From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye
Today’s about : ASEAN-BRICS, Australia, Australia-China, India, Japan-Australia, Myanmar, New Caledonia-France, Philippines, Russia’s War of Aggression on Ukraine (and beyond), US
ASEAN – BRICS
(Pushpanathan Sundram – East Asia Forum) Southeast Asian nations are increasingly interested in the BRICS association, aiming to diversify their diplomatic and economic partnerships. But this potentially challenges ASEAN’s unity and centrality. While Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam see benefits in terms of economic growth, trade diversification, and access to the New Development Bank, the move could also lead to marginalisation and disadvantages for ASEAN countries not included in BRICS. Given potential complications for ASEAN trade commitments, this could shift the region’s geopolitics as Western nations may perceive the alignment as move towards China and Russia. – ASEAN members balance with BRICS as the world shifts | East Asia Forum
Australia
(Hugh Piper – Lowy The Interpreter) Australia faces the real possibility of a minority government following the upcoming federal election, expected to be called within weeks, with recent polling putting the combined primary vote of minor parties and independents at 28 per cent. Unable to command a majority in their own right in the 151-seat lower house, both major parties – Labor and the Liberal-National Coalition – would have to rely on support from minor parties or independents. Such a scenario is a departure from the norm: Australians have only elected one parliament resulting in a minority government since 1940, when the modern two-party system took hold. – Australia’s foreign policy in a hung parliament | Lowy Institute
Australia – China
(Sam Roggeveen – Lowy The Interpreter) The PLA Navy’s unprecedented live-fire exercise 640 kilometres off the south coast of New South Wales, quickly followed by a second such exercise closer to New Zealand, was provocative and deeply regrettable. But it does not call for an immediate aggressive Australian response, it does not show that the Australian government’s diplomacy is failing, and it certainly does not indicate that Australia is helpless as China’s military power grows. – How should Australia respond to Chinese warships’ live fire? | Lowy Institute
(Victor Abramowicz – ASPI The Strategist) China’s continued attacks on aircraft patrolling the East Asian waters, including Australian aircraft, are unacceptable. But they’re encouraged by the targeted countries’ failure to equip their aircraft for self-defence. Australia should rapidly equip its key maritime aircraft with Raytheon AIM‑9X Sidewinder air-to-air missiles. This would make Beijing think twice. Moreover, integrating the AIM-9X should be relatively straightforward and could bring Australia opportunities to help its friends in doing the same. – Sidewinders on P-8s and MH-60Rs: deterring Chinese attacks on Australian aircraft | The Strategist
India
(Sohini Bose, Sreeparna Banerjee, Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury – Observer Research Foundation) India’s Northeast has risen to the forefront of its foreign policy aspirations in the past decade. Composed of eight states and bordering five neighbouring countries, the Northeast’s geostrategic position was realised with the renewed thrust to its Neighbourhood First policy and the launch of the Act East Policy in 2014 that aimed to strengthen India’s ties with its neighbourhood in the east. The region is a land bridge between the rest of India and Southeast Asia, is the hinterland for Bangladesh, and is a transit territory for Nepal and Bhutan to access the Bay of Bengal. – Connectivity and the Northeast: Challenges to India’s Neighbourhood First and Act East Policies
(Diptendu Choudhury – Observer Research Foundation) The exploitation of the aerial domain and the leveraging of air power—with its capacity to rapidly adapt technology tailored to conflict dynamics—is a sine qua non of modern warfare. This is reflected in recent conflicts, whether in Russia’s extensive employment of air power in the standoff against Ukraine, Israel’s aerial attacks in Gaza and Lebanon, Myanmar’s military air strikes against anti-junta resistance, the Houthi rebels’ disruption of Red Sea traffic with drone and missile attacks, the Turkish air strikes against Kurdish militants in Syria and Iraq, or the recent Pakistani air strikes against Afghanistan. Adding to such instances of direct deployment of air power is its use for coercion and political signalling in all critical and potential conflict zones. China’s aggressive and escalating use of large combat aircraft formations to transgress Taiwan’s airspace, which has effectively erased the sanctity of the median line in the strait separating the two nations, is a key example. Thus, control of the aerial domain, both over land and sea, has emerged as a military security imperative—one that is no longer an air-force-only requirement but a crucial joint warfighting necessity. – Strategic Premises for the Future of India’s Air Power
Japan – Australia
(Eva F Nisa – Australian Institute of International Affairs) Australian beef and lamb are pivotal to Japan’s growing Muslim-friendly tourism industry, driven by the increasing demand for halal-certified products. While Ramadan and Eid are peak seasons for halal businesses in Muslim–majority countries, Japan’s unique position highlights the intersection of global food cultures, trade, and tourism, particularly within Tokyo’s evolving hospitality scene. – Australian Beef and Lamb in Japan’s Growing Muslim-Friendly Tourism Industry – Australian Institute of International Affairs
Myanmar
(East Asia Forum) Four years after the military coup in Myanmar, the conflict between the State Administrative Council military junta and the resistance, who now control up to half of the country’s territory, remains at a standstill. The junta hopes to regain credibility through new elections, posing a test for ASEAN members on how to deal with what will be perceived as a sham election. Despite pressures from ASEAN for dialogue towards the restoration of democracy and China’s brokering of peace agreements, the future could lead to the balkanisation of Myanmar. – Remaking Myanmar will be slow and painful | East Asia Forum
New Caledonia – France
(Denise Fisher – Lowy The Interpreter) New Caledonia remains a tinder box. Local divisions run deep between primarily European loyalist and mainly indigenous independence parties after a contested independence referendum in 2021 led to a standoff, which last year in May erupted into six months of violence. Enter Manuel Valls. The former French prime minister and now France’s Overseas Territories Minister is in New Caledonia this week in an effort to advance talks on an agreement about the territory’s future. Local elections are planned for November and the prospect of tensions easing appears remote. – New Caledonia: A troubled France seeks agreement about the future | Lowy Institute
Philippines
(Sasha Lee – FULCRUM) President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has shifted his stance from opposing to obliging a potential International Criminal Court arrest warrant for former President Rodrigo Duterte. The ICC probe has become a trump card in the Marcos-Duterte feud ahead of the midterm elections. – Leveraging Justice: Marcos Jr. Uses the ICC Probe to Challenge the Duterte Dynasty | FULCRUM
Russia’s War of Aggression on Ukraine (and beyond)
(Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Olivia, Gibson, George Barros, William Runkel – Institute for the Study of War)
US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff referred to the early 2022 Istanbul protocols as offering “guideposts” for negotiations between Russia and Ukraine on February 23. An agreement based on those protocols would be a capitulation document.
Ukraine is unlikely to accept any peace agreement based on the Istanbul negotiations as such terms are effectively a full Ukrainian surrender to Russia’s long-term war goals.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to demonstrate his commitment to preserving Ukraine’s democracy and a just resolution to the war.
Ukrainian officials continue to highlight Ukraine’s domestic defense industry and domestically produced strike capabilities.
Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev as Special Presidential Representative for Investment and Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries on February 23.
Russian forces launched a record number of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of February 22 to 23, ahead of the third anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24.
Russia appears to be relying more on Iran and North Korea to support its war in Ukraine.
Russian forces continue to execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in clear violation of international law.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.
The Russian government continues efforts to increase its defense industrial output. – Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 23, 2025 | Institute for the Study of War
(UN Security Council) Today afternoon, the Security Council will convene for a high-level briefing on Ukraine. The meeting was requested by Ukraine, supported by Denmark, France, Greece, Panama, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Slovenia, the UK, and the US to mark the three-year anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Rosemary DiCarlo is the anticipated briefer. Ukraine and several regional countries are expected to participate under rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure. – Ukraine: Briefing and Vote on a Draft Resolution : What’s In Blue : Security Council Report
(UN News) Monday marks three years since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, in clear violation of the UN Charter and international law, and the UN Secretary-General has renewed his call for de-escalation and an end to the conflict. – Ukraine: Guterres says ‘Enough is Enough’ as war reaches the three-year mark | UN News
(UN News) 24 February 2025 marks the third year of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the civilian population continues to face near daily-attacks. The UN staff living alongside them, enduring the same difficult conditions, have been a lifeline throughout the war. – Ukraine three years on: Pain, loss, solidarity and hope for a better future | UN News
(Andrew Maher – ASPI The Strategist) In the coming days, a slew of commentary will claim that the Russia-Ukraine war may well imminently conclude after three years, following peace talks in Saudi Arabia. Such commentary will be wrong. Regardless of what agreements the United States and Russia may come to, the war would likely continue; it would just evolve. The belief that a negotiated end to the war would stabilise the status quo is the same misconception as thinking that the war started with Russia’s invasion in 2022 and that it involves only Ukraine and Russia. It also ignores the opportunities for rebuilding that a break in conventional fighting would present to Russian forces. – Negotiations can’t end the war in Ukraine; it would just evolve | The Strategist
(Kateryna Stepanenko – Institute for the Study of War)
Russian President Vladimir Putin launched a coordinated campaign in late 2022 and early 2023 to prevent the emergence of an independent veterans-based civil society in Russia, likely out of fear that veteran groups could threaten the stability of his regime upon their return from Ukraine. The Kremlin launched several initiatives to co-opt loyalist veteran figures and form state-controlled veterans organizations in support of the permanent militarization of Russian society at the federal, regional, and local levels. The Kremlin seeks to silence voices capable of meaningfully objecting to the continuation of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine or questioning Russian government decisions. Putin is likely trying to avoid a modern analog to the veterans-based civil society born from the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. The Kremlin likely fears political instability such as what followed the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1988-1989. It is falsely framing its current initiatives to co-opt veteran life as preventative measures against the reemergence of “Afghan syndrome” — a popular Russian term used to describe the aftermath of the Soviet government’s failure to reintegrate psychologically traumatized Soviet veterans into Russian society upon their return from Afghanistan. It is thus using the cover of “preventing Afghan syndrome” as an excuse to prevent the emergence of civil society groups that could have credibility among the population as well as organizational ability but might not remain loyal to Putin himself or his decisions and actions. – Putin is Unlikely to Demobilize in the Event of a Ceasefire Because He is Afraid of His Veterans | Institute for the Study of War
US
(Ngaire Woods – ASPI The Strategist) After withdrawing the United States from the Paris climate agreement and the World Health Organization, President Donald Trump may pull the country out of more international institutions in the coming months. Notably, Project 2025—the blueprint for his second presidency, developed by the conservative Heritage Foundation—calls for the US to exit the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Rather than acceding to Trump’s demands, member countries should recognise that a US withdrawal would primarily harm the US and use that to negotiate on their own terms. – What if the US leaves the IMF and the World Bank? | The Strategist
