Today’s sources: Center for Strategic & International Studies; Council on Foreign Relations; Just Security; Royal United Services Institute
Artificial Intelligence
(Michael Loftus – Just Security) In Aug. 2021, a U.S. drone strike in Kabul, Afghanistan killed an aid worker after he loaded water jugs into his car and nine other civilians—including seven children. In Nov. 2023, an Israeli missile by the Lebanese border killed a grandmother and her three granddaughters who had also been handling water jugs. In April 2024, when the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck a visibly marked World Central Kitchen convoy, international condemnation of Israel’s campaign in Gaza spiked. And most recently, the Feb. 28 Tomahawk strike on the Shajarah Tayyebeh Elementary School in Minab, as well as reports of widespread use of algorithmic targeting in the ongoing Iran campaign, have provoked deep concern from U.S. Congress and the public regarding military operations relying on AI models (although it is not yet clear the extent to which AI contributed to the failures that led to the Minab strike). With algorithmic targeting shrinking the role of human operators and decentralized strike capabilities magnifying coordination challenges, high-profile incidents of civilians killed on the battlefield produce strategic-level consequences for both countries and the corporations that underwrite military capabilities. Existing Testing, Evaluation, Validation and Verification (TEVV) procedures insufficiently address the growing role of algorithms in military targeting, which risks undermining respect for humanitarian law. While the U.S. Defense Department’s (DoD) responsible AI implementation guidance emphasizes ethical principles and Directive 3000.09 mandates legal review of the procurement or modification of autonomous weapons systems to ensure compliance with domestic and international law, DoD does not currently have a specific requirement to ensure that targeting algorithms recognize humanitarian actors, including aid workers, nor is there a clear standard by which to measure compliance. This falls patently short of the United States’ obligation to take constant care and ensure feasible precautions to protect civilians under Article 57 of Additional Protocol I (AP I) to the Geneva Conventions and corresponding customary international humanitarian law (IHL). Closing this gap is crucial to both U.S. military and strategic effectiveness and compliance with the law. – AI Targeting Algorithms and the Failure to Recognize Protected Emblems
Nigeria
(Ebenezer Obadare – Council on Foreign Relations) Almost three years into a presidency that began on a distinctly rocky note, Nigerian President Bola Tinubu today appears politically unassailable. In a recent private conversation, a top Nigerian commentator who counts himself as a friend of the administration referred to Tinubu, a tad arrogantly, as “Lord of all he surveys.”. From a certain perspective, the hubris is justified. At his inauguration in May 2023, Tinubu looked all but certain to crumble under a barrage of challenges, among them simmering anger from a contentious election, an irate opposition, a festering security situation, and an economy that had been brought to its knees by his incompetent predecessor. If things feel a little bit different today, it is not because Tinubu has turned Nigeria into Singapore overnight, but because what The Financial Times once described as his “shock therapy” has found approval in the right international financial circles. In January, The Economist hailed Tinubu’s “bitter medicine” and expressed optimism that the Nigerian economy “may be back from the brink.” The newsmagazine’s sanguine assessment was indexed on the following: the rise in the country’s external reserves to a seven-year high $46 billion, the stabilization of the naira following its historic plummeting in 2023, and improvement in oil production in the wake of the political settlement that has brought relative stability to the Niger Delta for the first time in decades. – Tinubu’s Northern Trap | Council on Foreign Relations
UK
(Eliza Lockhart – Royal United Services Institute) The UK government’s decision to implement a moratorium on donations made in cryptocurrencies following the recommendations of the Rycroft Review has prompted debate between those who think such a measure is heavy-handed, and those who argue it does not go far enough. On one level, the question appears straightforward: should political parties be permitted to accept donations in crypto? In practice, however, this debate reflects a deeper issue. Crypto exposes structural weaknesses in a regime that remains focused on donations at the point of receipt, rather than the increasingly complex and transnational pathways through which political influence is now funded and exercised. – Crypto Moratorium is the Right Starting Point for Political Finance Reform | Royal United Services Institute
US
(James M. Lindsay – Council on Foreign Relations) Donald Trump addressed the nation on the Iran War (…). To judge by news reports, his goal was to reframe the public debate in his favor. Poll after poll shows that Americans remain deeply skeptical about the war’s merits and likely consequences. That skepticism has persisted despite the administration’s insistence that Operation Epic Fury is substantially degrading Iran’s military capabilities and will soon end. Political scientists would have cautioned the Trump team about how much a presidential speech can move public opinion. For all the talk of a presidential bully pulpit, there’s not much evidence it exists. To borrow a phrase that Bruce Jentleson coined years ago, Americans are “pretty prudent.” They care less about what is said than what has happened already and what is likely to happen tomorrow. Trump’s nineteen-minute address did little to address those concerns. Most of his remarks instead rehashed points he has been making since Operation Epic Fury began. He extolled the bravery and professionalism of the U.S. military (which are immense), denounced the evils of the Iranian regime (which are many), and promised better days ahead (which may or may not be coming). – President Trump’s Iran Address Left Critical Questions Unanswered | Council on Foreign Relations
(Council on Foreign Relations) President Donald Trump declared a national emergency on foreign trade on April 2, 2025. Calling it “Liberation Day,” he announced unprecedented tariff rates for every U.S. trading partner at a level not seen since 1909. The ultimate goal was to reduce the U.S. trade deficit by forcing countries to the negotiating table. But the Trump administration has sealed an underwhelming amount of trade deals in the ensuing year, and Americans have often borne the knock-on effects. Although the U.S. Supreme Court struck down some of Trump’s tariffs in late February, it appears that the White House is gearing up to get their tariff agenda back on track by other means. – A Year After ‘Liberation Day,’ Experts Review the Costs of Trump’s Tariffs | Council on Foreign Relations
US/Arctic
(Michael Schiffer – Just Security) Since his first day back in the Oval Office, President Donald Trump has made the Arctic one of his highest priorities for national and economic security. On Jan. 20 2025, he signed an executive order titled “Unleashing Alaska’s Extraordinary Resource Potential.” In March 2025, he ordered agencies to expedite critical mineral production as a national security imperative, specifically approving the Ambler Road Project to unlock mineral deposits in remote Arctic Alaska, all in turn part of the administration’s critical minerals agenda. The president’s focus on the Arctic goes beyond the state of Alaska, of which one third lies within the Arctic Circle. In October 2025, Trump signed a presidential memorandum authorizing the construction of Arctic Security Cutters, declaring the United States would restore its status as “a great Arctic power.” The cutters will supplement the Coast Guard’s fleet of icebreakers and other Arctic-capable vessels. A month later, the administration touted its “ICE Pact” with Finland and Canada to revive their respective shipbuilding industries as “the largest and most transformative Arctic and maritime investment in U.S. history.”. Trump’s interest in acquiring Greenland, whatever one thinks of that idea and his ham-handed method for pressing the case, reflected an underlying recognition that the Arctic has become a zone of serious strategic competition. Russia maintains the world’s largest icebreaker fleet and has been militarizing its northern approaches for years. China has declared itself a “near-Arctic state” and is expanding its polar footprint. Climate change, whether the administration wants to acknowledge it or not, will soon remake global navigation and chokepoints, as the Arctic becomes ice-free year-round. So the administration has correctly identified the strategic direction in making the case for an enhanced American Arctic posture. The problem is that the administration’s own policies are systematically destroying the operational means necessary to execute this strategy. In doing so, it is not enhancing America’s security posture but, rather, eroding the strategic position of the United States in the Arctic more effectively than any adversary could hope. – The Trump Administration Is Sabotaging Its Own Arctic Strategy
War in Iran/Middle East/Gulf and beyond
(Heather Williams and Joseph Rodgers – Center for Strategic & International Studies) In a 20-minute speech on April 1, President Donald Trump referred to nuclear weapons over 20 times. The speech opened with an overview of the risks of a nuclear Iran as justification for the war and outlined progress in setting back the program: “For years, everyone has said that Iran cannot have nuclear weapons. But in the end, those are just words. If you’re not willing to take action when the time comes.”. By relying on the nuclear justification for the war, however, Trump may have painted himself into a corner because now, the end of the war must also have a nuclear solution. The nuclear issue is likely to determine not only when the war ends, but also how it ends, and who can claim “victory.” Ultimately, Trump needs a face-saving and expeditious off-ramp to resolve the nuclear issue if he is to achieve his objectives as outlined in the speech. – Options for the United States to Resolve the Iran Nuclear Challenge
(Will Todman – Center for Strategic & International Studies) On April 1, President Trump announced that the United States’ strategic objectives in the war with Iran were “nearing completion.” He threatened to send Iran “back to the stone ages” if it did not make a deal within three weeks, and said “we have all the cards, they have none.”. Yet, Iran does have other cards to play. A few days before President Trump’s address, the Houthis entered the fray in the Middle East. After months of signaling their readiness to escalate, they launched missiles toward Israel. Iranian officials had warned that their Yemeni proxies would be activated if the United States and Israel escalated further or if Arab Gulf states entered the war. But despite these threats and the Houthis’ past willingness to target international shipping, they have not attacked maritime traffic through Bab al-Mandab so far this year. Following Iran’s effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, Bab al-Mandab is the Middle East’s most critical maritime chokepoint. – The Houthi Threat: Is Trump Underestimating One of Iran’s Key Remaining Cards?
(Daniel Byman – Center for Strategic & International Studies) It is difficult to tell which side is winning in the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran because the objectives and strategies for victory of the combatants are so different. This is even further complicated by the fact that, for the United States, many of the highest costs of the war lie outside the theater of conflict and involve the economic costs to U.S. allies and the diplomatic damage to the United States. President Donald Trump and his advisers have laid out multiple goals for the United States, some quite limited and others expansive. These include ending Iran’s nuclear program, degrading its missile capabilities and conventional military stocks, stopping Tehran’s support for Hezbollah, Hamas, and other proxy forces, and, most ambitiously, regime change in Tehran. To achieve these goals, the United States and Israel have killed Iranian leaders and bombed Iran’s military forces and infrastructure. – Who Is Winning the Iran War?
(Leslie Abrahams and Lauryn Williams – Center for Strategic & International Studies) The energy sector has long been targeted as a point of leverage in geopolitical conflict. Historically, energy disruptions were concentrated on logistical and supply interruptions to exert economic pressure on adversaries—for example, through sanctions, oil embargos, and restrictions on key shipping lanes. More recently, however, direct physical attacks on energy infrastructure have increasingly been deployed as a core military strategy. In the context of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, strikes on Ukrainian energy systems tripled this year over previous years of the war, resulting in a near collapse of the country’s power grid. Last week, President Donald Trump threatened attacks on Iran’s electricity grid, and Iran responded that it would retaliate against energy and water systems across the Gulf. Today, Iran does not have long-range weapons capable of causing physical damage to domestic U.S. energy infrastructure. However, a physical risk remains; Iran has increasingly used unmanned aircraft systems to attack critical assets, and pro-Iranian entities within the United States have capabilities to use drones as weapons—a threat that is difficult for utilities to counter. The threat, however, does not end with physical attacks; the energy sector is vulnerable to, and has been increasingly targeted by, cyber threat actors in recent years. For several years, there has been strong evidence that foreign adversaries, notably the People’s Republic of China (PRC), have successfully infiltrated and pre-positioned on U.S. critical infrastructure, including energy systems. While these instances have not caused outages, significantly, they have demonstrated the PRC’s interest in targeting strategic critical infrastructure for disruption, including during future conflict. The United States itself has become more vocal about offensive cyber capabilities targeting the grid. In January, U.S. Cyber Command reportedly conducted a cyberattack, strategically turning power off and on in Venezuela in support of the mission to capture Nicolás Maduro, with President Trump famously stating a power blackout surrounding the raid was “due to a certain expertise that we have.”. Cyberattacks originating from Iran are a key concern as well. For more than a decade, Iran has invested heavily in its cyber capabilities and cultivated ties to hacker groups. Iran has so far conducted limited disruptive strikes in the current conflict, outside of the attack targeting U.S. medical technology firm Stryker. But, cybersecurity firms and critical infrastructure threat advisory groups warn of a heightened cyber threat environment as the Middle East conflict continues. The Trump administration has downplayed indications of imminent risk, but urged energy companies to increase physical and cybersecurity measures in case of retaliatory attacks. Even before the February airstrikes escalated geopolitical tensions, the cyber threat environment surrounding the United States energy infrastructure has been accelerating. In February, the Department of Energy Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response issued its first strategic plan to protect U.S. energy infrastructure from cybersecurity threats, physical attacks, and natural disasters. This year, the World Economic Forum ranked “cyber insecurity” a top 10 global risk, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s 2026 Annual Threat Assessment warned U.S. critical infrastructure, including the energy sector, faces escalating cyber challenges. – Iran Conflict Heightens Cyber Threats to U.S. Energy Infrastructure
(Caitlin Welsh – Center for Strategic & International Studies) The energy and fertilizer market disruptions resulting from the Iran war are threatening agriculture markets and food prices around the world. How could these market shocks affect food systems? What evidence are we seeing to date, and what are the policy solutions for farmers and consumers—in the United States and worldwide? – Iran, Fertilizer, and Food Security: Risks, Impacts, and Policy Responses
(John Augé and Kathryn Paik – Center for Strategic & International Studies) Despite their geographic distance from the Middle East, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz is having significant impacts on the Pacific Island countries, which are highly vulnerable to both oil pricing and supply. –Pacific Island Countries Are Highly Vulnerable to Oil Supply and Pricing
(Graeme Herd – Royal United Services Institute) Operations ‘Epic Fury’ and ‘Roaring Lion’ seek regime change in the Iranian Islamic Republic, understood as an end to Iran’s missile (launcher and production site) and nuclear programmes. Success would be International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections of Tehran’s nuclear sites and a surrender of its stockpile of weapons-grade fissile material to the US. Iran would pose no imminent threat to Israel or to US in the longer term. Two other unstated but reasonable-to-expect outcomes would follow. First, the US consolidates its position as the primary security provider and stabilizer in the region. Second, the Iranian energy sector – as with Venezuela following Maduro’s ousting – opens to US investment and influence over strategic sales to preferred partners, and control of global supply and the Strait of Hormuz. From the moment daylight strikes began on 28 February, at least four Iranian alternative end-state scenarios appeared possible, each resting on assumptions that can be made explicit. – Four Alternative End States in Iran – the Only Good One Becomes Unlikely | Royal United Services Institute
