Sources: Council on Foreign Relations; IISS; RUSI; The Jamestown Foundation
China
(Erik R. Quam – The Jamestown Foundation) The Party pins its legitimacy to success in developing “comprehensive national power” (CNP). Understanding how it conceptualizes CNP may enable the United States to identify effective ways for integrated deterrence to target vulnerabilities the Party has identified and drive perceptions that reduce the leadership’s confidence across constituent elements of CNP. CNP growth in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) will not be linear in the coming years, and Beijing’s approach to measuring CNP could lead to dangerous miscalculation. For instance, U.S. and Western policies that force the CCP to overinvest in science and technology at the expense of other elements of national power could be destabilizing; and political sensitivities within the Party could lead to mistakes in how CNP is measured, leading to policies that could unintentionally worsen CNP. The PRC has significant staying power and will remain a formidable challenger to the United States over the coming decades. It could even achieve preeminent status in CNP rank globally without ever passing the United States in terms of total GDP. As confidence in the PRC’s comparative position grows, growing dissatisfaction with the international order will likely change what deters Beijing over time. If ongoing attempts to enhance the country’s discourse power fail to translate its accrued national strength as measured by CNP into a more powerful position globally, Party leaders may turn to more assertive methods. Deterring the PRC at the strategic level over the coming decades would require undermining Chinese confidence in its assessments of the “two trends” (两个大局)—national rejuvenation and changes unseen in a century—that Chinese analysts and CCP leaders assess reflect a shift in the global balance of power as measured by CNP. This deterrence will depend in part on understanding that Beijing sees its “gray zone” actions in the context of CNP competition, as attempts to undermine U.S. power and improve the PRC’s relative position without crossing thresholds that would trigger responses in ways that damage its pursuit of CNP. – CNP Part IV: Calculation Holds Keys to Strategic Competition – Jamestown
Russia
(Tatiana Vorozhko – The Jamestown Foundation) Russia continues to demand that Kyiv cede the Ukrainian-controlled parts of its Donetsk oblast, promoting the “spirit of Anchorage” to allege that the United States informally accepted Russian control of the entire Donbas region, which comprises the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, as a starting point in peace talks. U.S. officials have recently disputed that any agreement was reached during the August 2025 talks in Alaska, resetting the stage for more realistic negotiations between Russia and Ukraine. Ceding the remaining Ukrainian-controlled areas of Donetsk Oblast would undermine Ukraine’s eastern defenses by putting its “fortress belt” into Russian hands, making it an unlikely concession. Under Ukraine’s Constitution, territorial changes require a constitutional referendum and approval from Ukraine’s parliament. Constitutional amendments cannot occur under martial law, which is unlikely to be lifted during active war. Approximately 57 percent of Ukrainians do not support ceding unoccupied territory, suggesting that a referendum is not likely to be successful. In early June, Zelenskyy said that the fastest path to ending Russia’s war against Ukraine would be an internationally monitored ceasefire along the current line of contact followed by negotiations, without Ukraine first ceding territory. – Moving Past ‘Spirit of Anchorage’ Could Spur More Realistic Negotiations – Jamestown
(Paul Globe – The Jamestown Foundation) Many believe in both Russia and the West that Muscovites are more interested in restoring ties with the West and less supportive of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine than are those living elsewhere in the Russian Federation. This is not the case, according to Lev Gudkov, one of Russia’s most distinguished sociologists. Anti-Western and pro-war attitudes are today “much more pronounced” in Moscow than elsewhere, mostly for economic reasons. That does not mean that some Muscovites are not against Kremlin policies but rather that fewer are likely to protest than UK – have up to now. This situation will be the case until the residents of the Russian capital lose some of their economic advantages. – Muscovites Now More Pro-War and Anti-Western Than Russians Elsewhere – Jamestown
UK – High North
(Dr Sidharth Kaushal and Commander Edward Black – RUSI) The Royal Marines are reshaping UK maritime strategy in the High North, countering Russian threats and advancing NATO objectives for regional security. This entails a close conceptual integration between the employment of the marines and maritime lines of effort. – The Royal Marines in the High North: Shaping the Maritime Battle | Royal United Services Institute
US
(Dongyoun Cho – IISS) In the second half of June 2026, the United States produced its most concentrated burst of quantum policymaking since the 2018 National Quantum Initiative Act. On 15 June, a bipartisan bill – the National Security Commission Quantum Computing Act of 2026 – was introduced in the House. On 22 June, the White House issued two executive orders: Executive Order 14412, ‘Securing the Nation Against Advanced Cryptographic Attacks’, accelerating the federal transition to post-quantum cryptography (PQC); and Executive Order 14413, ‘Ushering in the Next Frontier of Quantum Innovation’, directing a whole-of-government push on deployment and commercialisation. The following day, the Department of War released its first department-wide PQC strategy. The Office of Management and Budget followed on 24 June with the implementing memorandum. On 29 June, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) announced a partnership with SRI International to establish a Quantum Manufacturing Engineering Center (QMEC). Read individually, each measure is incremental. Read together, they enact a strategic reorientation. The science hasn’t changed, but the sequencing has. The flagship computing initiative in Executive Order 14413 aims to initiate the era of quantum-enabled scientific discovery, rather than to conclude it. Rather than waiting for laboratory maturity before addressing manufacturing, procurement, security and workforce questions, Washington is now mobilising these tracks simultaneously. Deployment infrastructure is being built in parallel with the science it is meant to deliver. This matters because, as argued in March, the decisive phase of quantum competition will be infrastructural rather than experimental. The question is no longer simply who achieves the next technical milestone, but who can govern the supply chains, institutions and standards through which quantum systems will operate. Two tests are likely to determine whether states could convert research leadership into strategic capability: governance of specialised supply chains and institutional capacity to absorb new systems. June’s measures are Washington’s first systematic attempt to answer both. – Washington’s quantum mobilisation: from discovery to deployment
US – Iran and beyond
(Gonzalo Saiz Erausquin – RUSI) The status of the Strait of Hormuz and ongoing peace talks between the US and Iran continue to dominate the headlines. The signing of the Memorandum of Understanding signalled that negotiations were inching towards a settlement that could reopen the Strait of Hormuz and restore a degree of normality to global shipping and energy markets. Optimism remained fragile and the US and Iran have exchanged renewed strikes, and Iran may close the waterway once again. Under such uncertainty, markets will take time to settle and traffic will resume slowly under continued high risk premiums. In return for reopening the Strait, the 14-point memorandum presented contentious promises beyond the ceasing of hostilities, such as the full lifting of US and UN sanctions on Iran, access to its blocked funds in US and foreign escrow accounts, a $300 billion reconstruction fund, and a UN Security Council resolution endorsing these points. While the situation is still volatile, bringing an end to the crisis seems a priority for President Trump and a potential resolution will bring about the possibility of reviving one of the biggest casualties of the conflict: international pressure on Russia. – The Future of Russian Sanctions After the Hormuz Crisis | Royal United Services Institute
(Clara Gillispie – Council on Foreign Relations) The interim U.S.-Iran peace agreement paved the way for oil and gas flows through the Strait of Hormuz to restart. However, the answer to when—or if—these flows will return to their pre-closure levels and patterns is anything but straightforward. The fragility of the current peace notwithstanding, there is simply no precedent for unwinding a market disruption of this magnitude; that is, a shut-in equivalent to more than 10 million barrels per day of oil supply and roughly 300 million cubic meters per day of liquefied natural gas (LNG) for over 100 days. Optimistic assessments envision that the majority (but not all) of this supply could return to global markets within a few months, even if the U.S.-Iran war itself may be far from over. The more pessimistic assessments envision that it will be nearly impossible to avoid an uneven regional recovery marred by periodic setbacks, contributing to a weak market case for a full recovery on any timeline. The outcome will depend on the various technical, commercial, operational, and geopolitical factors that could constrain the pace and nature of the strait’s reopening. But both optimistic and pessimistic assessments generally agree that returning the Persian Gulf’s seaborne energy flows will require careful sequencing of at least the following four critical, interdependent tasks. – Not So Strait-Forward: Hormuz, Iran, and the Future of Gulf Oil and Gas Flows | Council on Foreign Relations
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