Sources: ASPI The Strategist; Council on Foreign Relations; Crisis Group; IISS; RUSI; The Jamestown Foundation
China
(Gerald Mako – ASPI The Strategist) China’s military is integrating AI into logistics to make sustainment faster, better coordinated and able to support operations over greater distances. But the very features that deliver those gains in peacetime also expose the system to disruption, meaning AI may not give China the decisive sustainment edge it expects in a major war. AI-enabled logistics depend on uninterrupted data flows between sensors, planning systems and dispersed units, making them inherently vulnerable to electromagnetic warfare and cyberattacks. The Chinese military’s heavy reliance on commercial supply chains and civilian software adds more weak points. Intruding into logistics software can corrupt scheduling data, delay movements and trigger cascading failures across units and theatres. Jamming or spoofing the links that guide cargo drones and uncrewed ground vehicles could stop resupply altogether, even if the carrying equipment itself is unharmed. – Good in principle, but China’s new military AI logistics are themselves targets | The Strategist
(Erik R. Quam – The Jamestown Foundation) The Party pins its legitimacy to success in developing “comprehensive national power” (CNP). Understanding how it conceptualizes CNP may enable the United States to identify effective ways for integrated deterrence to target vulnerabilities the Party has identified and drive perceptions that reduce the leadership’s confidence across constituent elements of CNP. CNP growth in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) will not be linear in the coming years, and Beijing’s approach to measuring CNP could lead to dangerous miscalculation. For instance, U.S. and Western policies that force the CCP to overinvest in science and technology at the expense of other elements of national power could be destabilizing; and political sensitivities within the Party could lead to mistakes in how CNP is measured, leading to policies that could unintentionally worsen CNP. The PRC has significant staying power and will remain a formidable challenger to the United States over the coming decades. It could even achieve preeminent status in CNP rank globally without ever passing the United States in terms of total GDP. As confidence in the PRC’s comparative position grows, growing dissatisfaction with the international order will likely change what deters Beijing over time. If ongoing attempts to enhance the country’s discourse power fail to translate its accrued national strength as measured by CNP into a more powerful position globally, Party leaders may turn to more assertive methods. Deterring the PRC at the strategic level over the coming decades would require undermining Chinese confidence in its assessments of the “two trends” (两个大局)—national rejuvenation and changes unseen in a century—that Chinese analysts and CCP leaders assess reflect a shift in the global balance of power as measured by CNP. This deterrence will depend in part on understanding that Beijing sees its “gray zone” actions in the context of CNP competition, as attempts to undermine U.S. power and improve the PRC’s relative position without crossing thresholds that would trigger responses in ways that damage its pursuit of CNP. – CNP Part IV: Calculation Holds Keys to Strategic Competition – Jamestown
Drones, Navies, Sea Power
(Sean Andrews – ASPI The Strategist) At sea, drones are disruptive, but they are not decisive. They complicate the maritime fight, but they do not replace the enduring strategic logic of sea power. Combat in the Black Sea and Persian Gulf demonstrate this. Ukrainian uncrewed boats and aircraft have caused the Russian navy to withdraw from the more exposed areas of the Black Sea, but Ukraine hasn’t achieved control of the area in any measure. Both countries’ need for access for trade purposes has created a truce of sorts, allowing Russian and Ukrainian trade to move unhindered. Iran achieved limited denial in the Strait of Hormuz, and by doing so in a chokepoint gained great effect on global energy flows. Again, it didn’t achieve sea control. The debate over whether drones will make navies obsolete has become one of the most persistent and most misleading arguments in contemporary strategy. The imagery is seductive: cheap, fast, expendable drones humiliating billion-dollar warships; swarms overwhelming layered defences; small actors imposing strategic paralysis on larger fleets. But the conclusion that navies are entering their twilight is wrong. – Why navies still matter in the age of drones | The Strategist
Ethiopia’s Tigray
Payton Knopf, Special Advisor at the Dialogue Advisory Group and former U.S. Deputy Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa, speaks about the rising risk of renewed war in Ethiopia’s Tigray region. They revisit the roots of the 2020-2022 war in Tigray and why the conflict became so deadly. They examine the diplomacy behind the Pretoria Agreement that halted the fighting and where the deal has fallen short. They also discuss how unresolved disputes over territory, Tigray’s federal status, internal divisions and worsening Ethiopia-Eritrea tensions could push the region back toward war. Finally, they unpack why escalating regional dynamics, including the war in Sudan, could make a renewed conflict even more explosive, why full war is not inevitable, and what practical off-ramps still remain. – Is Ethiopia Sliding Toward a New Tigray War? | International Crisis Group
Philippines – ASEAN – South China Sea
(Derek Grossman – Crisis Group) On taking up the rotating chair of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) at the start of 2026, the Philippines declared that its top priority would be the South China Sea. Its plan was to conclude a Code of Conduct, with the aim of averting conflict in these heavily contested waters by upholding international law and insisting on the peaceful resolution of disputes. Manila knew this task would not be easy. Negotiations between China and ASEAN have dragged on for more than two decades, repeatedly delayed by Chinese obstruction and the competing interests of the bloc’s member states. Despite high expectations, it now seems that the latest push to forge a code will tread the same path of failure. Manila also has its eye on 12 July, a date of huge symbolic weight for the Philippines as it marks the tenth anniversary of the landmark ruling from the Permanent Court of Arbitration that invalidated Beijing’s maritime claims in the South China Sea. Snubbing the court ruling, China continues to assert its expansive “nine-dash line” claim in the South China Sea, which encompasses roughly 85 per cent of the sea. Beijing insists that it has a historical right to all these waters, but its claim contravenes the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which it has signed. In fact, Beijing’s sovereignty claims overlap with the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) – the spans of water 200 nautical miles off a nation’s coastline – of several neighbouring countries, including the Philippines. To press its case, China has employed aggressive tactics against the other claimant states, several of them ASEAN members, and set out to establish a de facto military presence in disputed areas. – Manila’s Push for a New Rulebook in the South China Sea Peters Out | International Crisis Group
Russia
(Tatiana Vorozhko – The Jamestown Foundation) Russia continues to demand that Kyiv cede the Ukrainian-controlled parts of its Donetsk oblast, promoting the “spirit of Anchorage” to allege that the United States informally accepted Russian control of the entire Donbas region, which comprises the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, as a starting point in peace talks. U.S. officials have recently disputed that any agreement was reached during the August 2025 talks in Alaska, resetting the stage for more realistic negotiations between Russia and Ukraine. Ceding the remaining Ukrainian-controlled areas of Donetsk Oblast would undermine Ukraine’s eastern defenses by putting its “fortress belt” into Russian hands, making it an unlikely concession. Under Ukraine’s Constitution, territorial changes require a constitutional referendum and approval from Ukraine’s parliament. Constitutional amendments cannot occur under martial law, which is unlikely to be lifted during active war. Approximately 57 percent of Ukrainians do not support ceding unoccupied territory, suggesting that a referendum is not likely to be successful. In early June, Zelenskyy said that the fastest path to ending Russia’s war against Ukraine would be an internationally monitored ceasefire along the current line of contact followed by negotiations, without Ukraine first ceding territory. – Moving Past ‘Spirit of Anchorage’ Could Spur More Realistic Negotiations – Jamestown
(Paul Globe – The Jamestown Foundation) Many believe in both Russia and the West that Muscovites are more interested in restoring ties with the West and less supportive of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine than are those living elsewhere in the Russian Federation. This is not the case, according to Lev Gudkov, one of Russia’s most distinguished sociologists. Anti-Western and pro-war attitudes are today “much more pronounced” in Moscow than elsewhere, mostly for economic reasons. That does not mean that some Muscovites are not against Kremlin policies but rather that fewer are likely to protest than UK – have up to now. This situation will be the case until the residents of the Russian capital lose some of their economic advantages. – Muscovites Now More Pro-War and Anti-Western Than Russians Elsewhere – Jamestown
UK – High North
(Dr Sidharth Kaushal and Commander Edward Black – RUSI) The Royal Marines are reshaping UK maritime strategy in the High North, countering Russian threats and advancing NATO objectives for regional security. This entails a close conceptual integration between the employment of the marines and maritime lines of effort. – The Royal Marines in the High North: Shaping the Maritime Battle | Royal United Services Institute
US
(Dongyoun Cho – IISS) In the second half of June 2026, the United States produced its most concentrated burst of quantum policymaking since the 2018 National Quantum Initiative Act. On 15 June, a bipartisan bill – the National Security Commission Quantum Computing Act of 2026 – was introduced in the House. On 22 June, the White House issued two executive orders: Executive Order 14412, ‘Securing the Nation Against Advanced Cryptographic Attacks’, accelerating the federal transition to post-quantum cryptography (PQC); and Executive Order 14413, ‘Ushering in the Next Frontier of Quantum Innovation’, directing a whole-of-government push on deployment and commercialisation. The following day, the Department of War released its first department-wide PQC strategy. The Office of Management and Budget followed on 24 June with the implementing memorandum. On 29 June, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) announced a partnership with SRI International to establish a Quantum Manufacturing Engineering Center (QMEC). Read individually, each measure is incremental. Read together, they enact a strategic reorientation. The science hasn’t changed, but the sequencing has. The flagship computing initiative in Executive Order 14413 aims to initiate the era of quantum-enabled scientific discovery, rather than to conclude it. Rather than waiting for laboratory maturity before addressing manufacturing, procurement, security and workforce questions, Washington is now mobilising these tracks simultaneously. Deployment infrastructure is being built in parallel with the science it is meant to deliver. This matters because, as argued in March, the decisive phase of quantum competition will be infrastructural rather than experimental. The question is no longer simply who achieves the next technical milestone, but who can govern the supply chains, institutions and standards through which quantum systems will operate. Two tests are likely to determine whether states could convert research leadership into strategic capability: governance of specialised supply chains and institutional capacity to absorb new systems. June’s measures are Washington’s first systematic attempt to answer both. – Washington’s quantum mobilisation: from discovery to deployment
US – Iran and beyond
(Crisis Group) It is always risky to take anything President Trump says at face value, but events in the three weeks since the U.S. and Iran signed a memorandum of understanding that was to end the hostilities between them have underscored its inherent vulnerabilities. His comments came after Iran attacked three commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz and the U.S. responded by revoking a temporary licence that had allowed Iran to sell its oil as well as conducting strikes on Iranian targets. These exchanges were sharper than those that had already punctured the ceasefire in place since 8 April. Iran, in turn, attacked U.S. military positions in Bahrain and Kuwait. Later on 8 July, the U.S. launched strikes for a second successive night, with Trump citing Iran’s earlier attacks to warn that “if it happens again, it will get much worse”. Iran retaliated by launching missiles and drones at U.S. military bases in the region. Precarious as it is, the situation is not entirely clear-cut. Even as he appeared to bury the 17 June memorandum and cast doubt on whether further talks would achieve anything, Trump said U.S. representatives could continue discussions with Iran. The two sides are left in a perilous grey zone: the political framework that was supposed to prevent escalation is not doing the job, but the diplomatic channels built around it have not formally closed (though they had already been paused as the Islamic Republic holds multi-day funeral services for Ali Khamenei, the late Supreme Leader who was killed on the first day of U.S.-Israeli bombing in February). Trump’s apparent dispatch of the memorandum may reflect frustration, a desire to restore deterrence after attacks on shipping or an effort to increase pressure on Tehran in the run-up to negotiations. Though there is a difference between coercion to force capitulation and coercion to strengthen a negotiating position, the distinction tends to vanish once missiles start flying. One problem lies in the memorandum’s inherent ambiguity: its language, which was purposely hedged to enable an agreement, is too vague to ensure seamless implementation. Alongside the parties’ competing interpretations of its terms and the repeated breaches on both sides, the deal has a deeper problem. Washington and Tehran have come to treat the agreement not as a bridge from war to diplomacy, but as an extension of war by other means. Meant to contain military confrontation, it is caught in a near-fatal contradiction: armed escalation has become the instrument by which both sides seek to impose their preferred understanding of the deal. – The U.S.-Iran Memorandum of Understanding on Life Support | International Crisis Group
(Gonzalo Saiz Erausquin – RUSI) The status of the Strait of Hormuz and ongoing peace talks between the US and Iran continue to dominate the headlines. The signing of the Memorandum of Understanding signalled that negotiations were inching towards a settlement that could reopen the Strait of Hormuz and restore a degree of normality to global shipping and energy markets. Optimism remained fragile and the US and Iran have exchanged renewed strikes, and Iran may close the waterway once again. Under such uncertainty, markets will take time to settle and traffic will resume slowly under continued high risk premiums. In return for reopening the Strait, the 14-point memorandum presented contentious promises beyond the ceasing of hostilities, such as the full lifting of US and UN sanctions on Iran, access to its blocked funds in US and foreign escrow accounts, a $300 billion reconstruction fund, and a UN Security Council resolution endorsing these points. While the situation is still volatile, bringing an end to the crisis seems a priority for President Trump and a potential resolution will bring about the possibility of reviving one of the biggest casualties of the conflict: international pressure on Russia. – The Future of Russian Sanctions After the Hormuz Crisis | Royal United Services Institute
(Clara Gillispie – Council on Foreign Relations) The interim U.S.-Iran peace agreement paved the way for oil and gas flows through the Strait of Hormuz to restart. However, the answer to when—or if—these flows will return to their pre-closure levels and patterns is anything but straightforward. The fragility of the current peace notwithstanding, there is simply no precedent for unwinding a market disruption of this magnitude; that is, a shut-in equivalent to more than 10 million barrels per day of oil supply and roughly 300 million cubic meters per day of liquefied natural gas (LNG) for over 100 days. Optimistic assessments envision that the majority (but not all) of this supply could return to global markets within a few months, even if the U.S.-Iran war itself may be far from over. The more pessimistic assessments envision that it will be nearly impossible to avoid an uneven regional recovery marred by periodic setbacks, contributing to a weak market case for a full recovery on any timeline. The outcome will depend on the various technical, commercial, operational, and geopolitical factors that could constrain the pace and nature of the strait’s reopening. But both optimistic and pessimistic assessments generally agree that returning the Persian Gulf’s seaborne energy flows will require careful sequencing of at least the following four critical, interdependent tasks. – Not So Strait-Forward: Hormuz, Iran, and the Future of Gulf Oil and Gas Flows | Council on Foreign Relations
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