In partnership with
Australia
(Josh Rooney – ASPI The Strategist) At the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in May, Defence Minister Richard Marles described attacks on global subsea cable infrastructure as ‘historically unprecedented’ in scale and frequency. Since November 2024, vessels have severed fibre optic cables across the Baltic, dragging anchors for nearly 100 km across the ocean floor. Taiwan reported five separate incidents of seabed cable damage in 2025 alone. With roughly 99 percent of Australia’s internet traffic flowing through just 15 subsea cables, Marles was unambiguous: ‘These cables are, in the most literal sense, the arteries of modern civilisation.’ Australia is one of the most exposed nations in the world to this threat. The capabilities being weaponised against our critical infrastructure – more than just cables – are not just sophisticated legacy military systems such as submarines. They include uncrewed vessels, drones and other autonomous platforms that are commercially available, inexpensive and have proven devastatingly effective in modern conflict. – Autonomous, sovereign, ready: what Australia’s defence moment demands | The Strategist
Australia – China
(Tilla Hoja – ASPI The Strategist) Australian foreign minister Penny Wong didn’t just pledge valuable surveillance drones to the Philippines this week; she pledged technology made in Australia and the United States, not in China. This means a decision was made to ensure the most trusted tech would be used, even if it would be more expensive than the most widely available Chinese technology. Australia should be praised for such support for both the Philippines and regional security in the face of increasingly aggressive action from China. But the decision should prompt more people to ask why Canberra understands the need to provide the Philippines with US and Australian tech while permitting Chinese drones to operate across Australia. Australia, like so many Western nations, didn’t consider the consequences of allowing Chinese drones into the market before a Chinese company, DJI, undercut all other competitors. As with solar panels, if you have a drone, it’s likely Chinese-made. The question for governments is not about whether DJI drones should be banned – that drone has flown. It’s whether governments have a framework to decide which drone systems can be used by the public and which can be trusted for sensitive operations such as policing, emergency response and critical-infrastructure work. At present, Australia regulates where drones may fly but not where their data may go. – Australia is flying blind on Chinese drone data | The Strategist
Central Asia – Japan
(Wilder Alejandro Sánchez, Marin Ekstrom – Lowy The Interpreter) Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the two most economically developed Central Asian nations, are ambitiously expanding their commercial aviation infrastructure and fleets to make their airports and airlines more globally renowned. One of the key partners in these countries’ infrastructure transformation is Japan. Japan has long been a major donor of official development assistance for Central Asian infrastructure projects: JICA, Japan’s international aid organisation, was actively involved in modernising three local airports in the Uzbek cities of Samarkand, Urgench, and Bukhara, as well as reconstructing the airport in the Kazakh capital of Astana. Commercial aviation, however, is still a relatively new sector for Japanese investment and engagement and could put Japanese and Central Asian business interests on a more equal footing. – Tokyo’s runway into Central Asia | Lowy Institute
China
(Samantha Hoffman – The Jamestown Foundation) Draft revisions to the National Defense Mobilization Law seek to ensure that civilian enterprises and capabilities, such as artificial intelligence developers and cybersecurity firms, efficiently support national mobilization. They also call for the development of more advanced data services. The revisions are intended to make the system stronger and more operationally coherent, in part by taking advantage of technological developments from the past 15 years since the law’s passage
The proposed update would also reinforce the Party’s ability to manage supply chains and ensure that the needs of the mobilization system are met. This would occur through mandating supply chain security assessments, as well as through the standardization of data collection, processing, and exchange across civilian and military systems so that civilian technological capacity can be rapidly converted into military capability. – Draft Law Would Exploit Tech for National Mobilization – Jamestown
China – Indo Pacific
(Connor Graham – Lowy The Interpreter) With Papua New Guinea ordering Taiwan’s representative office in Port Moresby to close, a presence dating back to 1990 will end. Foreign Minister Justin Tkatchenko framed it as routine adherence to PNG’s one-China policy, timed to the 50th anniversary of PNG–China diplomatic relations. China’s foreign ministry “highly commended” the move, before reaffirming the “comprehensive strategic partnership” between China and PNG. Taiwan called the decision unilateral, stating it came without consultation or warning, and an unnamed spokesperson for the US State Department referred to it as “yet another example of Beijing’s intimidation campaign”. The sudden closure comes just days after the Pukpuk Treaty, Australia and PNG’s bilateral alliance, came into legal effect. Within a week of signing its most important security agreement with Australia, PNG has signalled to Beijing that the door with China remains open, echoing a pattern set by other Pacific nations as they too signed with Canberra. – Pacific nations reassure Beijing, Canberra’s treaties aren’t exclusive | Lowy Institute
(Bart Hogeveen – ASPI The Strategist) When Indo-Pacific democratic governments unite in publicly criticising China’s military provocations, the European Union should join – just as countries such as Australia and Japan do in response to Russia’s ongoing aggression. When a Chinese nuclear-powered submarine test-launched a ballistic missile from the South China Sea into the Pacific Ocean on 6 July, Beijing described the launch as routine. The response from the region was anything but routine. More than a dozen Indo-Pacific governments, including several Pacific island nations, publicly criticised the action – an unusual expression of such unity. On the day of the incident, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte was quick to say the alliance ‘cannot be naive about China’, and ‘what happens in the Indo-Pacific is relevant to what is happening in the trans-Atlantic.’ Yet, the European Union remained silent. By now, we know that democratic silence and good faith will get nothing in return from Moscow or Beijing. They will see this only as an incentive for more aggression and for sowing further division among democratic partners, regional alliances and cross-regional partnerships. The EU’s high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, Kaja Kallas, has had another chance this week to show that Brussels takes its Indo-Pacific security partnerships seriously: she could have called out aggression by the China Coast Guard against the Philippine navy on Monday. But she hasn’t. – EU, speak out about China. You owe it to the Indo-Pacific | The Strategist
China – US – Strait of Hormuz
(David M. Hart – Council on Foreign Relations) Earlier this year, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz triggered a perverse optimism in some quarters of the climate movement. The movement’s archenemy, U.S. President Donald Trump, had, in one fell swoop, accomplished its dream of raising the price of oil. Yet, the most surprising outcome of the Strait of Hormuz crisis to date is that the price has not risen nearly as much as many analysts expected. The biggest reason is that China cut its fossil fuel imports massively in the months since the closure. But that answer begs another question: Why would China, the global champion of clean energy technology, do that? Why wouldn’t it maximize the pain felt by fossil fuel consumers worldwide, thereby boosting the sales of solar panels, batteries, and electric vehicles—the “new three” export industries that President Xi Jinping has lauded—even if it had to pay more for its own imports in the short run? Many political analysts have proposed answers to those questions. China values stability generally. China wants to be seen as the adult in the room in global politics. China might want to do the Trump administration a favor in the hope of a reciprocal benefit in the future. China might even prefer continued Republican control of the U.S. government. – Evolution, Not Revolution: Why China Isn’t Pushing Its Cleantech Advantage in the Hormuz Crisis | Council on Foreign Relations
Nicaragua – US
(Juan Sebastian Chamorro e Maria Fernanda Bozmoski – Atlantic Council) Daniel Ortega’s move to abolish elections marks a new stage of authoritarian rule and challenges the US to respond beyond rhetoric. The Trump administration should apply targeted economic and diplomatic pressure while avoiding measures that would disproportionately harm ordinary Nicaraguans. Instead of outright military intervention, the US should help to organize a regional coalition to support democratic forces and counter repression. – How the US should respond to Ortega declaring no more elections in Nicaragua – Atlantic Council
Russia – Tajikistan
(Paul Globe – The Jamestown Foundation) More than 800,000 Tajiks have acquired Russian citizenship over the last decade. Most have taken advantage of the right to dual citizenship that a 1995 accord uniquely allows among the countries of the former Soviet space. This arrangement has limited Moscow’s ability to restrict unpopular immigration and is even changing the country’s ethnic mix. Dual citizenship simultaneously poses a challenge to Tajikistan’s independence from Moscow’s control. Some in both countries now want that arrangement canceled. The Kremlin remains largely opposed, since abrogation would represent a retreat from Russian President Vladimir Putin’s desire to maintain Russian influence in Central Asia and his drive to reintegrate the former Soviet space. – Nearly a Million Tajiks Have Taken Russian Citizenship Affecting Both Countries – Jamestown
Russia – Ukraine
(David Kirichenko – ASPI The Strategist) Throughout the Russia–Ukraine war, special operations forces (SOF, or SSO in Ukrainian) have conducted many raids and missions to probe enemy defensive positions. Examples include Ukraine’s use of SOF probing operations in Bryansk and Kursk in 2023 and 2024 before launching its incursion into Russia’s Kursk region in August 2024. At the same time, the drone war in Ukraine was rapidly accelerating. By 2025, Kyiv had established a drone wall, with virtually every part of the front monitored by uncrewed aircraft. Conducting manoeuvre warfare became increasingly difficult, and snipers and special forces operators also faced greater risks. – The war in Ukraine has dramatically changed special forces operations | The Strategist
(Richard Arnold – The Jamestown Foundation) Kremlin Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov’s admission that Russia’s “special military operation” (SVO) has become a “real war” marks a departure from years of official rhetoric and may signal that Moscow is preparing to escalate rather than negotiate. Reports that the Kremlin has resolved to intensify the war, expected mobilization after the September Duma elections, Peskov’s remarks, and a draft law requiring exit visas to prevent draft-age men from leaving Russia point toward this potential escalation. Should escalation proceed, Russia’s capacity to sustain it rests partly on an expanding Cossack mobilization network that is forming drone units, conducting reserve exercises, and building a reserve force expected to reach 60,000. – Kremlin Rhetoric Hints at Escalation – Jamestown
Türkiye – China
(Vusal Guliyev – The Jamestown Foundation) Türkiye and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are working to improve transportation logistics and infrastructure to advance trans-Eurasian trade and connectivity through the Middle Corridor and the One Belt, One Road initiative. Türkiye’s Pasifik ISR and the PRC’s Guangzhou Communications Investment International Train Operation Management Co. Ltd. signed a railway cooperation agreement on June 10. This is another step for improving multimodal transport infrastructure and reducing transportation costs between the East and West. Security crises in the Strait of Hormuz and Russia’s war against Ukraine have highlighted the vulnerabilities of maritime and northern trade routes. Overland transit channels that diversify risk and shorten delivery times via the Middle Corridor have become an alternative for Eurasia. – Türkiye–PRC Railway Partnership Bolsters Middle Corridor – Jamestown
US
(Jenny Gordon – Lowy The Interpreter) With one set of tariff measures set to expire, the Trump administration has reached for another. The latest switch – which has added to the burden put on Australia – reinforces that US tariffs are likely here to stay in one form or other. The US political climate makes it very hard for the US government to raise taxes, so the tariff revenue is just too useful, even if a large share of the “liberation day” tariffs have to be paid back because the Supreme Court ruled that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act does not give the executive the right to levy taxes. With no prospect for a major reversal on the US imposing tariffs, Australia’s policy focus should be less about weathering the US storm, and more on working with others to find calmer waters. As the Section 122 temporary tariffs allowed for rebalancing the balance of payments were due to expire, the Trump administration has reached for other levers to pull. Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act gives the administration the powers to impose tariffs on countries that they assess do not have sufficient laws to prevent unreasonable or discriminatory trade practices. – Here we go again – the latest in the Trump tariff saga | Lowy Institute
(Vinh Nguyen, Elham Tabassi, Kat Duffy – Council on Foreign Relations) Google DeepMind CEO Demis Hassabis published a framework on July 14 calling for a U.S.-led Frontier AI Standards Body. In it, he proposes that it be modeled after the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), the industry-funded, self-regulatory organization that oversees the brokerage industry under Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) supervision. Three days after Hassabis published his piece, Bloomberg reported that the White House is reviewing a proposal—developed with Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent’s involvement—based on this FINRA template. The good news is that the choice of institutional form was never the hard part: a FINRA-inspired body that reports to the SEC could be a reasonable answer to a real coordination problem. Under Google’s proposal, frontier AI companies would submit their models for review up to thirty days before release. Over that period, those systems would be tested for dangerous cyber, biological, and deceptive capabilities. The companies’ participation in this oversight process would begin voluntarily, then become a condition of U.S. deployment once the process has proven itself. But that still leaves much undefined, such as how this body would be financed, whether its access to frontier systems is guaranteed or left to a lab’s discretion, and how its findings might need to be classified. The design choices made to address these problems could decide whether this new body becomes an institution that regulators and the public trust for decades, or one that will need to be rebuilt after its first crisis of confidence. – The U.S. Is About to Design an AI Regulator. Here’s How to Get It Right. | Council on Foreign Relations
US – Saudi Arabia
(John Carlson – Lowy The Interpreter) The US–Saudi Arabia nuclear cooperation agreement has not yet been made public, but from what is known so far there are serious grounds for concern. This deal compromises both the non-proliferation standards that up to now have been applied by the United States, and the contemporary standard for International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards applied under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The US established the “gold standard” for nuclear cooperation agreements with its 2009 agreement with the United Arab Emirates. This provides that the UAE will not have uranium enrichment facilities within its territory and will accept IAEA safeguards including the Additional Protocol. In contrast to the UAE agreement, the US–Saudi agreement does not exclude enrichment. It provides for the two parties to undertake a two-year study into the commercial viability of enrichment in Saudi Arabia. If the conclusion is positive, a joint US–Saudi enrichment program is envisaged. This would be operated by the US on a “black box” basis, without direct access to sensitive technology by the Saudis (though it is inevitable they would acquire some know-how). If the conclusion is negative, it is understood Saudi Arabia would be free to pursue enrichment independently or with other partners after 10 years. – The US just lowered its own nuclear bar | Lowy Institute
(Steven A. Cook – Council on Foreign Relations) U.S. and Saudi officials signed a deal this week that would permit Saudi Arabia to build nuclear power plants on its soil using U.S. technology. The reported terms involve looser conditions on nuclear proliferation compared to other U.S. nuclear technology deals, including a 2009 deal with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), though the Trump administration says the Saudi program would face rigorous inspections. But just one day after its signing by the U.S. energy secretary, President Donald Trump conditioned approval of the deal on Saudi Arabia signing the Abraham Accords, which are U.S.-brokered agreements begun under the first Trump administration that have normalized relations between Israel and Arab nations. The announcement of the deal drew strong opposition in Israel, where officials have expressed worry of a Saudi deal spurring other countries to seek nuclear enrichment programs and a path to nuclear weapons. The fate of the deal is now unclear. – The U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Deal Set Off Tremors. Is It Still Alive? | Council on Foreign Relations
(William F. Wechsler – Atlantic Council) The US is shifting from traditional nuclear nonproliferation efforts (“Plan A” and “Plan B”) to a new “Plan C” centered on deeper nuclear cooperation with regional allies. A new US–Saudi nuclear agreement exemplifies “Plan C” by potentially allowing Saudi domestic uranium enrichment while expanding US commercial involvement. This new plan may be the most practical path forward, given that the ongoing conflict with Iran has increased concerns about regional nuclear proliferation. – With a Saudi deal, the US begins ‘Plan C’ for nonproliferation in the Middle East – Atlantic Council
(The Soufan Center) As tensions escalate between the U.S. and Iran, the Trump administration has sought to raise the stakes, announcing a new nuclear agreement with longtime Iranian rival, Saudi Arabia. The potential for Saudi Arabia to enrich uranium in the near future raises concerns about who follows — whether other U.S. partners will demand the same terms, whether Russia and China will match them with partners of their own, or whether it will ignite a nuclear power race in the region. Adding to tensions in the region, the Iranian proxy group out of Yemen, the Houthis, declared a naval blockade against Saudi Arabia and claimed attacks on two Saudi oil tankers transiting through the Red Sea. The Trump administration most likely chose to announce the Saudi nuclear deal now because it recognizes the critical juncture this months-long conflict with Iran has reached, and Tehran has seemingly made a similar assessment of the moment by activating the Houthis. – Deal or No Deal? Saudi Nuclear Pact Hangs in Balance as Regional Conflict Expands – The Soufan Center
War in Iran – Middle East – Gulf
(The Soufan Center) Lebanon has become a central arena in the battle between the competing regional visions of the U.S. and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Lebanese President Joseph Aoun, making the first visit to Washington by a Lebanese President in 17 years, sought President Trump’s help to both disarm Hezbollah and force an Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon. Coinciding with Aoun’s visit, U.S. officials announced the start of a pilot program under which the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) will gradually take over positions in the south that were captured from Hezbollah and then vacated by Israel. Through diplomacy and regional operations, Iran is helping its chief ally, Lebanese Hezbollah, resist pressure from the U.S., Israel, and Lebanon to dismantle its militia wing. – Lebanon at the Fulcrum of the U.S.-Iran War – The Soufan Center
Public Opinion and Foreign Policy
(Council on Foreign Relations) Public sentiment is something decision-makers must contend with, especially in democratic states. However, the extent to which public opinion shapes foreign policy varies. Three Council of Councils experts in France, India, and Nigeria reflect on how public opinion does—and sometimes does not—affect foreign policy decisions. – The Nuanced Relationship Between Public Opinion and Foreign Policy | Council on Foreign Relations
Hybrid Navy
(Jennifer Parker – Lowy The Interpreter) When the UK launched its Defence Investment Plan on 30 June, the government promised a “generational transformation” of the military that would apply the lessons of Ukraine’s fight to resist Russian invasion and equip Britain to fight the wars of today and tomorrow. For the Royal Navy, this meant a hybrid fleet in which frigates operate alongside uncrewed vessels above and below the surface, linked by artificial intelligence as a single force. This amounts to a blueprint for a hybrid navy, with fewer crewed surface combatants and greater reliance on large uncrewed vessels operating as part of a distributed force. For navies such as Australia’s, this may look like an attractive – potentially cheaper – answer to capability gaps. But looks are deceiving. Naval leaders from Australia to the United States have adopted the term “hybrid fleet” to describe their future ambitions. But the UK’s plan takes the concept much further, without first demonstrating that the enabling technology can deliver it. In doing so, it misreads the most important lessons of maritime drone warfare in Ukraine. The problem is not the use of uncrewed systems. It is the assumption that they can provide a cheap and reliable substitute for crewed warships operating far from home in harsh seas. – Uncrewed and untested: The wrong lessons for a hybrid navy | Lowy Institute
