Novanta minuti a Shenzhen: l’immagine che vale più della sostanza / Ninety minutes in Shenzhen: the image that’s worth more than the substance

(‘Pillola’ SIOI) Il 19 novembre 2026, a margine del vertice APEC, Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin e Xi Jinping si sono seduti per la prima volta allo stesso tavolo a Shenzhen. Novanta minuti di colloqui, un tavolo circolare, un allestimento studiato per presentare i tre leader come titani geopolitici. Al termine, nessuna conferenza stampa congiunta: solo una “China-Russia-U.S. Heads of State Declaration toward Peace” in quattro punti, pubblicata dalla Casa Bianca, dal Cremlino e dal ministero degli Esteri cinese. Il testo — riforma dell’ONU, aumento della produzione e dell’offerta di prodotti petroliferi raffinati, primazia del consenso statale e delle immunità dei funzionari, riaffermazione che “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought” — non menziona l’Ucraina, Taiwan, l’Iran né il commercio, e non fissa tempi o formato per il dialogo sul nucleare.

La lettura ufficiale di Pechino è trionfalistica. Xinhua titola che Xi ha “chaired” un summit “groundbreaking”, il primo incontro faccia a faccia tra i capi di Stato di Cina, Russia e Stati Uniti, e riferisce che il presidente cinese lo ha definito “positive, constructive and fruitful”. Xi ha articolato quattro punti sulla convivenza tra grandi potenze — rispetto reciproco, coesistenza pacifica, cooperazione vantaggiosa per tutti, dialogo e consultazione — ammonendo che “on major sensitive issues concerning one another, it is important to communicate in advance… and in particular, not to challenge the red lines of one another”. Ha poi aggiunto: “The Thucydides Trap is by no means a destiny”, e sui deterrenti nucleari ha usato un’immagine da manuale: “Nuclear weapons, the Sword of Damocles that hangs over humanity, should be completely prohibited and thoroughly destroyed over time to make the world free of nuclear weapons.”

Mosca ha scelto un profilo basso. Il portavoce del Cremlino Dmitry Peskov ha riconosciuto che l’Ucraina “was not central” ai colloqui a tre, precisando che Putin avrebbe tenuto una propria conferenza stampa separata — nella quale, secondo la BBC, ha sostenuto che Kyiv e l’Europa non siano pronte a compromessi, mentre la Russia proseguiva gli attacchi. La disparità dei toni è essa stessa un dato: la parte russa ha incassato il riconoscimento di parità senza esporsi sul contenuto.

Sul versante dell’analisi, la reazione raccolta dall’Atlantic Council è la più severa. Melanie Hart, senior director del Global China Hub ed ex senior advisor per la Cina al Dipartimento di Stato, liquida l’incontro con una formula netta: “The trilateral summit was all image, no substance.” A dominare, aggiunge, è stata “Beijing shaping the narrative”, di cui la dichiarazione post-vertice è lo strumento. Daniel Fried, Weiser Family distinguished fellow ed ex assistant secretary of state per l’Europa, individua comunque un segnale da non scartare nella riaffermazione del linguaggio già usato da Stati Uniti e Russia, che “counts as a modest advance in bringing China into nuclear-arms issues and could be something to build on”. Hart raffredda subito ogni ottimismo: “China is building its nuclear arsenal at a pace the world has never seen”, Pechino non ha alcuna intenzione di rallentare e “agreeing to empty dialogue is just another way to buy time”.

Il punto più controverso è il terzo. Gissou Nia, director dello Strategic Litigation Project e già impegnata nei processi per crimini di guerra e contro l’umanità presso i tribunali internazionali dell’Aia, avverte che la clausola “threatens the ICC’s very raison d’être” e “represents the starkest departure yet from the United States’ long-standing support for the protection and promotion of human rights and accountability”. La lettura è condivisa dalla stampa internazionale: per The Diplomat la disposizione — quattro clausole in tutto, una delle quali dedicata a rivendicare l’immunità dei funzionari dalla giurisdizione internazionale — appare tanto più significativa perché il 19 novembre la Corte internazionale di giustizia ha riconosciuto il Myanmar colpevole di genocidio. The Guardian osserva che l’enfasi sul consenso statale e sull’immunità dei funzionari “could be interpreted as a challenge to the legal basis for the ICC’s arrest warrant against Putin”. Asia Times, su una linea più conciliante, legge invece il vertice come l’apertura di una “great power peace dialogue”.

Sul quarto punto, la riforma delle Nazioni Unite, Hart vi legge una “initiative aimed at weakening Western values”; Nia fissa il criterio alternativo, chiedendo riforme che “promote and support accountability and ensure equity and equal voices among states”. Sul petrolio, Fried ritiene che il linguaggio adottato suggerisca che “the US will work to undermine sanctions and other restrictions on Russian oil sales”, in continuità con l’accordo sul diesel siglato di recente dall’amministrazione Trump con Mosca. The Conversation collega invece il punto energetico alle disruption dello Stretto di Hormuz e allo shock del caso Nvidia, leggendovi un’esigenza di stabilità delle forniture.

Nella lettura dei tre protagonisti, Hart ritiene che Xi abbia ottenuto l’immagine desiderata di “China presiding over the United States and Russia”, non solo come “peer competitor” ma “in the driver’s seat, with the US and Russia along for the ride”. Per Fried, la comparsa di un presidente americano accanto a due autoritari è stata “a missed opportunity for a US president to advance a US and free-world agenda”, mentre “Putin comes out ahead simply by being treated as a great power equal to Xi and Trump”. Nia vi scorge il senso profondo dell’operazione: “A shared desire from Trump, Xi, and Putin to shield themselves from accountability” e il ritorno a un sistema in cui “great powers and spheres of influence ruled the day”.

Il giorno stesso, a Berlino, si teneva la diciassettesima riunione della “Coalition of the Willing”, con oltre quaranta partecipanti e la presenza degli inviati americani Steve Witkoff e Jared Kushner. Volodymyr Zelensky ha rivendicato l’inclusione dell’Europa nei formati negoziali: “Europe will be represented by five countries plus the European Union and NATO.” Il cancelliere tedesco Friedrich Merz ha definito le richieste massimaliste di Mosca “not realistic”, mentre il primo ministro britannico Andy Burnham ha parlato di “a clear and consistent and united negotiating position”. Nella dichiarazione congiunta di Germania, Francia, Regno Unito e Ucraina, i leader “condemned Russia’s systematic escalation of its deliberate and indiscriminate missile and drone attacks”. Fried non ha dubbi sulla gerarchia delle priorità: “The US president should be backing that [Berlin] meeting, not scrambling for photo ops and flattering the aggressive tyrant Putin, who is no friend.”

Il quadro che emerge dall’incrocio delle fonti è coerente: un vertice che ha dato a Pechino la regia simbolica e a Mosca il riconoscimento di grande potenza, che ha messo per iscritto un arretramento americano sul terreno della giustizia penale internazionale, e che ha lasciato l’Europa a rivendicare un ruolo negoziale che il tavolo di Shenzhen non le aveva riservato. Vale la pena sottolineare che la reazione dell’Atlantic Council qui ampiamente ripresa proviene da un think tank dichiaratamente critico verso l’amministrazione americana: è una lettura autorevole, non neutrale, e va letta come tale.

English version

On 19 November 2026, on the sidelines of the APEC summit, Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping sat at the same table for the first time, in Shenzhen. Ninety minutes of talks, a round table, a setup designed to present the three leaders as geopolitical titans. At the end, no joint press conference: only a four-point “China-Russia-U.S. Heads of State Declaration toward Peace,” published by the White House, the Kremlin and China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The text — UN reform, an increase in the production and supply of refined petroleum products, the primacy of state consent and of officials’ immunities, a reaffirmation that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought” — makes no mention of Ukraine, Taiwan, Iran or trade, and sets no timetable or format for nuclear dialogue.

Beijing’s official reading is triumphalist. Xinhua headlines that Xi “chaired” a “groundbreaking” summit, the first face-to-face meeting between the heads of state of China, Russia and the United States, and reports that the Chinese president called it “positive, constructive and fruitful.” Xi laid out four points on coexistence among great powers — mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, win-win cooperation, dialogue and consultation — warning that “on major sensitive issues concerning one another, it is important to communicate in advance… and in particular, not to challenge the red lines of one another.” He then added: “The Thucydides Trap is by no means a destiny,” and on nuclear deterrence he used a textbook image: “Nuclear weapons, the Sword of Damocles that hangs over humanity, should be completely prohibited and thoroughly destroyed over time to make the world free of nuclear weapons.”

Moscow chose a low profile. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov acknowledged that Ukraine “was not central” to the trilateral talks, specifying that Putin would hold his own separate press conference — at which, according to the BBC, he argued that Kyiv and Europe are not ready for compromises, while Russia continued its attacks. The disparity in tone is itself a data point: the Russian side pocketed recognition of parity without exposing itself on substance.

On the analysis side, the reaction gathered by the Atlantic Council is the harshest. Melanie Hart, senior director of the Global China Hub and a former senior advisor for China at the State Department, dismisses the meeting with a blunt formula: “The trilateral summit was all image, no substance.” What dominated, she adds, was “Beijing shaping the narrative,” of which the post-summit declaration is the instrument. Daniel Fried, Weiser Family distinguished fellow and former assistant secretary of state for Europe, nonetheless identifies a signal not to be discarded in the reaffirmation of language already used by the United States and Russia, which “counts as a modest advance in bringing China into nuclear-arms issues and could be something to build on.” Hart immediately cools any optimism: “China is building its nuclear arsenal at a pace the world has never seen,” Beijing has no intention of slowing down, and “agreeing to empty dialogue is just another way to buy time.”

The most controversial point is the third. Gissou Nia, director of the Strategic Litigation Project and previously involved in war crimes and crimes against humanity trials at the international tribunals in The Hague, warns that the clause “threatens the ICC’s very raison d’être” and “represents the starkest departure yet from the United States’ long-standing support for the protection and promotion of human rights and accountability.” The reading is shared by the international press: for The Diplomat, the provision — four clauses in all, one of them devoted to asserting officials’ immunity from international jurisdiction — appears all the more significant because on 19 November the International Court of Justice found Myanmar guilty of genocide. The Guardian observes that the emphasis on state consent and officials’ immunity “could be interpreted as a challenge to the legal basis for the ICC’s arrest warrant against Putin.” Asia Times, on a more conciliatory line, instead reads the summit as the opening of a “great power peace dialogue.”

On the fourth point, UN reform, Hart reads a “initiative aimed at weakening Western values”; Nia sets the alternative criterion, calling for reforms that “promote and support accountability and ensure equity and equal voices among states.” On oil, Fried believes the language adopted suggests that “the US will work to undermine sanctions and other restrictions on Russian oil sales,” in continuity with the diesel agreement recently signed by the Trump administration with Moscow. The Conversation instead links the energy point to the disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz and the Nvidia shock, reading in it a need for supply stability.

In the reading of the three protagonists, Hart believes Xi obtained the desired image of “China presiding over the United States and Russia,” not only as a “peer competitor” but “in the driver’s seat, with the US and Russia along for the ride.” For Fried, the appearance of an American president alongside two authoritarians was “a missed opportunity for a US president to advance a US and free-world agenda,” while “Putin comes out ahead simply by being treated as a great power equal to Xi and Trump.” Nia glimpses the deeper meaning of the operation: “A shared desire from Trump, Xi, and Putin to shield themselves from accountability” and a return to a system in which “great powers and spheres of influence ruled the day.”

The same day, in Berlin, the seventeenth meeting of the “Coalition of the Willing” was being held, with more than forty participants and the presence of American envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner. Volodymyr Zelensky asserted Europe’s inclusion in the negotiating formats: “Europe will be represented by five countries plus the European Union and NATO.” German Chancellor Friedrich Merz called Moscow’s maximalist demands “not realistic,” while British Prime Minister Andy Burnham spoke of “a clear and consistent and united negotiating position.” In the joint statement by Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Ukraine, the leaders “condemned Russia’s systematic escalation of its deliberate and indiscriminate missile and drone attacks.” Fried has no doubt about the hierarchy of priorities: “The US president should be backing that [Berlin] meeting, not scrambling for photo ops and flattering the aggressive tyrant Putin, who is no friend.”

The picture that emerges from cross-referencing the sources is consistent: a summit that gave Beijing the symbolic direction and Moscow recognition as a great power, that put in writing an American retreat on the terrain of international criminal justice, and that left Europe asserting a negotiating role that the Shenzhen table had not reserved for it. It is worth stressing that the Atlantic Council reaction extensively drawn on here comes from a think tank openly critical of the American administration: it is an authoritative reading, not a neutral one, and should be read as such.

 

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