Sources: ASPI The Strategist; East Asia Forum; Lowy The Interpreter
Afghanistan
(Muhammad Rizwan – Lowy The Intepreter) On a spring evening earlier this year, an object the size of a dinner plate flew in low over Rawalpindi, the garrison city that houses the headquarters of Pakistan’s army. Air defences caught it before it hit anything. But it wasn’t alone. The Taliban claimed credit for a number of drone strikes inside Pakistan, reaching from the alleys of Quetta to the outskirts of Islamabad. The machines involved were not much to look at: plastic frames, lithium batteries, and motors you could buy on a hobbyist website, the whole thing assembled for a few hundred dollars. Nobody in Washington or Brussels said much of anything. That silence is the story. Almost five years after the last American military cargo plane left Kabul, Afghanistan has become the world’s most ignored security problem. The country doesn’t appear in the latest US National Security Strategy. It hardly stands out in European capitals preoccupied with Ukraine, Iran, Gaza and migration policies. The reasoning, when articulated, usually goes like this: the war has ended, the Taliban are now in control, and whatever unfolds within that country is no longer our concern. This line of thinking is not holding up. – Afghanistan’s exportable threat | Lowy Institute
Australia
(Hangga Fathana – Lowy The Interpreter) Australia is trying to face outwards while parts of its politics are turning inwards. Its strategic posture remains firmly engaged with the Indo-Pacific. Support for AUKUS is steady, the United States alliance is still regarded as important, and majorities favour coming to the defence of several regional partners, including Indonesia. Yet beneath this confidence sits a more unsettled domestic mood. A record number of Australians say migration is too high, and support for cultural diversity has fallen sharply since 2024. This is the tension captured by the 2026 Lowy Institute Poll. The poll does not simply show how Australians feel about the world; it reveals how Australia’s regional ambitions are shadowed by anxieties at home – Australia’s unsettled settlement | Lowy Institute
(Natalie Treloar – ASPI The Strategist) The Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) should evolve into a formal cybersecurity regulator, with a role comparable in principle to what the Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA) does in Australia’s health sector. The ACSC would have authority to set minimum cybersecurity standards, certify high-risk products and services, investigate major cyber incidents, mandate remediation of systemic vulnerabilities and enforce compliance across critical sectors. It would be responsible for regulation, compliance, certification and public accountability, while the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) would continue to lead operational cyber defence, intelligence, and national cyber operations. – The ACSC should become Australia’s cybersecurity regulator | The Strategist
Australia – India
(Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan – ASPI The Strategist) Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s three-day visit to Australia last week delivered substantial outcomes, especially in the defence and security sector. Amid growing unease about relying on the United States to resist China, Australia and India are keen to see how they can gain strength from each other, much as Japan and Australia are increasingly working together. Examples of this appeared during Modi’s visit. Australia and India are framing new minilateral coalitions to maximise their strategic options. Where the two will land is not entirely certain because of the limitations of their material power, but they stand a better chance if they work in unison with other Asian partners, such as Indonesia and New Zealand. Unsurprisingly, these were the other two countries that Modi visited last week. – Modi’s visit: Australia, India seek to gain strength from each other | The Strategist
Japan
(Yan Shot – East Asia Forum) After the Liberal Democratic Party’s landslide victory in Japan’s 2026 snap election, faction-like ‘political groups’ have become increasingly active. Many are organised around members of factions dissolved after the 2023–24 slush-fund scandal. Their revival reflects both structural pressures and immediate political calculations, including preparation for the 2027 LDP presidential race, training for new lawmakers and competition for access to Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi. The trend suggests factionalism has re-emerged without fully addressing money in politics. – Japan’s LDP drifts back toward old factional habits | East Asia Forum
Quad
(Titli Basu – East Asia Forum) The Quad’s ambitions have outpaced its ability to deliver tangible outcomes. As US–China relations move towards managed competition, the grouping’s relevance depends less on strategic signalling and more on credible, scalable delivery that strengthens Indo-Pacific resilience. While it has generated a range of initiatives, the central challenge is turning agenda-setting into sustained implementation and demonstrating operational effectiveness across its widening portfolio. – Quad’s relevance now depends on delivery | East Asia Forum
Thailand – ASEAN – Myanmar
(William J Jones – East Asia Forum) Thailand under Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul has emerged as a key proponent of pragmatic re-engagement with Myanmar, proposing a two-pronged strategy centred on the ASEAN chair, envoy and Troika, and a framework of regionalism, relevance and resilience. While ASEAN remains rhetorically committed to its fractured Five-Point Consensus, some member states are gradually shifting towards normalisation. Thailand’s approach offers a pragmatic path for restoring diplomatic engagement with Myanmar ahead of its 2028 ASEAN chairmanship. – Bangkok seeks to spearhead ASEAN re-engagement with Myanmar | East Asia Forum
UK – China
(Zeno Leoni – East Asia Forum) UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s 2026 visit to China reflected bipartisan recognition that engagement with Beijing is unavoidable despite persistent concerns over security, human rights and strategic dependence. London is constrained by domestic political pressures and the United Kingdom’s close alignment with the United States through NATO, Five Eyes and AUKUS. But the Labour government’s approach seeks to balance economic cooperation with a more ‘clear-eyed’ stance on competition and values. Rather than reviving the ‘Golden Era’ of bilateral ties, London’s diplomatic posture prioritises pragmatic, incremental engagement while acknowledging that no China policy can fully reconcile economic interests, security concerns and normative commitments. – UK China policy is a necessary compromise | East Asia Forum
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