In collaboration with
Fonti: Atlantic Council; Chatham House; Lowy The Interpreter; The Jamestown Foundation
Europe, Energy, Greece, Cyprus
(Atlantic Council) As Russia wages war in Ukraine and Iran maintains its hold on the Strait of Hormuz, Europe is getting a reality check about how energy can be weaponized—and now it should be “united” in addressing it, said Stavros Papastavrou, Greece’s minister of environment and energy. Papastavrou spoke at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Forum on Wednesday, explaining that today’s crises have jolted Europe into a sense of “energy realism.”. Now, it is looking to become more resilient. And for Michael Damianos, Cyprus’s minister of energy, commerce, and industry, “becoming more resilient means being a bit more diversified.”. Cyprus currently holds the presidency of the Council of the EU, and Damianos explained that in diversifying, the EU needs to “develop [its] own internal sources of energy,” which “can … include fossil fuels as well.” Papastavrou agreed, arguing that Europe needs to develop “all” domestic resources “in order to be able to have our energy independence.”. While Europe maintains several ambitious renewable energy targets, Papastavrou argued that European leaders are realizing from this crisis that these goals, while “noble,” are based on “morality” and “did not take into account the competitiveness of the economy.”. “We need to be technologically neutral,” he said. – Europe’s route out of this energy crisis, as mapped by Cyprus and Greece – Atlantic Council
Indonesia – France
(Aniello Iannone – Lowy The Interpreter) Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto has now travelled to France three times this year, and four times since he took office(Opens in new window). The first, in January, was a stopover of under five hours(Opens in new window) behind visits to Britain and Switzerland. In April, Prabowo made a 36-hour circuit that took in Vladimir Putin’s Kremlin(Opens in new window) and a new defence understanding with Washington(Opens in new window). This month, he returned for a reception at Les Invalides, a state banquet at the Élysée(Opens in new window), and Eid al-Adha prayers with Indonesians in Paris. The visit produced four commercial agreements worth US$3.5 billion(Opens in new window), signed at the launch of a France-Indonesia High-Level Business Council. That figure is worth examining, because it carries less than it suggests. The equipment that defines the relationship was contracted years ago. Indonesia ordered 42 Rafale fighters in 2022, in a package worth roughly $8 billion, and the first six were handed over at Halim Perdanakusuma on 18 May(Opens in new window), along with four Falcon jets, an A400M and the first Meteor missiles. Two Scorpène submarines are to be built at PT PAL(Opens in new window), a program that only reached pre-production at the end of May(Opens in new window). The $3.5 billion announced in Paris added no new capability to any of this. It was a set of commercial commitments placed on top of the $11 billion in memoranda(Opens in new window) signed during French President Emmanuel Macron’s visit to Jakarta a year earlier, and Indonesia’s own investment minister now describes the council’s purpose as making those earlier promises real. – Prabowo in Paris: liberté, égalité, and the autonomy that isn’t | Lowy Institute
Indo-Pacific
(Nick Kemp – Lowy The Interpreter) Governments across the Indo‑Pacific are under pressure to do more, respond faster and manage a wider range of risks than at any point in recent decades. Climate shocks, cyber incidents, infrastructure demands and regional uncertainty have all increased the workload. Yet the ability of governments to act with purpose has not kept pace. This is not because governments lack ambition. It is because the internal machinery of the state has been shifting in ways that are harder to see. One of the most consequential changes is the steady expansion of the assurance function – the layers of oversight, compliance, review and risk management that sit around core delivery. Assurance is essential. No government can operate without it. But across the region, it has become a dominant organising logic. Each generation of officials inherits a slightly more conservative system than the one before it. Safety is rewarded; initiative is not. The incentives are clear: avoid risk, avoid exposure, avoid the kind of decision that might fail in public. Over time, this produces a quiet narrowing of what the system is willing – or able – to attempt. The consequences are visible in different forms across the Indo‑Pacific. – How assurance ate the state | Lowy Institute
Iraq, Iran
(Renad Mansour – Chatham House) As the US-Israeli war with Iran drags on, Iraq’s government under new Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi faces a challenge that has plagued successive governments: how to establish meaningful authority over the dozens of armed groups, loosely connected under the umbrella organization of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), that operate outside the government’s direct command. The issue has become increasingly urgent because some of these groups, backed by Iran, are drawing Iraq into the regional conflict that Baghdad has sought to avoid. The long-standing issue has gained fresh momentum in recent weeks. Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, who leads the Saraya al-Salam armed group, announced his support for its integration in May. More notably, Qais al-Khazali, the head of the Asaib Ahl al-Haq armed group and a long-time Tehran ally who has recently increased his focus on domestic Iraqi politics, also signalled his group would integrate into the state. While Sadr has made similar pledges before, it is noteworthy that such rhetoric is now being echoed by a wider range of actors. However, other factions have refused. These include groups that are more deeply embedded in Iran’s ‘axis of resistance’, among them Kataeb Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, who have made it clear that they will continue to fight regardless of Baghdad’s policies. Their position exposes the limits of any integration effort: the groups with the greatest domestic political stake in Iraqi institutions are the most amenable to integration, while groups with more loyalty to Tehran’s regional project have less incentive to subordinate themselves to the government in Baghdad. – Can Iraq’s new prime minister finally rein in its armed factions? | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
Kenya – G7
(Fergus Kell – Chathan House) Kenya’s participation at the G7 summit in France on 16-17 June sees it walk a familiar tightrope between international opportunity and domestic political risk. Though Kenya has attended three G7 summits since 2017, its presence this year has been spotlighted by South Africa’s reported exclusion following US pressure. President William Ruto will see the invite as tacit endorsement of his efforts to present Kenya as a reliable broker between global powers. The G7 summit also follows Kenya’s co-hosting of the Africa–France summit on 11–12 May in Nairobi, framed as the first edition in a non-Francophone country by design – although critics took a more sceptical view. But Ruto’s international ambitions rest on shaky domestic foundations. – Kenya’s G7 role must address the economic pressures fuelling domestic criticism of President Ruto | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
US, Iran
(Jessica Brandt – Council on Foreign Relations) Iran’s diplomatic response to President Donald Trump’s threat to destroy Iranian civilization wasn’t a condemnation or a counterthreat. It was a scheduling request. “8PM is not so good. Could you change it to between 1 and 2PM — or if possible, 1 and 2AM?” one Iranian embassy wrote on X. When Trump later delivered an expletive-laden demand that Tehran open the Strait of Hormuz, it responded with a joltingly deadpan quip: “We’ve lost the keys.”. These jocular retorts are not one-offs. They are part of Iran’s much broader strategy to push back on the United States in the information domain—one that encompasses satirical memes, artificial intelligence (AI)-generated videos, and sarcastic pile-ons designed to undercut U.S. soft power abroad and deepen reticence for military action among Americans at home. This is a problem, as I pointed out in a recent New York Times guest essay. The United States isn’t well postured to address foreign influence campaigns like this—nimble, culturally savvy, and not fundamentally deceptive. And as Iran refines its approach, other threat actors are watching. – Iran’s Trolling Caught the U.S. Off Guard. Here’s How to Push Back. | Council on Foreign Relations
US, Israel, and the war in Iran
(Daniel B. Shapiro – Atlantic Council) The Iran conflict has exposed several major fissures between President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu over war aims. The two leaders are moving apart over the Strait of Hormuz, the elements of a deal with Iran, and Hezbollah’s threat from Lebanon. These disagreements do not preclude the two leaders from working together to stop Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, but they do narrow the space to make common cause on other issues. – From a gap to a chasm: Diverging US and Israeli interests in the war with Iran – Atlantic Council
Georgia
(Beka Chedia/The Jamestown Foundation) Georgia’s ruling Georgian Dream party has signaled its desire to restore the suspended U.S.–Georgia strategic partnership and claimed active dialogue with Washington is underway. At the same time, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze rejected suggestions that Georgia must alter its domestic or foreign policies as a condition for improved relations. Tbilisi’s simultaneous deepening of ties with the People’s Republic of China, alongside growing engagement with Iran and pragmatic relations with Russia, has intensified U.S. scrutiny over foreign influence, intelligence penetration, and democratic backsliding in Georgia. Georgian Dream denies allegations that Georgia is drifting toward Russia, the People’s Republic of China, or Iran, arguing that economic ties with these countries remain limited. Critics, however, contend that the government’s growing engagement with non-Western powers risks undermining trust with Georgia’s traditional Western partners. – Georgian Dream Seeking U.S. Reset While Resisting Requisite Reforms – Jamestown
Russia, Iran, Gulf States
(Fuad Shahbazov – The Jamestown Foundation) Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg on April 27 about the ongoing conflict in and around Iran. The visit highlighted the two states’ Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty, signed in January 2025. Russia has reaped some economic benefits from Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which raised oil demand and prices and caused the United States to ease sanctions on Russian oil already at sea. If Moscow shows robust military support for Iran, however, it risks damaging economic and diplomatic ties with other Gulf states. Russia is constrained from acting as a main mediator in the Iran conflict due to its war against Ukraine. The Iran conflict also endangers key trade corridors, including the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which links Russia and Iran via the Caucasus. – Russia Balances Relationship with Iran and Other Gulf States – Jamestown
