Geostrategic magazine (june 16-17, 2024)

LABORATORIO DI RICERCA COMPLESSA / COMPLEX RESEARCH LABORATORY

The Global Eye

Daily from global think tanks and open sources

(the analyzes here recalled do not necessarily correspond to the geostrategic thinking of The Global Eye)

Australia – Indian Ocean

(Samuel Bashfield – Lowy The Interpreter) The waters of the Indian Ocean lap on the shores of Western Australia all the way across to Africa. But how far Australia’s defence and foreign policy interests extend into this vast watery expanse is a live debate. The “Indo-Pacific”, at least as Australia conceives this area, drives a cartographic division, chopping the Indian Ocean in two east and west. The 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper limits Australia’s Indo-Pacific definition in this region to the “eastern Indian Ocean.” More recently, the 2024 National Defence Strategy finds that the “Northeast Indian Ocean is central to Australia’s security.”

Halfway, right: Australia’s approach to the Indian Ocean | Lowy Institute

Canada

(International Institute for Sustainable Development) LNG expansion will not only hamper Canada’s progress toward its climate goals but also create challenges for the economy in the long term.

New Report Highlights Economic and Environmental Costs of Canada’s LNG Expansion | International Institute for Sustainable Development (iisd.org)

China – Middle East 

(Anant Mishra, Christian Kaunert – ASPI The Strategist) Beijing appears to be strengthening its role of mediator in the Middle East to present itself as a constructive and responsible actor on the global stage. Following its successful mediation in 2023 between Iran and Saudi Arabia to restore their mutual diplomatic ties, Beijing hosted leaders from rival Palestinian groups Fatah and Hamas for reconciliation talks in April this year.

In the Middle East, China presents itself as a constructive actor | The Strategist (aspistrategist.org.au)

China – Taiwan – Israel – Hamas

(Assaf Orion, Roy Ben Tzur, Ofir Dayan – INSS) The conduct of China and Taiwan since the October 7 massacre in the context of the Swords of Iron war reflects differences in their interests, objectives, and strategic positions with respect to Israel, the Middle East, and the international arena. While China is opposed to Israel and sympathetic to Hamas, Taiwan shows sympathy and support for Israel. In spite of the emerging clarity, Israel should not at this stage change its fundamental policy on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

Facing Off—China and Taiwan in the Contexts of the Swords of Iron War | INSS

European Union

(Gurjit Singh – Gateway House) The European Parliament elections have thrown up a win for the right-wing parties – quite a change from the previous centre-left composition. There will be repercussions for the EU and domestic policies of the member countries. Is this election an indication of a future Europe turning right, or is it a reaction to domestic situations individually within states?

What the EU elections mean – Gateway House

(Brooke Moore – European Policy Centre) Last week, the Bonn Climate Change Conference hosted the third and final Glasgow Dialogue (GD3) aimed at advancing the Loss and Damage Fund (LDF) to provide climate-vulnerable nations with much-needed support. Despite the EU’s recent elections casting uncertainty on its international climate role, the EU must leverage its influential position on the LDF Board to prioritise the needs of beneficiary countries. By bolstering international climate finance, particularly for loss and damage, the EU can support those in need, progress global climate efforts, and maintain its international clout.

GD3 set the stage; COP29 will test the ability to act (epc.eu)

(Alberto-Horst Neidhardt – European Policy Centre) In recent years, the EU has been confronted with emergencies that have severely impacted the asylum and reception systems of member states. Following the adoption of the New Pact reforms, the Union now has a dedicated instrument for dealing with such situations. The newly adopted Crisis and Force Majeure Regulation (the ‘Regulation’) sets in place a procedure for determining if a member state faces an emergency and defines which response should be set into motion, including enhanced solidarity and derogations from the Asylum Procedures Regulation (APR).

The Crisis and Force Majeure Regulation: Towards future-proof crisis m (epc.eu)

(Eric Maurice – European Policy Centre) The European elections on 6-9 June have brought mixed results. In the European Parliament, the populist, nationalist and far-right parties won seats but not as many as predicted. The pro-EU groups – European Popular Party (EPP), the Socialists and Democrats (S&D), the liberals and centrists in Renew Europe and the Greens – still hold the majority but will find it challenging to steer the political direction of the EU because of their differences on a number of issues like climate, migration or social policy.

2024 EU elections results: Limited change, great challenges (epc.eu)

India

(Manjeet Kripalani – Gateway House) India’s new government has to navigate the nation through a world in turmoil. Will its successful foreign policy continue? Or will there have to be shifts and changes to accommodate new realities?

Three Continuities, Three Shifts – Gateway House

(East Asia Forum) Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s search for a supermajority in his third term fell short due to losses in important battleground states, forcing him to a rely on a coalition to govern for the first time in his prime ministership. The outcome indicates that economic issues such as high unemployment matter most to voters, highlighting the need for a shift in India’s economic model and the growth of labour-intensive industries that can absorb its growing workforce.

Indian voters show they want a new Modi in New Delhi | East Asia Forum

Middle East and the Gulf

(Ghada Soliman – RSIS) While Hamas has shown interest in negotiating an Israeli three-phase ceasefire proposal as referred to by US President Joe Biden, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has maintained that the Gaza war would only end once Israel’s objectives were achieved. It has also been reported that the US is considering direct negotiations with Hamas to secure the release of American hostages.

Israel’s Military Operation in Rafah: Security Implications of Palestinian Displacement – RSIS

(Col. (res.) Ron Tira – BESA Center) Israel’s main objective in the Iron Swords War is to topple the Hamas regime – an ambitious goal that seeks to change the political-strategic reality in Gaza. To achieve it, international cooperation is required to ensure legitimacy for the new regime as well as funding for the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip, establishment of its civilian administration, transfer of Gazan public servants to a new employer, de-radicalization, and internal security. The war must therefore be conducted by a coalition. Indeed, the war began with an unprecedented alignment of the United States, the West, and moderate Arab countries on Israel’s side. But Israel’s refusal to conduct a dialogue with the international partners on the nature of the regime that will replace Hamas, foot-dragging on the humanitarian issue, extremist messaging, and poor management of the legal dimension have resulted in severe damage to Israel’s legitimacy and ability to harness the international community’s help in achieving the war’s objectives. The damage was done with no associated gains, as the Israeli government’s conduct has steered it away from, rather than toward, achieving the goals of the war. Unless there is a profound change in the way the government conducts itself (and if it is not already too late), Israel’s situation in the coming years will be worse than it was before the war.

Israel’s Conduct of the War After October 7: Is This Carelessness or Wrongdoing? (besacenter.org)

(Bonn International Center for Conversion) Since 2011, over 12 million Syrians have been forcibly displaced, constituting “the largest displacement crisis in the world” according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). While close to 7 million Syrians are internally displaced, just over 5 million left their country and became refugees. The vast majority escaped to the neighbouring countries of Türkiye, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. While some refugees went on to claim asylum in EU countries or were resettled in more distant countries, like the United States and Canada, more than 4 million Syrians remain in Lebanon and Türkiye without a durable solution. Resettlement to third countries has declined, and local integration has not been a policy priority for either Türkiye or Lebanon. In fact, barriers that prevent local integration have been implemented. Domestic pressures in both those countries, including economic decline and an array of political, natural and health crises are feeding growing hostile public attitudes towards refugees. As a result, both Lebanon and Türkiye have chosen repatriation to Syria as their preferred solution despite the evidence that the conditions in Syria do not exist to provide safe, voluntary, dignified and sustainable returns.

Publications – BICC

Nigeria

(International Institute for Sustainable Development) Nigeria’s push to expand its Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) production could put the country in a precarious economic situation, prolonging its dependency on fossil fuels and leaving it with stranded assets as international demand for gas falls, according to new research by the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD).

Nigeria’s Dash for LNG Risks Asset Stranding with European Gas Demand Forecast to Fall | International Institute for Sustainable Development (iisd.org)

South Africa

(International Institute for Sustainable Development) South Africa can take action to boost the deployment of grid-located batteries through better understanding of the sector, co-operative planning, increasing access to finance, and supporting localized production, new research suggests.

How South Africa can Improve Grid Battery Deployment to Unlock Economic and Security Benefits | International Institute for Sustainable Development (iisd.org)

Southeast Asia

(Grace Stanhope, Alexandre Dayant – Lowy The Interpreter) Southeast Asia has navigated the economic impacts of COVID-19 and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine relatively well, but at a high cost: slower poverty reduction, significant learning losses, and large budget deficits. Despite the crucial role of international development finance in supporting the region, this funding is steadily declining. Continued cuts in external support could severely hinder Southeast Asia’s recovery and future development progress.

2024 Southeast Asia Aid Map: Warning signs for the region | Lowy Institute

Southeast Asia – Global South

(Hoang Thi Ha – ISEAS) The Global South discourse has been gaining greater salience in contemporary global politics, driven by the shift of the world’s centre of gravity to the Indo-Pacific, the rise of non-Western powers, and intensified great power competition. Both China and the US recognise the strategic importance of engaging the Global South. China focuses on infrastructure development and economic integration with developing nations, while the US prioritises a values-driven development agenda. US engagement with the Global South is further constrained by its withdrawal from the global free trade agenda and its focus on industrial revitalisation through reshoring and friendshoring. Southeast Asian countries are associated with the Global South across various material indicators and normative dimensions, including their developmental level, membership in organisations representing the Global South, and alignment with the Global South discourse advocating for a more representative and equitable international order. However, Southeast Asian countries make their foreign policy decisions based on their respective national interests rather than on ideological solidarity with the Global South. This is evident in their varied responses to the Russia-Ukraine war, the Israel-Hamas conflict, and South China Sea disputes. In economic relations, the region’s prosperity has hinged on its interconnectedness with both the Global North and South, its pragmatism, and its ability to bridge diverse value systems rather than ideological allegiance to any bloc, especially one as heterogeneous as the Global South.

2024/45 “Southeast Asia and the Global South: Rhetoric and Reality” by Hoang Thi Ha and Cha Hae Won – ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute

South Korea

(Soyoung Kim – East Asia Forum) Gender divide in South Korea is often cited as a significant social issue, but research reports show little substantial ideological difference between men and women. The politicisation of gender conflict seems to overlook more prevalent sources of contention, such as class and economic dissatisfaction, while exacerbating perceived gender differences, potentially skewing policy perspectives and distracting from deeper systemic issues.

Scrutinising South Korea’s gender divide narrative | East Asia Forum

South Korea – Kenya

(Anthony V Rinna – East Asia Forum) South Korea’s aim of strengthening its position in Africa was on display at the June 2024 Korea-Africa Summit. Kenya, with its strategic location and growing semiconductor industry, is a key partner for South Korea. Kenya’s semiconductor ambitions and workforce development goals offer opportunities for technological cooperation and educational exchanges. But infrastructure development is crucial for accessing Africa’s critical minerals and facilitating technology production and South Korea faces competition from China, which has already invested heavily in infrastructure in Africa.

Why Kenya is South Korea’s springboard to the African continent | East Asia Forum

Uganda – Eastern DRC

(Kristof Titeca – EGMONT) Uganda has various economic, political and security interests in Eastern DRC. The latter is for example a vital export market for Ugandan products, and an important source of gold, Uganda’s most important export product. In this situation, a careful tactical game is played, in which Kampala seeks to protect these interests in Eastern DRC – for example from Kigali. This does not only involve a clear engagement with Kinshasa, but to a lesser extent also with M23. This is particularly the case because M23 is expanding (and keeping) its territory; creating an incentive for regional actors to engage with them.

Uganda’s Chess Game in Eastern DRC: With or Without M23? – Egmont Institute

USA – Asia

(Brandon Yoder, Charles Miller – East Asia Forum) If Donald Trump returns to the US presidency in 2024, he is expected to maintain a strict foreign policy marked by isolationism and protectionism, and favouring unilateral US intervention. This policy will likely focus on pushing allies to help the United States isolate China. But strategic contradictions exist as Trump wants US allies to pay their ‘fair share’ in exchange for security guarantees and to apply tariffs on goods from all countries, including US allies.

What Trump’s return would mean for US alliances in Asia | East Asia Forum

Vietnam

(Nguyen Khac Giang – ISEAS) In Vietnam, the provinces often wield significant influence over the central government, as evidenced by the popular saying “phép vua thua lệ làng”, meaning “The king’s order stops at the village’s gate”. This power dynamic has drastically changed since the launch of the anti-corruption campaign. Since 2021, half of the removed members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) were provincial leaders, resulting in a decrease in provincial representation in the Committee from 40 per cent to 28 per cent. The government has implemented disciplinary measures, rotation policies for officials, and institutional reforms to curb the fragmented power of provinces and shift the balance towards the central authority. While these reforms have helped combat widespread abuse of power and corruption by provincial elites, they have also contributed to the already sluggish decision-making process in the provinces, negatively impacting their socio-economic performance. Moving forward, Vietnam must strike a balance between its anti-corruption efforts and the need for provincial autonomy, to sustain economic growth at the local level. This balance can be achieved by reducing the number of provincial administrative units and expanding accountability mechanisms from the bottom up.

2024/44 “Anti-Corruption Politics and Shifts in Central-Local Relations in Vietnam” by Nguyen Khac Giang – ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute

 

Latest articles

Related articles