Sources: ASPI The Strategist; Chatham House; Council on Foreign Relations; East Asia Forum; Lowy The Interpreter; RUSI; The Jamestown Foundation
Afghanistan
(Muhammad Rizwan – Lowy The Intepreter) On a spring evening earlier this year, an object the size of a dinner plate flew in low over Rawalpindi, the garrison city that houses the headquarters of Pakistan’s army. Air defences caught it before it hit anything. But it wasn’t alone. The Taliban claimed credit for a number of drone strikes inside Pakistan, reaching from the alleys of Quetta to the outskirts of Islamabad. The machines involved were not much to look at: plastic frames, lithium batteries, and motors you could buy on a hobbyist website, the whole thing assembled for a few hundred dollars. Nobody in Washington or Brussels said much of anything. That silence is the story. Almost five years after the last American military cargo plane left Kabul, Afghanistan has become the world’s most ignored security problem. The country doesn’t appear in the latest US National Security Strategy. It hardly stands out in European capitals preoccupied with Ukraine, Iran, Gaza and migration policies. The reasoning, when articulated, usually goes like this: the war has ended, the Taliban are now in control, and whatever unfolds within that country is no longer our concern. This line of thinking is not holding up. – Afghanistan’s exportable threat | Lowy Institute
Australia
(Hangga Fathana – Lowy The Interpreter) Australia is trying to face outwards while parts of its politics are turning inwards. Its strategic posture remains firmly engaged with the Indo-Pacific. Support for AUKUS is steady, the United States alliance is still regarded as important, and majorities favour coming to the defence of several regional partners, including Indonesia. Yet beneath this confidence sits a more unsettled domestic mood. A record number of Australians say migration is too high, and support for cultural diversity has fallen sharply since 2024. This is the tension captured by the 2026 Lowy Institute Poll. The poll does not simply show how Australians feel about the world; it reveals how Australia’s regional ambitions are shadowed by anxieties at home – Australia’s unsettled settlement | Lowy Institute
(Natalie Treloar – ASPI The Strategist) The Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) should evolve into a formal cybersecurity regulator, with a role comparable in principle to what the Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA) does in Australia’s health sector. The ACSC would have authority to set minimum cybersecurity standards, certify high-risk products and services, investigate major cyber incidents, mandate remediation of systemic vulnerabilities and enforce compliance across critical sectors. It would be responsible for regulation, compliance, certification and public accountability, while the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) would continue to lead operational cyber defence, intelligence, and national cyber operations. – The ACSC should become Australia’s cybersecurity regulator | The Strategist
Australia – India
(Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan – ASPI The Strategist) Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s three-day visit to Australia last week delivered substantial outcomes, especially in the defence and security sector. Amid growing unease about relying on the United States to resist China, Australia and India are keen to see how they can gain strength from each other, much as Japan and Australia are increasingly working together. Examples of this appeared during Modi’s visit. Australia and India are framing new minilateral coalitions to maximise their strategic options. Where the two will land is not entirely certain because of the limitations of their material power, but they stand a better chance if they work in unison with other Asian partners, such as Indonesia and New Zealand. Unsurprisingly, these were the other two countries that Modi visited last week. – Modi’s visit: Australia, India seek to gain strength from each other | The Strategist
Climate Diplomacy
(Beatrice Mosello, Pelin Zorlu – Chatham House) As much of Europe emerged from a record-breaking heatwave that closed schools, disrupted businesses and exposed the limits of adaptation even in some of the world’s wealthiest economies, London Climate Action Week (LCAW) took on particular salience. While the impacts of climate change were unfolding in real time, more than 75,000 participants from across the world attended over 1,300 events to debate the future of global climate action. The central takeaway was not simply renewed urgency. It was that climate diplomacy is changing shape and that climate action is happening. In recent years, many have questioned the effectiveness of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The slow pace of consensus-based negotiations and the limited progress made at its annual COP summits have led some to argue that climate multilateralism is dead, or at least on life support. – Climate diplomacy has gone freelance. Multilateralism must adapt, not disappear | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
Georgia – Iran
(Giorgi Menabde – The Jamestown Foundation) Georgian President Mikheil Kavelashvili traveled to Tehran on July 3 to attend the funeral of Iran’s late Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and met with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian. The visit has divided Georgia’s political class, with critics arguing that the delegation’s rank and the attendance itself turned a condolence gesture into a political statement against Georgia’s Western partners. Supporters frame the trip as balanced diplomacy toward a neighboring power under explicit Iranian pressure, while opponents warn that deepening ties with Tehran risks isolation, the expansion of sanctions-evasion channels, and lasting damage to Georgia’s international reputation and constitutionally mandated Euro-Atlantic course. – Georgia Weighs Diplomatic Cost of Mourning Khamenei – Jamestown
Japan
(Yan Shot – East Asia Forum) After the Liberal Democratic Party’s landslide victory in Japan’s 2026 snap election, faction-like ‘political groups’ have become increasingly active. Many are organised around members of factions dissolved after the 2023–24 slush-fund scandal. Their revival reflects both structural pressures and immediate political calculations, including preparation for the 2027 LDP presidential race, training for new lawmakers and competition for access to Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi. The trend suggests factionalism has re-emerged without fully addressing money in politics. – Japan’s LDP drifts back toward old factional habits | East Asia Forum
Peru and Colombia
(Luis Miguel Castilla – Chatham House) In the space of two weeks in June, two Andean countries elected new right-wing governments. In Peru, Keiko Fujimori, leader of its largest congressional party, won the presidency on her fourth attempt. In Colombia, Abelardo de la Espriella, a criminal defence lawyer running for office for the first time, defeated Iván Cepeda, a senator of the governing left. Fujimori will take office later this month, de la Espriella in August. It is tempting to interpret these outcomes as part of a regional swing to the right, aligned with US President Donald Trump – and it is often reported as such. However, the deeper story is one of persistently divided societies: in Peru and Colombia electorates were split almost exactly in half. Fujimori’s margin of victory was so narrow that the count stretched on for days. De la Espriella won by 49.7 per cent to 48.7. Indeed, the UNDP’s 2026 regional report finds that political polarization in Latin America has grown faster than in any other region and now exceeds the global average. This raises an important question. When mandates are this thin and political antagonism this deep, can election winners govern? – New leaders in Peru and Colombia may find it hard to deliver on their promises | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
Quad
(Titli Basu – East Asia Forum) The Quad’s ambitions have outpaced its ability to deliver tangible outcomes. As US–China relations move towards managed competition, the grouping’s relevance depends less on strategic signalling and more on credible, scalable delivery that strengthens Indo-Pacific resilience. While it has generated a range of initiatives, the central challenge is turning agenda-setting into sustained implementation and demonstrating operational effectiveness across its widening portfolio. – Quad’s relevance now depends on delivery | East Asia Forum
Russia
(Maksym Beznosiuk – The Jamestown Foundation) Russia is expanding military training in schools, increasing basic military instruction in grades 6–11 as of September 1 and adding drone and artificial intelligence training to prepare students for military service. The Kremlin is also introducing a class on the “Spiritual and Moral Culture of Russia”. Russia’s 2026 budget for military-patriotic activities reached approximately $910 million, a twentyfold increase compared to pre-war levels in 2021. Moscow has increasingly embedded military training, drone instruction, ideological indoctrination, and pro-Russian narratives into the education system in both Russia and occupied Ukraine. Since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Kremlin has invested in nationalistic school curriculum, propaganda films, television series, video games, and other digital content to normalize military service, glorify war, and shape youth attitudes toward Russia’s war against Ukraine. – Russia Expands Youth Militarization (Part One) – Jamestown
Russia – Ukraine
(Pavel K. Baev – The Jamestown Foundation) Perceptions of Russia’s war against Ukraine are shifting, as the impression of stalemate gives way to Ukraine’s growing military-technological edge and Moscow’s visible strategic drift. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit in Ankara, U.S. President Trump’s silence toward Russian President Vladimir Putin, and Türkiye’s alignment with allied deterrence have compounded Russian setbacks in Crimea and the deepening fuel crisis. Elite discontent, spreading repression against business magnates, and public fatigue in Russia suggest that mobilization, strategically necessary to sustain the war, could instead trigger a domestic meltdown. – Russia’s Virtual Retreat in War Against Ukraine is Accelerating – Jamestown
Thailand – ASEAN – Myanmar
(William J Jones – East Asia Forum) Thailand under Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul has emerged as a key proponent of pragmatic re-engagement with Myanmar, proposing a two-pronged strategy centred on the ASEAN chair, envoy and Troika, and a framework of regionalism, relevance and resilience. While ASEAN remains rhetorically committed to its fractured Five-Point Consensus, some member states are gradually shifting towards normalisation. Thailand’s approach offers a pragmatic path for restoring diplomatic engagement with Myanmar ahead of its 2028 ASEAN chairmanship. – Bangkok seeks to spearhead ASEAN re-engagement with Myanmar | East Asia Forum
UK
(Ian Ball, John Crompton and Dag Detter – RUSI) The publication of the Defence Investment Plan has answered one question and sharpened another. Ministers have set out where much of the next wave of defence money is meant to go. But the harder question is whether the system can show how that money will become effective military capacity. Britain’s defence debate is still dominated by inputs. How quickly should spending rise? Should the target be 2.5%, 2.7%, 3% or 3.5% of GDP? How much more will be needed to meet the Russian threat, reassure NATO allies and adapt to a less certain American security guarantee? These are serious questions. The next government will almost certainly need to find more money for defence. But a larger defence budget does not automatically produce more defence capability. Modern war has made that clear. Readiness depends not only on platforms and weapons systems, but on whether Britain can sustain, repair, replenish and adapt them through munitions stocks, drone production, shipyards, depots, air defence, training areas, resilient bases, service housing, logistics and industrial surge capacity. The Defence Investment Plan should therefore be judged not only by whether it allocates enough money, but also by whether it helps Parliament, the Treasury, the services and the public see how money becomes capacity – and whether that capacity becomes military power. – Defence Spending Must Become Defence Capacity | Royal United Services Institute
(Alex Krasodomski – Chatham House) Britain’s next prime minister faces major policy decisions on tech and AI. They should aim to strengthen the UK’s tech sovereignty by building the national strengths – and the alliances – that give a middle power leverage in a shifting order. – What the UK government should do on AI and tech policy | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
UK – China
(Zeno Leoni – East Asia Forum) UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s 2026 visit to China reflected bipartisan recognition that engagement with Beijing is unavoidable despite persistent concerns over security, human rights and strategic dependence. London is constrained by domestic political pressures and the United Kingdom’s close alignment with the United States through NATO, Five Eyes and AUKUS. But the Labour government’s approach seeks to balance economic cooperation with a more ‘clear-eyed’ stance on competition and values. Rather than reviving the ‘Golden Era’ of bilateral ties, London’s diplomatic posture prioritises pragmatic, incremental engagement while acknowledging that no China policy can fully reconcile economic interests, security concerns and normative commitments. – UK China policy is a necessary compromise | East Asia Forum
US – Iran
(Max Boot – Council on Foreign Relations) On March 1, President Donald Trump said that the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran would last “four to five weeks” at most. More than four months later, after a brief lull, the war is reigniting and showing no sign of ending. Over the past week, the ceasefire has unraveled as Iran attacked merchant ships trying to transit the Strait of Hormuz near the Oman coast, rather than the Iranian shoreline. The United States struck back by bombing Iranian military bases and at least two bridges, and Iran in turn retaliated against U.S. military bases in the region and U.S.-allied Persian Gulf states. Over the weekend, Iran declared that the strait was closed, and Trump struck back on Monday by declaring that the U.S. blockade of Iranian oil was back on—and that the United States (as “THE GUARDIAN OF THE STRAIT”) would impose a 20 percent toll on cargo passing through the waterway. – Trump’s Iran Deal Has Collapsed, Leaving the U.S. With Few Good Options | Council on Foreign Relations
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