Rana Foroohar’s analysis for New York Times is very realistic. It is a reflection of ‘historical judgement’ that shows how the de-generational megacrisis we are experiencing is the result of decades of bad policy choices. Foroohar writes: Global institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank and later organizations like the World Trade Organization — groups that were essentially about connecting global finance, trade and business across borders — were influenced by these neoliberal philosophies. They vigorously advocated the Washington Consensus, a series of economic principles derived from the tent poles of market liberalization and unfettered globalization. These prescriptions generated more growth than ever before; the four years leading up to the 2008 financial crisis were one of the strongest global growth periods of the past half century. But they also created substantial amounts of inequality within nations.
We start here to emphasise once again the double face of neoliberal globalisation: while, on the one hand, it has enabled millions of people to live the conditions of a decent life, on the other hand, it has unsustainably increased inequalities within countries, raising the level of social discontent and acting on the credibility, in the eyes of voters, of democratic systems.
Another passage by the author is very interesting: Even before the pandemic and the war in Ukraine, the prices of the things that make us middle class — from housing to education and health care — were rising far faster than wages. That’s still the case, even with recent wage inflation. The sense that the global economy has become too unmoored from national interests has helped fuel the political populism, nationalism and even fascism (in the form of Donald Trump and the MAGA movement) that we are grappling with today. It’s a bitter irony that the very philosophies that were meant to tamp down political extremism did just the opposite when taken too far.
In essence, the disconnect between the globalised economy and national interests is not a good thing. If care must be taken that national interests do not radicalise into nationalism, the same interests must be considered and safeguarded. This is where our strategic reasoning lies: in order to avoid further dangerous forms of ‘autarky’, the relationship between the global and the territories must be politically rethought. The national interest can and must only be enhanced within the framework of ‘open societies’. It is on this point that, particularly in the last thirty years, politics has been fugitive.
Let us take up Foroohar’s analysis again: How can we make sure that economic globalisation doesn’t again run too far ahead of national politics? And how can we fix things in a way that doesn’t result in 1930s-style protectionism or a false fit of nostalgia for a bygone era? We don’t yet have a new unified field theory for the postneoliberal world. But that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t continue to question the old philosophy. One of the most persistent neoliberal myths was that the world was flat and national interests would play second fiddle to global markets. The past several years have laid waste to that idea. It’s up to those who care about liberal democracy to craft a new system that better balances local and global interests.
For us, balancing global processes and local interests involves rethinking globalisation into ‘glocalisation’. We need critical and complex thinking and ruling classes capable of working in the beyond that already belongs to our present. This is a structural perspective because today the problem is systemic, of the political-strategic sustainability of the world and worlds.
Italian version
Verso la ‘glocalizzazione’
L’analisi di Rana Foroohar per il New York Times è ben realistica. E’ una riflessione di ‘giudizio storico’ che mostra come la megacrisi de-generativa che stiamo vivendo sia il frutto di decenni di scelte politiche sbagliate. Scrive Foroohar: Global institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank and later organizations like the World Trade Organization — groups that were essentially about connecting global finance, trade and business across borders — were influenced by these neoliberal philosophies. They vigorously advocated the Washington Consensus, a series of economic principles derived from the tent poles of market liberalization and unfettered globalization. These prescriptions generated more growth than ever before; the four years leading up to the 2008 financial crisis were one of the strongest global growth periods of the past half century. But they also created substantial amounts of inequality within nations.
Partiamo da qui per sottolineare ancora una volta la doppia faccia della globalizzazione neoliberale: se, da un lato, ha permesso a milioni di persone di vivere le condizioni di una vita dignitosa, dall’altro lato ha aumentato in maniera non più sostenibilità le disuguaglianze all’interno dei paesi, alzando il livello del malcontento sociale e agendo sulla credibilità, agli occhi degli elettori, dei sistemi democratici.
Un altro passaggio dell’Autrice è molto interessante: Even before the pandemic and the war in Ukraine, the prices of the things that make us middle class — from housing to education and health care — were rising far faster than wages. That’s still the case, even with recent wage inflation. The sense that the global economy has become too unmoored from national interests has helped fuel the political populism, nationalism and even fascism (in the form of Donald Trump and the MAGA movement) that we are grappling with today. It’s a bitter irony that the very philosophies that were meant to tamp down political extremism did just the opposite when taken too far.
Non è cosa buona, in sostanza, il distacco tra l’economia globalizzata e gli interessi nazionali. Se occorre prestare attenzione al fatto che gli interessi nazionali non si radicalizzino in nazionalismi, gli stessi interessi devono essere considerati e salvaguardati. Qui si pone il nostro ragionamento strategico: per evitare ulteriormente pericolose forme di ‘autarchia’ occorre ripensare politicamente il rapporto tra la globalità e i territori. L’interesse nazionale può e deve essere valorizzato solo nel quadro di ‘società aperte’. E’ su questo punto che, particolarmente negli ultimi trent’anni, la politica è stata latitante.
Riprendiamo ancora l’analisi di Foroohar: How can we make sure that economic globalization doesn’t again run too far ahead of national politics? And how can we fix things in a way that doesn’t result in 1930s-style protectionism or a false fit of nostalgia for a bygone era? We don’t yet have a new unified field theory for the postneoliberal world. But that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t continue to question the old philosophy. One of the most persistent neoliberal myths was that the world was flat and national interests would play second fiddle to global markets. The past several years have laid waste to that idea. It’s up to those who care about liberal democracy to craft a new system that better balances local and global interests.
Per noi, il bilanciamento tra processi globali e interessi locali passa attraverso il ripensamento della globalizzazione in ‘glocalizzazione’. Serve un pensiero critico e complesso e classi dirigenti in grado di lavorare nell’oltre che già appartiene al nostro presente. Si tratta di una prospettiva strutturale perché oggi il problema è sistemico, di sostenibilità politico-strategica del mondo e dei mondi.
