Today’s sources: ASPI The Strategist; Lowy The Interpreter; Middle East Institute; Royal United Services Institute; The Jamestown Foundation; The Washington Institute
Arctic
(Robert Wihtol – ASPI The Strategist) For centuries, the Arctic was considered the exclusive domain of polar bears, exotic marine life and the occasional intrepid explorer. However, as climate change has thawed the polar ice, it has also opened up new shipping lanes and access to the region’s vast natural resources. And US President Donald Trump’s threats to take over Greenland for national security reasons have catapulted the Arctic onto the global stage. As a result, Kenneth Rosen’s latest book, Polar War, could hardly be more timely. Rosen is an investigative journalist whose articles on a range of political and social issues have been published in The New Yorker, The New York Times and The Atlantic. The struggle for control of the Arctic has a long history. With an eye on the longer-term economic gains, in 1867 US secretary of state William Seward convinced a reluctant Congress to approve the purchase of an economically unprofitable Alaska from a deeply indebted Russia. The price was US$7.2 million (equivalent to about US$160 million today), a deal that one must assume Russia now regrets. – Bookshelf: the Arctic is the new global hotspot | The Strategist
Azerbaijan/South Korea
(Vusal Guliyev – The Jamestown Foundation) The State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) and South Korean engineering firm Samsung E&A signed a Memorandum of Understanding on February 25 to improve the efficiency of energy assets, localize production, develop a regional industrial hub, foster human capital development, and advance decarbonization cooperation. South Korea–Azerbaijan meetings in November 2021 and September 2025 explored expanding bilateral energy cooperation and exposing local Azerbaijani firms to international standards, including in renewable energy. The new agreement reflects Azerbaijan’s broader strategy of deepening energy ties with East Asian partners and positioning itself as a key energy and logistics hub linking Europe and Asia through transit infrastructure and cross-border collaboration. – Azerbaijan and South Korea Sign Energy MoU – Jamestown
China
(Rena Sasaki, Yuutarou Usutani – The Jamestown Foundation) Authorities are pushing a “new model” for the property sector, but a wide gap persists between a grim reality on the ground and officially sanctioned policy discourse. The “new model” is best understood as a stability-oriented governance package that combines selective completion and delivery of housing units, the containment of local fiscal and debt risks, and expectation management efforts that increasingly intersect with information controls. The sector’s problems are a function of fiscal constraints that result from the end of the land-finance model, reduced demand due to weaker household finances, and information bottlenecks leading to households becoming more cautious. Strict information controls around issues of building quality and delivery timelines prevent accurate assessment of local market conditions—including by the government. As a result, accurate policy prescription is difficult to achieve and prospective homebuyers are disincentivized from purchasing, thus prolonging the property downturn. – The Policy–Reality Gap in the PRC’s Property ‘New Model’ – Jamestown
Myanmar
(Mon Zin – ASPI The Strategist) In Myanmar, the junta’s air campaign against civilian communities has become one of the most decisive tools sustaining its rule. Imported jet fuel is therefore a strategic lifeline for the junta, and investigations indicate that, despite sanctions, it still reaches Myanmar through opaque logistics networks. These include tactics such as shadow fleets, repeated resale arrangements and intermediaries that obscure fuel origins. These grey-zone networks have emerged and expanded amid fragmented and uneven enforcement of sanctions. Closing these vulnerabilities will require tighter monitoring of aviation fuel supply chains and more coordinated sanction enforcement by Australia and its partners. Data and documentations from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data, Myanmar Witness and the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Myanmar shows the importance of air power to the regime. Since 2022, airstrikes have increasingly targeted civilian areas, including villages, schools, religious sites and camps for internally displaced people. – From Tehran to Naypyidaw: shadow supply chains sustain Myanmar’s air war | The Strategist
Philippines/China
(Don McLain Gill – Lowy The Interpreter) What they say about desperate times and desperate measures. With oil and gas disruptions in the Middle East, the Philippines is scrambling for options, last week declaring a state of energy emergency. And now what might have previously been unthinkable for the net energy importing country is now apparently under consideration – a joint energy exploration agreement with China in the West Philippine Sea. In an interview with Bloomberg on 24 March, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr said that his country was considering joint gas exploration with China, particularly in the western section of the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Marcos said that the ongoing energy crisis could serve as an “impetus” for both Manila and Beijing to reach an agreement and resolve their protracted territorial dispute. Department of Foreign Affairs Secretary Ma Theresa Lazaro also noted that joint exploration may be “forthcoming” since tensions between the two countries in the West Philippine Sea – what Manila calls its EEZ territory in the South China Sea – do not reflect the entirety of the bilateral relationship. The precise details of what Marcos was alluding to has since been debated, whether he was pointing to a specific project or the idea of joint exploration in general terms. – The perils of a Philippines–China energy deal in disputed waters | Lowy Institute
Russia
(Hlib Parfonov – The Jamestown Foundation) Russia has established the Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) as an independent military branch, institutionalizing drone warfare after lessons from Ukraine, reflecting a doctrinal shift toward drones as a central component of modern combined-arms operations. The USF features a centralized command structure overseeing development, procurement, training, and deployment, with integrated units across all command levels and a dedicated acquisition system managed jointly with the Ministry of Defense’s research directorate. Moscow plans to recruit nearly 79,000 personnel by 2026, drawing heavily from students, veterans, and technically skilled civilians, while expanding university training pipelines and specialized academies to sustain long-term drone force development. A four-phase roadmap for the USF envisions a massive expansion to roughly 210,000 personnel and nearly 1,000 units, embedding drone capabilities across ground, air, and naval forces, despite funding gaps and organizational challenges. Russia’s buildup parallels Ukraine’s earlier institutionalization of its drone force and signals an enduring transformation, with drones accounting for most battlefield fire missions and reshaping operational doctrine, particularly along the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) northern and northeastern strategic fronts. – Russia’s Unmanned Systems Forces Become Wildcard in Moscow’s Military Modernization – Jamestown
(Paul Globe – The Jamestown Foundation) Russian President Vladimir Putin’s moves against Telegram channels and the Internet more generally have alienated many Russians, angered regime allies in business and government who depend on the web, and undercut the Kremlin leader’s own goals. This alienation and anger have not led to massive protests because the regime has shown it is ready to repress anyone who takes part and because of the widespread sense among Russians that nothing they do will change Kremlin policies. This trend leaves Putin with a shallower and softer reserve of support. In the event of some future shock, he might have to rely on repression alone—a conclusion some in the Kremlin already share—thus limiting Putin’s options in the future. – Putin’s Moves Against Internet Alienate Russians – Jamestown
Syria
(Charles Lister – Middle East Institute/Al Majalla) When the United States and Israel launched military operations against Iran a month ago, the Middle East was plunged into debilitating conflict, with retaliatory Iranian missiles and drones striking at least 12 countries across the region. In addition to thousands killed through US-Israeli action in Iran, Lebanon and Iraq, at least 37 people have reportedly been killed in Iranian attacks on the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Türkiye and Iraqi Kurdistan. Iran’s strikes on Gulf energy infrastructure and its de facto closure of the Straits of Hormuz, furthermore, have triggered global economic shockwaves that leading experts warn could “send the world economy plummeting into a deep recession.”. It is in this context of escalating regional conflict that Syria has remarkably just completed its most stable month in 15 years. After nearly 14 years of civil war, Syria’s transition has been far from peaceful, and two brief but horrifically deadly chapters of violence on the Coast and the southern governorate of Sweida served as a reminder of the fragility of the country’s transition. Even so, the general trajectory has been one of stabilisation. – US-Iran War Gives Syria’s Global Economic Pitch More Urgency – Middle East Institute
War in Iran/Middle East/Gulf and beyond
(Burcu Ozcelik – Royal United Services Institute) The Islamic Republic has not collapsed in the way US President Donald Trump may have anticipated. Iran has instead shown agility and discipline in executing a phased escalatory response: first retaliating against targets across the Gulf, then widening the battlefield into the economic and energy sphere through the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz. The next step may be to use the Houthis in Yemen as a lever in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb. But taking the steps many expected Iran to take under acute pressure is not the same as proving regime endurance. The post-war picture in Iran is likely to be shaped not only by military losses or retained offensive capabilities, but by something less visible in the short term. This includes the scale of damage to economic infrastructure, the burden on industrial recovery, and the future of Iran’s access to the regional financial and commercial environment that has helped it absorb pressure until now. If relations with the Gulf harden further, those constraints may become sharper still. The economic consequences of the war, whether debilitating or, under a negotiated settlement, partly reversible, may prove more consequential than the military phase itself. – The Real Test for Iran Comes After the War | Royal United Services Institute
(Andy Perry – ASPI The Strategist) Just reports of mines are often sufficient to disrupt maritime traffic. Even if ship owners, crews and insurers weren’t aware of the missile threat in the Strait of Hormuz, news reporting of sea mines in the narrow waters would likely be enough to stop commercial traffic that Iran didn’t direct through safe passages. That goes for even the US Navy, too. A single, inexpensive mine can threaten a multi-billion-dollar warship, and no navy, regardless of technological superiority, can afford to ignore that. Mine warfare doesn’t need to sink ships to succeed. It works by imposing unacceptable risk. So maritime access through the strait can be shaped less by firepower and more by caution, uncertainty, and slow responses of mine countermeasures forces. For this effect to endure, Iran will require the means to sustain it. To understand what comes next, we need to understand Iran’s mine warfare capability. – How Iran can stop shipping with mines – in the strait, the whole Gulf and even the Red Sea | The Strategist
(April Longley Alley – The Washington Institute) Following a month of saber rattling, the Houthis entered the Iran war on March 28 by firing missiles at southern Israel (none of which hit their targets). The move was apparently linked to the conflict’s recent escalatory trajectory. The day before the strike, Houthi spokesman Yahya Saree laid out for the first time what conditions would trigger military action by the group: (1) continued escalation against Iran and the “axis of jihad and resistance,” (2) additional alliances joining the fight on the side of the United States and Israel (likely implying the Arab Gulf states), and (3) the Red Sea being used to carry out hostile operations. Following the strikes, Saree explained the move as a response to continued U.S. and Israeli escalation, particularly the recent targeting of Iranian infrastructure. He noted that Houthi strikes would continue until “aggression against all fronts of the resistance ceases.” Indeed, given President Trump’s recent threats of heightened military action—whether aimed at destroying Iran’s critical infrastructure (e.g., electricity and desalination plants), capturing oil export facilities on Kharg Island with ground troops, reopening the Strait of Hormuz by force, and/or destroying Iran’s remaining stockpiles of high-enriched uranium—the Houthis are signaling that Tehran’s axis has escalatory options too. – The Houthis Join the War | The Washington Institute
(Karen E. Young – Middle East Institute/Afkar) The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states are confronting the greatest threat to their economic security and energy strategy since their formation. The economic fallout of the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran is severe, but uneven across the Gulf. So too is each state’s ability to sustain energy exports and protect critical infrastructure—both of which have been targeted unequally by Iran. The war has produced the largest disruption to global oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies in modern history. Before February 28, roughly 20 percent of global oil and 20 percent of exported global LNG flowed through the Strait of Hormuz. Since then, traffic has dropped to around 5 percent of normal levels. Following Iran’s March 18 strike on Qatar’s Ras Laffan LNG facility—the largest of its kind in the world—Qatari exports have effectively halted. Even under optimistic assumptions, export capacity could remain at least 17 percent below pre-war levels for three to five years. Qatar Energy alone stands to lose roughly $20 billion annually—against a 2025 government revenue baseline of $54 billion. – How the War Is Redefining Gulf Economic Power and Energy Strategy – Middle East Institute
(Alex Vatanka – Middle East Institute) Iran’s leadership did not take long to respond to President Donald Trump’s latest address on the war. Regime-linked media dismissed the April 1 White House speech as a repetition of earlier claims, while officials and commentators close to the Iranian government framed it as further evidence that Washington remains uncertain about its own course. Also notable was how widely the speech seemed to unsettle other audiences. In parts of the Iranian diaspora opposition, it appeared to narrow whatever limited space had existed for viewing the United States’ actions as aligned with Iranian aspirations. Among allies, including partners in Europe, Asia, and the Gulf, his remarks are bound to raise fresh questions about American war aims. And in global markets, the immediate reaction — rising oil prices and declining stock markets — suggested that investors heard not clarity but continued uncertainty. In the battle over messaging, Trump’s ambiguity is giving Iran’s narrative the edge. – Trump Address Wages War on the Message – Middle East Institute
