Today’s sources: Atlantic Council; Council on Foreign Relations; The Jamestown Foundation; The Soufan Center
Armenia/Russia
(Paul Globe) Yerevan wants Moscow to cede Russian control of South Caucasus Railway to a third country with good relations with both Armenia and Russia, with Kazakhstan, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar most often mentioned. That would end Russia’s control of railways in Armenia under a 2008 agreement currently set to run to 2038 and deprive Moscow of yet another of its levers in the South Caucasus, thereby allowing Yerevan to pursue a more independent line. Moscow is reluctant, and if it resists, Yerevan could denounce the 2008 agreement and seek a partner even less to Russia’s liking, including the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the European Union, which would not want Moscow to slow east–west trade. – Russia at Risk of Losing Control of Railways in Armenia – Jamestown
China
(Daniel Fu – Jamestown Foundation) Experts in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) argue that the country’s energy system is resilient enough to withstand major external disruptions, including conflict in the Persian Gulf, repudiating Western claims of PRC vulnerability to strategic chokepoints. Through supply route diversification via Russia, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia, potential blockades of the straits of Hormuz or Malacca now inflict less economic damage to the PRC’s energy supply. Global economic interdependence and the PRC’s growing domestic energy capacity further limit risk of disruption. Strategic petroleum reserves, diversified imports, domestic production (especially coal), and rapid expansion of renewable energy have helped reduce the PRC’s reliance on seaborne oil and enhanced its long-term energy security. – The Myth of the PRC’s Overseas Energy Vulnerability – Jamestown
(Melanie Hart, Caroline Costello, and Samantha Wong – Atlantic Council) Earlier this month, hundreds of Chinese officials filed into the Great Hall of the People in Beijing to approve the nation’s new five-year development plan. Rank-and-file delegates to China’s National People’s Congress sat down low, in a semicircle, gazing up at the main stage. Chinese President Xi Jinping sat center stage, well above the crowd, flanked by Communist Party leaders in a setting reminiscent of “The Last Supper,” Leonardo Da Vinci’s famous High Renaissance painting. On paper, the roughly three thousand delegates who attend this meeting from across the nation—representing every province and ethnic group and gazing up at the dais—have final say over policy. In reality, that group is a rubber stamp. The seating chart is designed to remind everyone where the real power lies: with Xi Jinping and the party leaders granted a seat up on the main stage. Beijing holds these National People’s Congress meetings every spring. Every five years, the gathering signs off on a new five-year development plan. This year’s version is the fifteenth such plan issued since 1953, so Beijing refers to it as the fifteenth five-year plan. These plans signal how Beijing views the world, what their priorities are, and how they want the Chinese people to view their government and where the nation is headed. The meetings are highly scripted, and the plans are finalized well in advance. This year, Beijing crafted the political theatre to send a very clear top-line message: Everything is going according to plan. China is becoming a high-tech power on the world stage, the economy is moving toward higher-value-added growth, and the Chinese Communist Party is taking care of the Chinese people. To the extent that there are bumps in the road, that is due to China’s “external environment,” particularly the United States, which Beijing likes to paint as a global spoiler. Those top lines are fairly consistent year-to-year. Beijing always uses these meetings to signal that everything is going according to plan. The details are where things get interesting. This year, five key signals stood out as particularly relevant to the United States and its allies. – Five takeaways for US policymakers about China’s new five-year development plan – Atlantic Council
China/Latin America
(Jonas Wright-Lee – Council on Foreign Relations) In February, tensions escalated between China and Panama following the annulment of two Chinese port contracts, prompting public threats and retaliatory measures. The United States imposed visa restrictions on Chilean officials over a proposed underwater fiber-optic cable and hosted a critical minerals summit that led to agreements with Argentina, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, and Peru. China signed more than twelve agreements during a state visit by Uruguayan President Yamandú Orsi and made meaningful infrastructure investments across the region. – China in Latin America: February 2026 | Council on Foreign Relations
France/Algeria
(Karim Mezran – Atlantic Council) There are signs of a thaw between Algeria and France, nearly two years after the onset of the serious diplomatic crisis between the North African nation aUS/Cuband former colonial power. Ambassador Stéphane Romatet may soon return to lead France’s diplomatic mission in Algiers, as both countries have taken concrete steps on the diplomatic front. However, there appears to be no real political strategy in Algeria for redefining its relationship with France, with the risk that progress in the current favorable moment could lose momentum and end with the two countries stuck in a new limbo. Over recent months, Algeria has softened its positions on issues related to the colonial past. In particular, on March 9, the Algerian parliament approved an amended law condemning French colonial rule, removing provisions that had called for France to issue official apologies and broad compensation. The Algerian Senate had called for the removal of these provisions, saying that they did not reflect President Abdelmadjid Tebboune’s official approach. The amended law helped to at least partially ease the long-standing dispute with France. – Can France and Algeria get their relationship back on track? – Atlantic Council
Russia
(Alex Horobets – The Jamestown Foundation) The March 5 detention of former First Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Ruslan Tsalikov marks a major blow to Russian Secretary of the Security Council Sergei Shoigu’s inner circle. The investigation treats long-standing corruption within the Ministry of Defense as the activity of a single criminal group. Putin keeps Shoigu in formal positions, but his clan and bureaucratic influence are being systematically dismantled. This is a convenient arrangement for the Kremlin: the former minister remains manageable while being stripped of real power and resources. Criminal cases serve as a tool to push out Shoigu’s network, as the technocratic team led by current Defense Minister Andrei Belousov takes control of the military budget under increased oversight from the security services. The central question is whether Russian President Vladimir Putin will change the system or just replace the beneficiaries of corruption. – Tsalikov’s Detention Marks Major Blow to Shoigu’s Inner Circle – Jamestown
US
(Tressa Guenov – Atlantic Council) The United States relies on intelligence alliances and partnerships to maintain its security. Taking major action without informing allies and criticizing allies in public undermine these critical intelligence-sharing mechanisms. Without trust and reciprocity, the United States will lack a full intelligence picture as it works to counter Russian, Chinese, North Korean, Iranian, and transnational threats. – By alienating its intelligence partners, the US risks losing more than trust – Atlantic Council
US/Cuba
(Diana Roy – Council on Foreign Relations) Since January, the Donald Trump administration has severely limited oil shipments to Cuba, a decision which has sparked fuel shortages, sharp price increases, and prolonged power outages—the country has already experienced three nationwide blackouts in March. Cuba’s recent economic and energy crises stem from a combination of long-standing structural challenges and policy decisions, including underinvestment in the energy sector, but Trump’s hard-line policies and economic sanctions have exacerbated these difficulties since he returned to office in 2025. Senior U.S. officials have indicated that the end goal of these policies is to bring about political and economic liberalization in Cuba, including the potential removal of President Miguel Díaz-Canel from power. “Cuba has an economy that doesn’t work and a political and governmental system that can’t fix it. So they have to change dramatically,” said U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio on March 17. “They’ve got some big decisions to make over there.”. Despite the increasingly aggressive rhetoric and growing economic pressure, experts said that the Trump administration’s goals remain unclear and doubt that a Venezuela-style military takeover of Cuba is likely—particularly as the United States remains engaged in a widening conflict with Iran. Michael J. Bustamante, chair in Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami, told CFR that the Trump administration’s approach “seems very, very unpredictable.” But part of the strategy, he added, could be to “try to keep Cuban counterparts guessing.”. Trump has repeatedly claimed that the Cuban government is nearing a breaking point due to the U.S. embargo, saying the island is “seeing the end” and suggesting that the United States could pursue additional action soon—though he has not indicated what that would be. These comments have drawn sharp rebuke from the Cuban government, with Díaz-Canel vowing to respond with “impregnable resistance” to “any external aggressor.” Cuban Deputy Foreign Minister Carlos Fernández de Cossío later said that the island is preparing for potential U.S. “military aggression” as tensions between the two countries mount. But Díaz-Canel publicly confirmed on March 13 that Cuba is in negotiations with the United States to find solutions to the two countries’ differences, with talks currently in their initial stages. – Trump’s ‘Maximum Pressure’ Campaign on Cuba, Explained | Council on Foreign Relations
War in Iran/Middle East/Gulf and beyond
(John C. K. Daly – The Jamestown Foundation) The conflict in and around Iran has disrupted emerging Eurasian transport networks, undermining reliance on Iranian corridors. Rapid infrastructure growth and rising transit volumes through Iran are jeopardized by U.S.–Israeli air strikes and regional instability. Iran had become a critical hub in the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative and the Russia-led International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC). Attacks on key Iranian ports such as Chabahar and Bandar Abbas have stalled connectivity projects, forcing regional states to reconsider alternatives, such as the Middle Corridor that bypasses Iran. – Iran Conflict Derails Eurasian Transport Development – Jamestown
(The Soufan Center) The Houthis’ entry into the Iran War signifies that the economic shockwaves caused by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz may soon be compounded by disruptions in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. A system in which ‘non-hostile’ states willing to pay hefty dues to Tehran are granted safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz could cause a bifurcation in economic effects. Secondary logistics hubs such as Salalah port in Oman and Jeddah port in Saudi Arabia may serve as targets for Iran or the Houthis to exercise further pressure on the global economy. The fertilizer crunch is felt globally, mostly in the Northern Hemisphere with planting season in full swing, but its effects on global food supply may become apparent as soon as the fall. – One Month In: Economic Imbroglio and Supply Chain Disintegration – The Soufan Center
