Today’s sources: ASPI The Strategist; Atlantic Council; Council on Foreign Relations; Just Security; Lawfare; Lowy The Interpreter; The Jamestown Foundation
Artemis Accords/Lunar Governance
(Jing Ge – Lowy The Interpreter) In 1969, when the words “Houston, Tranquility Base here. The Eagle has landed.” were broadcast to the world, anxious onlookers on Earth knew Apollo 11 had successfully landed on the Moon. From that moment on, the Moon was no longer an unreachable celestial body, but a place humanity had actually reached. Fifty-seven years later, NASA’s Artemis II has once again carried out a crewed lunar mission . The ultimate goal of the Artemis program is to establish a permanent base at the Moon’s south pole and use it as a stepping stone to Mars. This signals a shift in lunar activity from exploratory first steps to a new phase focused on sustained access, long-term use, and rule-making. Today’s competition over the Moon is one of governance, made up of three dimensions: the ability to access the Moon on a sustained basis, occupying key locations, and rule-making. – Moon governance in the spotlight after Artemis II | Lowy Institute
Artificial Intelligence/Anthropic/Claude’s Constitution
(Lisa Klaassen, Ralph Schroeder – Lawfare) In January, the frontier artificial intelligence (AI) company Anthropic published a landmark document for its AI model called Claude’s Constitution. Described as Anthropic’s “vision for Claude’s character,” the document marked a notable departure from standard industry prose. It is not simply a safety policy or a public-facing white paper. Anthropic frames the constitution as a legal and philosophical charter: a detailed account of the values, priorities, and forms of judgment that should guide Claude’s behavior—and one that the company says will play a “crucial role” in training future versions of the model. At first glance, the constitution is a groundbreaking exercise in transparency. Across 84 pages, Anthropic sets out an ambitious vision for how the model is supposed to behave. Claude should be not merely useful but also “broadly safe,” “broadly ethical,” compliant with company guidelines, and “genuinely helpful” to the user, in that order of priority. Its significance lies in revealing, in unusually explicit terms, how one major AI corporation attempts to govern its technology from within. Lawfare has already given the document close attention. Kevin Frazier argues that the constitution is important because it moves beyond the dry mechanics of a system prompt and invites public engagement in the shaping of a frontier model. Alan Rozenshtein offers a different reading, treating the document less as a legal charter than as a “character bible” for an artificial agent. Both articles illuminate why the constitution warrants scrutiny. Yet neither confronts its central problem: Anthropic’s framing overstates the document’s legitimacy while understating where the power to shape AI behavior actually resides. Transparency should not be mistaken for conceptual clarity or institutional legitimacy. The challenges presented by the constitution, in our view, are threefold. First, the constitution anthropomorphizes Claude, encouraging readers to think of the model as though it possesses the moral character of a human being. Second, it borrows the language of constitutionalism—and, with it, the symbolic authority of public law—for what remains a corporate product. Third, the document presents a hierarchy of “principals” in which Anthropic retains ultimate authority, while the implications for developers and end users are left thinly specified. These features are not incidental defects; they shape how responsibility is allocated, how legitimacy is imagined, and why users may be encouraged to trust the model. – The Code Is Not the Law: Why Claude’s Constitution Misleads | Lawfare
Australia/US/Global Order
(Bethany Allen, Nathan Attrill and Fergus Ryan – ASPI The Strategist) Since the end of World War II, Australia has enjoyed an ideologically simple security environment: all its core allies have been liberal democracies, and all its foes have been illiberal. The United States, the architect and defender of the liberal rules-based world order, has long served as Australia’s most important security guarantor against illiberal foes. But this simple division of the world into liberal allies and illiberal foes has ended, at least for now and perhaps for good. Although the US still operates under a formally democratic system, the administration currently setting its foreign policy is openly and proudly illiberal. To a growing number of Europeans, the US is even beginning to look something like an antagonist. Meanwhile, the US remains Australia’s top security partner. – Australia in a world where its top security partner is illiberal | The Strategist
Belarus/Uzbekistan
(Anna J. Davis – The Jamestown Foundation) Belarus is positioning itself as a nuclear energy mentor to Uzbekistan. Uzbek delegates recently visited the Belarusian nuclear power plant to learn about workforce training systems, regulatory coordination, emergency preparedness, and the development of supporting social infrastructure associated with operating Russian‑designed reactors. Belarus’s opportunities to share its nuclear experience lie with countries that are partnered with Russia’s state-owned nuclear corporation, Rosatom, as Belarus itself depends on Russian nuclear technology and fuel services for its domestic nuclear energy capabilities. As Belarus seeks to convert its dependence on Russia into influence and relevance, it is balancing a fine line that Moscow may interpret as interference and a challenge to its dominant position as a nuclear supplier. – Belarus Offers Uzbekistan Nuclear Expertise – Jamestown
China/Internet of Things
(Matthew Johnson – The Jamestown Foundation) A new action plan for the Internet of Things (IoT) increases the possibility that Chinese-built connected infrastructure in the United States could become a platform for data access, cyber pre-positioning, and attacks on U.S. cyber-physical systems in a prolonged crisis or confrontation. The plan, launched jointly by nine ministries, defines IoT as a total cyber-physical environment that links “people, machines, and things” across sensing, networks, platforms, applications, and security, and sets targets for 10 billion terminal connections, more than 50 standards, and deployment across production, consumption, and governance. The plan indicates Beijing is moving from connected devices to connected backbone systems. It reinforces the new Five-Year Plan, suggesting that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) wants to supply not only endpoints like sensors, appliances, and vehicles but also the next generation of AI, computing, and space-ground communications infrastructure that will underpin them. – New Internet of Things Plan Targets Global Infrastructure – Jamestown
China/People’s Liberation Army
(K. Tristan Tang – The Jamestown Foundation) The Outline of its 15th Five-Year Plan contains new development priorities for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) through 2030, as well as a high degree of continuity with directives from previous plans. This iteration adds a section on military governance, in addition to the recurring focus on combat capability and military–civil fusion, and emphasizes military theory, military governance, and “spin-on” mechanisms for facilitating the integration of civilian technologies into the PLA. The repeated appearance of policies that have existed for years highlights the limited effectiveness of past reforms. The Outline’s release has been accompanied by a number of specific regulations and implementation mechanisms to further obligate compliance with policy directives. If fully implemented, the defense-related aspects of the 15th Five-Year Plan could significantly grow the PLA’s combat capability, especially in military–civil fusion and joint operations and exceed prior observed growth. – New Five-Year Plan Could Boost PLA Combat Power – Jamestown
Energy Security
(Daniel B. Poneman – Council on Foreign Relations) Every year, CERAWeek gathers the most influential leaders across the energy sector from industry, government, academia, and nongovernmental organizations. This year, unsurprisingly, the dramatic impact of geopolitical instability coursing through energy markets infused the zeitgeist of the entire week among its eleven thousand participants. As CERAWeek founder Daniel Yergin explained many years ago in his Pulitzer Prize–winning classic The Prize, energy and security issues have long been tightly intertwined. Conference-goers and main-stage speakers alike parsed and re-parsed the countless variables emerging from the war in Iran and the post–Nicolás Maduro leadership in Venezuela. Navigating global unpredictability at a time of exploding energy demand is the name of the game. Facing such volatility, U.S. officials drove home the Trump administration’s “energy pragmatism” approach, while attempting to assuage market concerns regarding the largest oil shock in history. Secretary of Energy Chris Wright maintained that it is now more important than ever to focus on reliability and affordability in energy supply. That focus on reliability—as well as the dominance agenda underlined by U.S. Interior Secretary Doug Burgum—highlighted the growing importance in the global energy stack of nuclear and natural gas. Wright described natural gas as “America’s superpower”—the United States is the world’s largest exporter—and nuclear as critical to American energy preeminence, with emerging small modular reactor and fusion technologies as strategic priorities. Marking a major pivot in European attitudes, German Federal Minister for Economic Affairs and Energy Katherina Reiche plainly stated that Germany’s phaseout of nuclear energy in the past fifteen years was a “huge mistake” and that the “only way to secure [energy] supply is gas.” – Energy Security: Back to the Future | Council on Foreign Relations
Global Debt Trap
(Nischal Dhungel – Lowy The Interpreter) Looking at global credit spreads today, you’d be forgiven for thinking the world was enjoying a period of profound macroeconomic tranquillity. Despite the steepest interest rate hikes in a generation and war in the Middle East, corporate and sovereign bonds have held up remarkably well. Traders remain fixated on the trajectory of the US Federal Reserve and obsessed with the artificial intelligence financing frenzy. But that calm is a mirage. While advanced economies debate the nuances of “soft landings”, low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) are quietly sliding into a sovereign debt catastrophe. According to the World Bank’s International Debt Report 2025, in 2024 the total external debt stock of LMICs hit a record US$8.9 trillion, with the 78 most vulnerable nations accounting for a record US$1.2 trillion. Global markets have entirely failed to price this in. It is a slow-motion wreck unfolding in plain sight. – High rates and expensive oil create a global debt trap | Lowy Institute
Global Health
(Surina Venkat – Council on Foreign Relations) The United States declared victory in the fight against measles in 2000, saying the once common and deadly illness had been eliminated. But that could be changing, as measles makes an unwelcome global comeback. Canada already lost its measles-elimination status last year, and now the United States and Mexico—where cases have climbed into the thousands—face a similar fate. The disease is highly contagious but also easily preventable, owing to the invention of a vaccine in 1963 and decades of childhood immunization campaigns. Measles today persists primarily in low-income and lower-middle-income countries like Bangladesh, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Pakistan, where vaccination rates remain low. But rising vaccine skepticism and disruptions to public health infrastructure have revived measles in the past decade. Cuts to vaccination programs around the world have also increased the likelihood of measles’ continued spread, which experts say can pave the way for larger outbreaks. – What’s Behind the Global Resurgence of Measles? | Council on Foreign Relations
Houthis/Iran
(Mariel Ferragamo, Kali Robinson – Council on Foreign Relations) Yemen’s Iran-aligned Houthi movement has become one of the Middle East’s most potent nonstate actors since Israel’s war against Hamas reignited in 2023. The group’s campaign of disruptive strikes in the Red Sea has persisted despite U.S. retaliatory attacks and fueled tensions in recent years. After a period of relative calm following the announcement of a U.S.-brokered ceasefire between Israel and Hamas in late 2025, the Houthis entered the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran that began in February, opening another front in the widening conflict. The Houthis launched an initial ballistic missile at Israel on March 28, pledging to continue strikes “until the aggression against all fronts of the resistance ceases.” Several more Houthi missile attacks have followed. – Iran’s Support of the Houthis: What to Know | Council on Foreign Relations
Russia/Indo-Pacific
(Paul Pelczar – Lowy The Interpreter) A Russian naval visit to Jakarta in recent days has passed with little media notice in Australia. Drawn from the Pacific Fleet, the task group included a corvette, a submarine, and a standard support vessel. To most Australians, such a visit may appear irregular, rare, or simply part of background activity. It is better understood as part of a consistent pattern. Russia has always been present in the Indo-Pacific – just not always visible to the wider Australian audience. That has shaped how it is assessed, and often how little emphasis it receives. Russia’s activity in the near region rarely dominates headlines. When it does, it tends to generate a short-lived domestic stir – the reported interest in staging long-range aviation from Indonesia in early 2025, or maritime deployments associated with the 2014 G20 “shirtfront” episode. These moments attract attention, but they can also narrow how Russia is viewed as an actor in the region. – There’s a bear in there: Russia in the Indo-Pacific | Lowy Institute
Taiwan
(You-Hao Lai – Just Security) Democracies under attack by authoritarian regimes must confront an uncomfortable question: how can they defend themselves effectively without eroding the very freedoms they aim to protect? Taiwan, which faces a sustained campaign of Chinese information manipulation on social media, sits at the sharp end of this governance dilemma. Last year, the Taiwanese government banned RedNote (Xiaohongshu)—a Chinese social media platform with over three million users on the island—drawing immediate criticism from civil society and opposition voices alike. Among the criticisms: the ban’s rationale was narrowly framed, the tool was largely ineffective, and the measure was disproportionate. The episode exposed how Taiwan’s democratic institutions are caught between the imperative to act on Chinese information interference and the legal, political, and market forces constraining policy responses. At the same time as the RedNote ban, the United States was brokering a historic deal to keep TikTok alive while addressing the security risks of Chinese ownership. Can democracies like Taiwan learn anything from the U.S. experience? The answer lies not in the ownership-driven model underpinning the TikTok legislation—which middle powers cannot replicate—but in the operational safeguards embedded in the subsequent deal. Making this path work will require coordinated action between middle and major democracies. – Lessons from Taiwan’s Platform Governance Challenge
US/Africa
(Michelle Gavin – Council on Foreign Relations) Democracy is in increasingly short supply in Africa, but it remains a hot topic of conversation. If the Trump administration thinks it has opted out of this discourse, it should think again. Consider the latest developments in Cameroon. Since 1982, Paul Biya has been the President of Cameroon. Last year, he was declared the winner of deeply flawed elections at the age of 92, giving him a mandate for an eighth term in office. For years, Cameroonians and friends of the country have been frustrated with the ailing Biya’s insistence on maintaining power at any cost, and simultaneously worried about what kind of leadership transition might eventually unfold. The country has held regular elections, but they are neither free nor fair, and in the lifetime of most citizens, there has been no model for a rule-governed transfer of power. Ambitious would-be successors have bided their time for decades, waiting for their chance to assume the top job in a country where power and access to economic opportunity have been centralized. A power struggle could easily become violent. – A Failed U.S. Attempt to Opt Out of Democracy Talk | Council on Foreign Relations
US/Artificial Intelligence/Legislation
(Jakub Kraus – Lawfare) On March 20, the White House released a “comprehensive” national framework for artificial intelligence (AI), three months after calling for legislative recommendations on the technology in an executive order that sought to curb certain state AI laws. The framework has already received support from influential Republicans in Congress, including House Speaker Mike Johnson (R-La.) and Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Texas), who will likely work closely with the White House to advance AI legislation aligned with the framework. On the other side of the aisle, Sen. Maria Cantwell (D-Wash.), who serves alongside Cruz as ranking member of the Senate’s commerce committee, said the framework “identifies key areas to address.” Thus, the framework offers a fairly clear sketch of which types of AI policy could become U.S. law before the 2026 midterm elections. – White House AI Framework Proposes Industry-Friendly Legislation | Lawfare
US/China/Frontier Artificial Intelligence Chips
(Sunny Cheung, Kai-shing Lau – The Jamestown Foundation) Procurement records suggest that U.S. export controls on frontier artificial intelligence (AI) chips imposed meaningful constraints until January 2026, as institutions in the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) appeared to be adapting procurement practices to preserve access rather than replacing foreign hardware with domestic alternatives. Tender documents from universities and state-linked entities show repeated efforts to obtain Nvidia H200-class computing power. Some mention H200s explicitly, others specify capabilities that can only refer to H200s, and others still obfuscate by appending politically acceptable labels such as “domestic chips” or “H20” to specifications that indicate they actually refer to H200s. The persistence of these workarounds indicates that despite visible progress by domestic firms such as Huawei, PRC alternatives remain insufficient for the most demanding frontier AI workloads, making continued access to U.S. hardware strategically consequential. – Procurement Documents Reveal AI Chip Workarounds – Jamestown
US/Non-State entities/National Security
(David S. Kris – Lawfare) In March, the Defense Department designated Anthropic a supply chain risk, sparking legal controversy. The designation came after Anthropic prohibited the use of its artificial intelligence (AI) model, Claude, for “mass domestic surveillance” and for “fully autonomous weapons.”. Apart from its fascinating particulars, this ongoing dispute reveals a fundamental shift: Non-state entities (NSEs) of various kinds—corporations, universities, and individuals—are becoming much more important for national security. These entities are increasingly enabling, and sometimes limiting, defense and intelligence activity. Unsurprisingly, states are pushing back, treating NSEs as rival geopolitical actors, and using a wide array of carrots and sticks to dominate them. Both trends—NSEs limiting states, and states dominating NSEs—stress existing frameworks for national security governance. Those frameworks were not designed for the current geopolitical reality and would benefit from a systematic review. – Non-State Entities and National Security | Lawfare
War in Iran/Middle East/Gulf and beyond
(Michael Froman – Council on Foreign Relations) This week, President Donald Trump declared victory in Iran, and, on Wednesday, after the announcement of a two-week ceasefire brokered by Pakistan, he heralded a “big day for World Peace!”. People are now asking whether the war was worth it. The truth is that it’s simply too soon to tell. The success or failure of the war to advance the United States’ national interest hinges as much on what happens next as it does on what happened over the course of the past forty-one days. In the Secretary of War Pete Hegseth’s telling, Operation Epic Fury was a “capital V military victory.” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dan Caine framed this victory in the context of “three distinct military objectives: destroy Iran’s ballistic missile and drone capabilities, destroy the Iranian navy, and destroy their defense industrial base to ensure that Iran cannot reconstitute the ability to project power outside their borders.” This is consistent with the objectives Under Secretary of War for Policy Elbridge Colby described during a conversation at CFR at the start of the war. – Was the Iran War Worth It? | Council on Foreign Relations
(Landon Derentz – Atlantic Council) Iran’s military capabilities have been weakened, but its ability to disrupt global trade via the Strait of Hormuz has grown and remains a major source of leverage. To reduce Iran’s leverage over the global economy, the United States and its allies should build large-scale energy infrastructure to bypass the strait. This strategy should be paired with robust drone defenses to protect the new infrastructure. – Operation Overflow: How to break Iran’s grip over the Strait of Hormuz – Atlantic Council
