(Marco Emanuele)
Ivo Daalder, già Ambasciatore degli Stati Uniti alla NATO, scrive per POLITICO che, nella guerra in Iran, il presidente americano Trump si trova intrappolato tra due opzioni negative: la necessità di intensificare il conflitto con truppe di terra o l’accettazione di un accordo che, con buone probabilità, avrebbe potuto ottenere senza una guerra. Ma, sottolinea Daalder, Trump si affida anzitutto al suo istinto.
L’Autore pone un punto decisivo, che condividiamo: l’importanza, in trattative così delicate, di avere un corpo di negoziatori-diplomatici, non improvvisati. Il pensiero va, inevitabilmente, agli amici e familiari del presidente. Ma il tema è strutturale, non legato alle persone. Non si può sovrapporre il contesto di negoziazioni in ambito privato con quello di trattative per concludere una guerra: situazioni completamente diverse, altri livelli di complessità.
Scrive Daadler che, secondo i negoziatori improvvisati, the idea is that if one side “holds the cards,” the other side must fold. But that’s not how diplomacy works. E cita i 28 punti per l’Ucraina, i 20 per Gaza, i 15 per l’Iran.
Daadler conclude amaramente: Now, Trump is stuck in a situation of his own making. His gut let him down. His negotiators don’t know how to deal with a determined enemy that seeks its own survival by imposing maximum pain on others. And we’re all paying the price.
Nella guerra mondiale ‘a pezzi’, sempre più diffusa nella condizione ‘onlife’ (non più solo offline e non più solo online), l’arte diplomatica deve certo ripensarsi in termini di comprensione delle modalità della guerra e di costruzione della pace, ma non può snaturarsi. L’istinto non basta, tanto quanto la convinzione (che diventa auto-inganno) che ogni contesto equivalga all’altro, che basti imporre la propria posizione di (presunto) dominio per ‘vincere’. Invece, vincono le sfumature, mai la realtà è bianca o nera: tutto è complesso.
(English Version)
Ivo Daalder, former US Ambassador to NATO, writes for POLITICO that, in the war in Iran, US President Trump finds himself caught between two undesirable options: the need to escalate the conflict with ground troops, or accepting a deal that he could, in all likelihood, have secured without going to war. But, Daalder points out, Trump relies first and foremost on his instincts.
The author makes a crucial point, which we agree with: the importance, in such delicate negotiations, of having a team of negotiators-diplomats, not amateurs. One’s thoughts inevitably turn to the president’s friends and family. But the issue is structural, not tied to individuals. One cannot equate the context of private negotiations with that of talks to end a war: completely different situations, different levels of complexity.
Daalder writes that, according to improvised negotiators, the idea is that if one side “holds the cards,” the other side must fold. But that’s not how diplomacy works. And he cites the 28 points for Ukraine, the 20 for Gaza, the 15 for Iran.
Daadler concludes bitterly: Now, Trump is stuck in a situation of his own making. His gut let him down. His negotiators don’t know how to deal with a determined enemy that seeks its own survival by imposing maximum pain on others. And we’re all paying the price.
In the ‘fragmented’ world war, increasingly prevalent in the ‘onlife’ condition (no longer just offline and no longer just online), the art of diplomacy must certainly rethink itself in terms of understanding the nature of war and the building of peace, but it cannot lose its essence. Instinct is not enough, nor is the conviction (which becomes self-deception) that every context is the same as another, that it is enough to impose one’s position of (supposed) dominance to ‘win’. Instead, it is the nuances that prevail. Reality is never black and white: everything is complex.
