From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye.
Today’s about: Armenia-Karabakh Refugees-Azerbaijan; Bangladesh-India; China; China-Gulf-Central Asia; China-Russia-Far East-Arctic; Guinea-Guinea Bissau; Humanitarian Aid; India; India-Jordan-Oman; Myanmar; Nuclear Deterrence; Papua New Guinea-IMF; Philippines-ASEAN; Quantum Computing; Russia-Ukraine; Sub-Saharan Africa; Sudan; Thailand; Thailand-Cambodia; Ukraine-Taiwan; US; US-Europe
Armenia – Karabakh Refugees – Azerbaijan
(Joshua Kucera-Crisis Group) Armenia’s struggle to integrate over 100,000 refugees who fled Nagorno-Karabakh when Azerbaijan seized back control of the territory in 2023 risks undermining the country’s efforts to unite society behind its push for a lasting peace with Baku. – As Armenia Strives for Peace, Karabakh Refugees in Danger of Getting Left Behind | International Crisis Group
Bangladesh – India
(Crisis Group) Suspicion lingers between Dhaka and New Delhi after the ouster of Sheikh Hasina, the Bangladeshi premier whom India had backed. Further strain on ties would hurt both countries. Fresh elections in Bangladesh are a chance for the two governments to put the tensions behind them. – After the “Golden Era”: Getting Bangladesh-India Ties Back on Track | International Crisis Group
China
(Mariko Watanabe – East Asia Forum) Key to China’s industrial policy success is not mere subsidies but a system of coordination underpinned by the central government’s Catalogue of Industrial Guidance. With resources flowing to sectors prioritised by the catalogue, economies of scale have helped propel China’s manufacturing output. But the expansive support of the catalogue has produced a new structural crisis in the Chinese economy — overcapacity. If the sources of industrial policy failure behind China’s overcapacity are not addressed, scale — which has been a key pillar of Chinese and global prosperity — threatens to transform into a dangerous liability. – China’s industrial policy a recipe of overcapacity | East Asia Forum
China-Gulf-Central Asia
(Roman Vakulchuk, Kamila Beishembaeva – East Asia Forum) China and the Gulf states are expanding renewable energy investment in Central Asia. Through complementary competition, they vie for influence while occupying distinct and often mutually supportive roles in clean energy projects, particularly in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. While foreign investment carries dependency risks, the pace and direction of Central Asia’s decarbonisation will ultimately depend on regional governments’ ability to diversify partners and set the terms of engagement. – How China and the Gulf states are shaping Central Asia’s energy transition | East Asia Forum
China-Russia-Far East-Arctic
In the past decade, the development of the Far East has resonated with the continuous enhancement of China-Russia relations. A series of initiatives of mutually beneficial cooperation carried out by China and Russia centered on the local cooperation between Northeast China and the Russian Far East constitutes one of the endogenous driving forces of China-Russia relations. As an important region on the northward route of the Belt and Road Initiative, the Far East is a crucial area for China and Russia to build the “Polar Silk Road.” The Sino-Russian cooperation forms a transportation corridor of the Eurasian continent and the main artery of energy transportation realizes “connectivity”, expands cooperation in the fields of economy, trade, and investment, and deepens cooperation in the energy field. It is also one of the priority directions to support the China-Russia strategic partnership and promote practical cooperation. The sub-regional cooperation between China and Russia in the Northeast and Far East regions has formed a “strategic stabilizer” for bilateral relations. This means that through deeply intertwined and mutually beneficial substantive cooperation and institutional arrangements at the sub-regional level, a “shock-absorbing layer” and “ballast stone” have been constructed for the macro-level strategic relations, enabling them to maintain stability and development in a complex environment. Significantly reduce the possibility of derailment or significant fluctuations in the bilateral relations between China and Russia. – Sino-Russian Sub-Regional Cooperation in the Far East and Arctic: From “Border Economic Belt” to “Strategic Cooperation Engine” | The Arctic Institute – Center for Circumpolar Security Studies
Guinea – Guinea Bissau
(Crisis Group) Dans cet épisode d’Afrique 360°, Rinaldo Depagne et son co-présentateur, Ibrahim Yahaya Ibrahim, reçoivent Vincent Foucher, chargé de recherches au Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, pour parler du coup d’état du 26 novembre en Guinée-Bissau et de l’élection présidentielle qui se tiendra dans quelques jours en Guinée-Conakry. – Guinée et Guinée-Bissau entre putschs et élections | International Crisis Group
Humanitarian Aid
(Sam Vigersky – Council on Foreign Relations) On a cool Geneva morning in early December 2024, Tom Fletcher, the United Nations’ newly appointed under-secretary-general for humanitarian affairs, entered the stately Palais de Nations to launch the 2025 Global Humanitarian Overview (GHO). “The world is on fire,” Fletcher told journalists, bobbing his head for effect, “and this is how we will put it out,” a copy of the GHO raised in his right hand. More of a technocratic roadmap than fire hose, the GHO is nonetheless the United Nations’ signature humanitarian product. Equal parts planning instrument and communications playbook, it forecasts who needs help, where and why they need it, and what interventions could alleviate their suffering—along with the costs. – The Great Aid Recession: 2025’s Humanitarian Crash in Nine Charts | Council on Foreign Relations
India
(Nandan Dawda – Observer Research Foundation) India’s cities are facing a severe mobility crisis. According to the TomTom Traffic Index 2024-25, major Indian metropolitan cities rank among the most congested cities in the world, with commuters losing an average of 94 hours to traffic congestion annually. Urban transport is also a major source of fine PM2.5 particulate pollution, accounting for up to 40 percent in Bengaluru and Pune, and up to 41 percent in Delhi. Yet, despite significant investments in metro rail, road infrastructure, and bus systems, mobility remains unsafe, unreliable, and grossly unequal. While every monsoon exposes infrastructural vulnerabilities, recurring heatwaves and extreme weather put further stress on the ageing transport systems. Private vehicle ownership is on the rise, growing by almost 10 percent annually, outpacing population growth and precipitating a decline in public transport ridership. More alarmingly, bus ridership has contracted in most major cities, further increasing congestion and shrinking last-mile access, which is critical for the poor, women, and the elderly. These urban mobility challenges are symptomatic of an underlying governance problem. Urban transportation functions are split up among an array of agencies, including municipal bodies, state transport undertakings, traffic police, regulatory bodies, and metro corporations, each with its own specific mandates and jurisdictions, and each riddled by severe capacity constraints in sector-specific governance and technological expertise. This multiplicity has led to fragmented decision-making, a lack of institutional coordination, and a focus on short-term, project-based interventions rather than longer-term planning, hindering the establishment of an integrated urban mobility system. – The Case for a Dedicated Urban Transport Service Cadre in India
India-Jordan-Oman
(Prasanta Kumar Pradhan – Manohar Parrikar Institute) Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited two key West Asian countries—Jordan and Oman—during his three-nation tour from 15 to 18 December, which also included Ethiopia. The visit was significant in reinvigorating India’s relations with Jordan and in further strengthening the already robust India–Oman partnership. More broadly, the tour contributed to advancing India’s ‘Think West’ policy by reinforcing New Delhi’s diplomatic, economic and strategic engagement with the West Asian region. – Modi’s Visit to Jordan and Oman Reinforces India’s ‘Think West’ Policy – MP-IDSA
Myanmar
(FULCRUM) Myanmar’s generals are once again offering elections as a transition process in Myanmar, promising a return to stability. The State Security and Peace Commission (SSPC) regime is reprising the military’s 2010 playbook, when it dangled the 2011 transition to democracy as an attempt to stabilise the country and its economy. Electors have no real choices, however. Given that key opposition parties (including the National League for Democracy or NLD) have decided to forgo participation in the polls, the military and its political proxies are expected to do well. But this would be largely symbolic and would not resolve many of the contradictions that forestall a return to the state of affairs before the 2021 coup. – Myanmar’s 2025 Election: Rhetoric and Realities | FULCRUM
(Joanne Lin, Moe Thuzar – FULCRUM) In late December 2025 and January 2026, Myanmar’s generals will stage what seems to be a return to electoral politics. The polls, which the State Security and Peace Commission (SSPC) military regime is touting as a “return to democracy”, will be held under a new electoral system and introduce electronic voting. The existing first-past-the-post (FPTP) system, which has hitherto characterised all previous Myanmar elections, will be combined with proportional representation (PR) for seats in the bicameral legislature, including at state and regional-level assemblies. Such a move in Myanmar’s present political situation raises concerns, as the FPTP/PR combination would give the military and its allies the power to dominate the legislature, while ethnic nationalities would not gain more voice. – Why ASEAN Must Hold the Line on Myanmar’s Election | FULCRUM
Nuclear Deterrence
(Lukasz Kulesa – RUSI) The 80th anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 2025, and the awarding of the 2024 Nobel Peace Prize to Nihon Hidankyo – the grassroots movement of atomic bomb survivors of these two attacks – as well as increased tension between nuclear-armed states, have brought additional attention to the question of whether there can be realistic pathways to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons and pursue nuclear disarmament. This paper summarises the results of a project between RUSI and the Hiroshima Organization for Global Peace (HOPe), and examines pathways for reducing the roles and functions of nuclear weapons. – Reducing Global Reliance on Nuclear Deterrence | Royal United Services Institute
Papua New Guinea-IMF
(Maholopa Laveil – East Asia Forum) At the end of 2026, the IMF loan program with Papua New Guinea will end after more than three years of lending. IMF conditions have helped stabilise budgets and ease foreign exchange rationing, but anti-corruption reforms have stalled and PNG risks being grey-listed by the Financial Action Task Force. Australia has used IMF-linked lending to deepen its bilateral ties with PNG. The program’s end will test PNG’s institutional commitment to reform absent IMF oversight. – PNG’s IMF-led reform era draws to a close | East Asia Forum
Philippines-ASEAN
(Simran Walia – Manohar Parrikar Institute) The Philippines will chair ASEAN in 2026, with the theme ‘Navigating our Future, Together’. In light of the evolving dynamics between the United States and China, this chairmanship offers both opportunities and challenges for regional stability and the security environment in Southeast Asia. In addition to providing a forum for communication and debate among its member countries, ASEAN’s primary function is to facilitate summits and other events with nations such as the US, Japan and India.In foreign policy and Indo-Pacific regional security, Manila’s agenda for the ASEAN chairmanship would include several goals and priorities. President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. declared three main priorities: People Empowerment, Prosperity Corridors, and Peace and Security Anchors. Given the geopolitical difficulties facing Southeast Asia, these three ‘Ps’ represent an ambitious agenda centred on regional stability and inclusive economic progress. – The Philippines as 2026 ASEAN Chair: Expectations and Challenges – MP-IDSA
Quantum Computing
(Prateek Tripathi – Observer Research Foundation) Despite decades of research and investment, progress in quantum computing remains hindered by its Achilles’ heel: the lack of practical applicability. Even by the most optimistic estimates, commercially relevant quantum computers are “at least a decade away,” a statement which has been reiterated time and again. Although recent developments in quantum error-correction and hardware are certainly encouraging, practical large-scale quantum computers are still likely a long way off. However, numerous false and superficial assertions were made regarding the technology. In addition to being disingenuous in many cases, this also has the added impact of severely undermining public confidence in an otherwise blossoming scientific endeavour. There is an urgent need for the field to undergo a reality check while dispelling the rumours and false claims that plague it, to clearly recognise and address the major obstacles being faced by the technology. – Quantum Computing: Separating Hype from Reality
Russia-Ukraine
(V K Saxena – Vivekananda International Foundation) While even the mention of Ukraine’s victory at this time and stage of the Russo-Ukraine war may be unthinkable, but in the course of nearly four years now, the credit for several acts of tactical and strategic brilliance in the battlefield cannot be snatched from them. This work recounts some such acts briefly, for their abiding value to a warfighter. – Russo-Ukraine war – Some Sparks of Brilliance Re-visited | Vivekananda International Foundation
Sub-Saharan Africa
(The Soufan Center) An attempted coup in Benin and a military takeover in Guinea-Bissau underscore the continuous exploitation of deteriorating security conditions, socioeconomic grievances, and institutional backsliding in parts of sub-Saharan Africa. The security situation in the Sahel and West Africa remains dire, forming the epicenter of terrorism casualties and Islamist insurgencies, with al-Qaeda and Islamic State-affiliated groups wreaking havoc throughout the region. In Benin, the military coup was thwarted through loyal armed forces and an Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) standby force spearheaded by Nigeria, which struck the putschists with air strikes. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has faced criticism in recent years regarding the need for reform to ensure its continued relevance, and it appears increasingly aware of this. – Putschists in West Africa: ECOWAS Response Differs in Benin, Guinea-Bissau – The Soufan Center
Sudan
(Crisis Group) This week on The Horn, we post a recent discussion between Crisis Group’s CEO and President, Comfort Ero, and leading expert Alex de Waal, about ongoing efforts to bring Sudan’s war to an end. – Bonus Episode: Reflecting on Sudan’s Collapse and Elusive Peace | International Crisis Group
Thailand
(Pongkwan Sawasdipakdi – FULCRUM) On the night of 12 December, Thai politics entered a new phase when Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul dissolved the Parliament, paving the way for elections likely to be held in early February 2026. It is still far too early to predict a frontrunner. Yet despite the electoral uncertainty, Thailand’s approach toward Cambodia amid the current tensions and conflict is unlikely to become more conciliatory. Much has been written about the roles of nationalism and electoral incentives in hardening Thailand’s stance in the current conflict. Less discussed, however, is how the Constitutional Court’s verdict against former Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra may constrain the range of diplomatic choices available to future leaders. While the ruling does not explain the origins of the current conflict, the court’s reasoning carries broader implications for the boundaries of acceptable diplomacy in Thailand’s foreign policy, especially in times of conflict. – Court Ruling Against Former PM Will Haunt Thailand’s Cambodia Policy | FULCRUM
Thailand – Cambodia
(Tita Sanglee – FULCRUM) The collapse of the Thailand-Cambodia “peace deal” six weeks after its signing at the 47th ASEAN Summit is hardly surprising. After all, the fast-tracked peace brokered by Malaysia under American and Chinese oversight was devoid of any organic de-escalation. Thailand-Cambodia disputes, born of ambiguous colonial-era demarcation and requiring sustained mutual accommodation and concession, repel any quick and conclusive resolution. Hampering this is the routine instrumentalisation of historical grievances for domestic political gains, which is played out contingently alongside government changes and interpersonal ties. This encourages flare-ups, and the conundrum emerges as to why the materially richer Thailand cannot deter the weaker Cambodia. – Thailand’s Deterrence Failure Against Cambodia: A Focus on Structural Hindrances | FULCRUM
Ukraine – Taiwan
(David Axe – ASPI The Strategist) The notable thing was the timing. In back-to-back strikes on Russian air power from 18 to 20 December, the Ukrainian state security agency, the vaunted SBU, launched long-range attack drones at Russian warplanes at Belbek air base, in occupied Crimea 240 km from the front line. Imagery from the nighttime or early morning attacks indicates that the drones hit a Mikoyan MiG-31 interceptor and two Sukhoi Su-27 fighters. The drone strikes on Russian warplanes were, from a certain point of view, unremarkable: Ukrainian drones have hit 14 Russian aircraft on the ground in Crimea since August. What was remarkable was when the drones struck. The MiG-31 and one of the Su-27s were fully armed and fuelled and their crews were in the cockpits at the moment the drones barrelled in. It’s rare for a Ukrainian drone to hit a Russian warplane when it’s fully loaded and most vulnerable to catastrophic secondary explosions. That the Ukrainians did it twice in three days indicates it wasn’t an accident. It’s apparent the SBU knew the aircraft were getting ready to launch and timed the drone strikes accordingly. How the SBU knew isn’t hard to guess—and it sheds light on a critical Western capability—and vulnerability. It’s one that could win a war in the western Pacific or, by way of its absence, lose the same war. Fast, fine-grain intelligence makes all the difference between a successful deep strike and a failed one. Even more than Ukraine, the US-led alliance that may come to Taiwan’s defence in the event of a Chinese attack on the island democracy utterly depends on deep strikes for victory. – Another lesson from Ukraine for Taiwan’s friends: the power of surveillance | The Strategist
US
(Mark F. Cancian – Center for Strategic & International Studies) On December 22, President Trump announced a new class of “battleships” that will be 100 times more powerful than previous battleships and larger than any other surface combatant on the oceans. The ship’s purported characteristics are so extraordinary that the announcement will surely spark immense discussion. However, there is little need for said discussion because this ship will never sail. It will take years to design, cost $9 billion each to build, and contravene the Navy’s new concept of operations, which envisions distributed firepower. A future administration will cancel the program before the first ship hits the water. – The Golden Fleet’s Battleship Will Never Sail
(Esther Brimmer – Council on Foreign Relations) The December 18 swearing-in of Jared Isaacman as the new NASA administrator and the announcement of a new national space policy reasserts the Trump administration’s aim to achieve U.S. dominance in space. The stakes of President Donald Trump’s space ambitions are immense for both U.S. national security and economic prosperity. As CFR’s recent Task Force report, Securing Space: A Plan for U.S. Action, explained, Americans have come to heavily depend on thousands of satellites orbiting the globe that affect most of daily life, such as GPS and crop planting. – Trump Wants to Reset U.S. Space Policy to Assure Dominance. His New Plan Needs Work | Council on Foreign Relations
(Matthew Kroenig and Jonathan Rosenstein – Atlantic Council) The United States now confronts a two-nuclear-peer threat environment for the first time in its history, requiring immediate decisions to expand and adapt its nuclear posture beyond Cold War–era assumptions. Existing US nuclear forces and policies, while fundamentally sound, are no longer sufficient to deter simultaneous strategic and regional nuclear challenges from China and Russia without additional deployed warheads and new theater capabilities. Absent decisive action on force sizing, nonstrategic nuclear capabilities, missile defense, and nuclear enterprise reform, US deterrence credibility and escalation control will erode in an increasingly coordinated adversary environment. – Nuclear priorities for the Trump administration: A time to decide – Atlantic Council
(Arvind Gupta – Vivekananda International Foundation) The National Security Strategy (NSS) of the US (Nov 2025) is a remarkable document. It makes a distinctive break from the past, shedding the American penchant for projecting itself as an unlimited global power. Instead, it focuses on a few priorities. It blames the earlier American administrations for misplaced policies of “permanent American dominance of the entire world”, placing “destructive bets on globalism”, saddling the country with “forever global burdens” and hollowing out the “middle-class industrial base”. Written in an unambiguous and clear language, it leaves little room for second-guessing. In Trump’s words, American strategy will put “America First” and will “develop every dimension of our national strength”. The Strategy document has a clear definition of America’s core foreign policy interests as seen by the Trump administration. – Trump’s National Security Strategy Signals Retreat from Globalism but Not the Globe | Vivekananda International Foundation
US-Europe
(Anna Wieslander – Atlantic Council) The new US National Security Strategy seeks to divide the world into spheres of interest, a formulation reminiscent of the nineteenth century. The United States adopting this approach would put Europe, which faces a revisionist Russia to its east, in a bind. To ensure their security and interests, Europeans should now look to the EU, which is able to exert global influence more than any single European state. – US strategy is leading to a Europe squeezed from the east and the west – Atlantic Council
