to earn support. – Saudi Public Opinion in a Changing Middle East: Great Powers, the Gaza War, Pathways for the Kingdom | The Washington Institute
Sri Lanka
(UN News) Sri Lanka’s Government has a “historic opportunity” to end decades of impunity and deliver justice for victims of past violations, the UN human rights office (OHCHR) has said, urging sweeping reforms to address crimes committed during and after the country’s civil war. The 26-year conflict, from 1983 to 2009, pitted Government forces against the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) – more commonly referred to as the Tamil Tigers – who sought an independent state for the island’s Tamil minority in the north and east. The civil war claimed an estimated 80,000 to 100,000 lives, and thousands more were forcibly disappeared, their fates still unknown. Hundreds of thousands were also displaced from their homes. The final months were among the bloodiest, with tens of thousands of civilians killed in indiscriminate shelling, extrajudicial executions, and other violations of international law committed by both sides. – UN says Sri Lanka has ‘historic opportunity’ to end impunity, deliver justice | UN News
Sudan
(UN News) The UN Security Council has rejected the Rapid Support Forces’ (RSF) declaration last month of a rival administration in parts of Sudan it controls, warning the move threatens the country’s unity and risks worsening the brutal conflict between the militia and forces of the military government. In a statement issued on Wednesday, Council members said the step posed “a direct threat to Sudan’s territorial integrity” and could fragment the country, fuel the fighting, and deepen an already dire humanitarian crisis. Ambassadors reaffirmed “unwavering” support for Sudan’s sovereignty, independence and unity, stressing that unilateral actions that undermine these principles jeopardise not only Sudan’s future but also peace and stability across the wider region. The Council called on the RSF and Sudanese Armed Forces to return to talks aimed at reaching a lasting ceasefire and creating the conditions for a political settlement involving all political and social groups. The goal, they said, is a credible, inclusive transition to a civilian-led government that can lead the country towards democratic elections and deliver “a peaceful, stable and prosperous future” in line with the Sudanese people’s aspirations. – Security Council rejects creation of rival government in Sudan | UN News
(UN News) UN human rights chief Volker Türk has expressed outrage over Monday’s deadly large-scale attack by the Rapid Support Forces militia on El Fasher, the capital of Sudan’s North Darfur state, which has been besieged by the RSF since April last year. At least 57 civilians were killed in the attack, which included the Abu Shouk displacement camp on the outskirts of the city, and UN human rights office, OHCHR, is also following up on allegations of summary executions there. “It is with dismay that we yet again witness an unimaginable horror inflicted upon civilians in El Fasher, who have endured over a year of siege, persistent attacks and dire humanitarian conditions,” said Mr. Türk. – ‘Only hunger and bombs’ for besieged civilians in Sudan’s El Fasher | UN News
Syria
(UN News) Humanitarians must be able to reach families affected by the “deeply alarming” recent violence in Syria’s Sweida region who need food and other basics to survive, the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) said on Wednesday. – Syria: UNICEF calls for safe access to children in Sweida as needs mount | UN News
US
(Ben Fishman – The Washington Institute for Near East Policy) Before leaving for the summer recess on July 23, the U.S. House Appropriations Committee passed a $44.7 billion budget bill for the State Department—$13 billion less than the previous year’s budget, but much higher than the Trump administration’s $27.5 billion request. Assuming the full House and Senate vote in a similar direction, it would mark a significant break from the White House—particularly given that the operations, management, and security portions of the bill are similar to the administration’s request, meaning that most of the restored billions are on the programs and policy side. Regardless of the raw budget numbers, however, extensive personnel cuts and the dissolution of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) will make implementing the bill extremely challenging even if it passes. – Congressional Funding Increase Not Enough to Strengthen State Department | The Washington Institute
(Brian Katulis – Middle East Institute) All eyes this week are on Alaska, where US President Donald Trump will hold a pivotal meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin to discuss ending the Ukraine war. But the United States remains consumed by several domestic issues, including continued strains over policing, immigration, and checks and balances inside America’s system of government. All of this comes at a time when Trump’s domestic political standing continues to slip lower, including among members of his own party. In this swirl of events, several unresolved challenges in the Middle East loom large, foremost among them the ongoing Israel-Hamas war and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s threat this past week to fully reoccupy Gaza. – Trump’s unpredictable diplomacy of distraction mostly comes up empty | Middle East Institute
US – China
(The Soufan Center) U.S. supply chain vulnerabilities related to rare earths came to the forefront during the escalation of the “trade war” between Washington and Beijing in the spring, which included a range of reciprocal measures. For decades, the Chinese Communist Party has cultivated a whole-of-government approach to securing its dominance in the supply chain of rare earths and other critical minerals, citing national security as its justification. The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) dominance of the supply chain presents a strategic risk to U.S. and allied countries’ national security. How well Washington succeeds in breaking Beijing’s chokehold on rare earth elements will have a significant impact on the strategic competition between the U.S. and the PRC. – The Race to Break Beijing’s Chokehold on Rare Earth Elements – The Soufan Center
US – India
(Chietigj Bajpaee – Chatham House) US-India relations are under strain. The Trump administration imposed a 25 per cent tariff on India on 7 August, followed by a further 25 per cent that is set to go into effect on 27 August. The two sets of tariffs are ostensibly about different issues: the 7 August tariff was imposed after the countries were unable to secure a trade deal ahead of a 1 August deadline, while the more recent one is a secondary tariff related to US pressure on Russia to secure an end to the war in Ukraine. However, together they reflect concerted pressure on New Delhi by the Trump administration that has taken some of the shine off what was a promising bilateral relationship. – Trump’s tariffs put strain on US–India ties, but relations will endure in the long run | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
US – Russia
(Steven Pifer – Brookings) Things change fast. On August 5, President Donald Trump’s imposition of new sanctions on Russia on August 8 seemed all but certain. On August 6, negotiator Steven Witkoff met with Russian President Vladimir Putin, and Trump proclaimed “great” (but unexplained) progress. On August 8, Trump announced no new sanctions but said he would meet Putin in Alaska. Putin will count the meeting itself as a major victory, for which he has paid little, and he will seek to trap Trump into embracing Moscow’s key demands for ending the Russia-Ukraine war. Trump can counter this by putting forward a strong position of his own. That would mean no agreement in Alaska, but it could set the stage for later progress toward a settlement. On July 29, Trump gave Putin a 10-day deadline to take action to end the Russia-Ukraine war. That immediately raised the question: was Trump serious this time? He set multiple deadlines in April and May. In each case, the Russians did nothing, and Trump applied no punitive measures. – Avoiding Putin’s trap in Alaska | Brookings
(Daniel Fried – Just Security) The Trump administration’s initial preparations for the Aug. 15 Alaska meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin appeared shaky. But the meeting could advance a lasting settlement of the war if President Donald Trump avoids Putin’s predictable traps, decides to ramp up the pressure on Russia, and makes clear that the United States will back Ukraine’s security. First, the bad news: when U.S. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff met with Putin in the Kremlin Aug. 6, he apparently mistook Putin’s remarks for a significant Russian concession when none existed. The United States may have arranged the Trump-Putin meeting on the basis of a false impression of Russian willingness to end the conflict on terms other than Ukraine’s effective surrender. Trump had been warning Russia to settle the conflict or face punishing economic pressure. But Trump dropped his latest deadline and turned to musing publicly about unspecified territorial “swaps,” and then criticized Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy for not accepting them in advance. Trump’s decision to impose additional tariffs on India for its purchase of Russian oil might have been a sign of pending pressure on the Kremlin to end the war, but the United States vitiated the potential impact of this move through inconsistent messaging. – Trump’s Meeting With Putin: Beware of Traps, Play the Right Card
