From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye
Today’s about : Afghanistan, Australia, China, Europe, India, Indonesia, Iran, Russia’s War of Aggression on Ukraine, Syria, Syria-US, Türkiye, UK, US, US-Iraq, US-Middle East, US-Ukraine
Afghanistan
(Kalicharan Veera Singam – East Asia Forum) Despite its increasingly repressive domestic rule, more countries than ever are engaging with Afghanistan’s Taliban rulers. India’s first official meeting with the Taliban in January 2025 encapsulates a broader global trend of once-reluctant countries now engaging with the Taliban. Credible terrorism concerns, worsening humanitarian conditions and geopolitical rivalries are pushing governments toward quasi-acceptance and recognition of Taliban rule. – The Taliban’s long game out of isolation | East Asia Forum
Australia
(Isha Desai – The Strategist) Women’s rights and protections are regressing on the international stage, from the Taliban’s erasure of women from public life to US President Donald Trump’s misogynistic rhetoric and decision to suspend USAID. Against this backdrop, Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) has launched its International Gender Equality Strategy. This strategy aims to deepen its partnerships in the Indo Pacific region, with a focus on gender responsive humanitarian and climate aid. – How Australia is advancing gender equality in the Indo-Pacific | The Strategist
(Danielle Cave – The Strategist) US President Donald Trump, his powerful offsider Elon Musk and his Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) are slashing public spending in an effort to save US taxpayers anywhere between US$500 billion and US$2 trillion. Caught up in these enormous cuts are scientists, researchers, medical experts, technologists and PhD scholars who are losing jobs, grants and scholarships at an unprecedented rate as funding streams are cancelled or put on hold. To date, DOGE has allegedly made only US$105 billion of cuts. This means they have, at minimum, hundreds of billions to go. In the science and technology sector, these early cuts may be just the beginning. Believe it or not, there is an enormous opportunity for Australia in this unusual situation. If the government acts quickly, this is a once-in-a-century brain gain opportunity. Australia should take a two-pronged approach. – As Trump sacks scientists, Australia should hire them. US drain is our brain gain | The Strategist
China
(Abhishek Bhardwaj – Interesting Engineering) China’s state-owned oil and gas company has announced a major hydrocarbon discovery breakthrough in the exploration of Paleozoic buried hills in the Beibu Gulf Basin. The China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) made the announcement on Thursday. The breakthrough came after drilling was done to a total depth of about 15,879 feet (4,840 meters) in an area with an average water depth of about 121 feet (37 meters). – 800 barrels per day: China discovers major oil, natural gas reserve
Europe
(Atlantic Council) Europe is on the March. In the first week of the new month, European leaders took several notable steps on the continent’s security. On Sunday, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer hosted more than a dozen European leaders to discuss creating a “coalition of the willing” to support Ukraine. On Tuesday, the likely next German chancellor, Friedrich Merz, announced an agreement to overhaul German spending rules on defense. Then on Wednesday, French President Emmanuel Macron gave an impassioned national address on Europe’s security needs, which was followed on Thursday by a special meeting of the European Council in Brussels. This packed schedule follows the tempestuous meeting between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and US President Donald Trump on February 28—the latest indication of an emerging transatlantic rift over European security. – How European leaders are responding to Trump’s approach to Ukraine and Europe – Atlantic Council
India
(Shahadat Swadhin – East Asia Forum) India’s approach to minority rights reveals a stark contradiction. While the BJP government criticises Bangladesh’s treatment of Hindus, it oversees systemic marginalisation and discrimination growing discrimination against Muslims domestically. Protests over a Hindu monk’s arrest in Bangladesh and violence against Muslims in India highlight this double standard. This selective outrage serves domestic electoral interests but damages India’s regional leadership and threatens stability in South Asia. – India’s double standards on minority rights | East Asia Forum
Indonesia
(Yohanes Sulaiman – East Asia Forum) Indonesia’s decision to join BRICS under the leadership of Prabowo ostensibly stems from an ambition to position the nation as an advocate for developing countries and to reduce geoeconomic global tensions. But the move is seen as largely symbolic with minimal tangible benefits. Existing voices within BRICS have already laid claim to leadership over the Global South. And despite potential economic gains, China’s economic dominance within BRICS raises questions about the actual economic benefits of joining the coalition. By overlooking ASEAN in pursuing global leadership, Prabowo’s ambitions are seemingly driven more by self interest rather than strategic considerations. – Indonesia’s BRICS accession underscored by Prabowo’s self interest | East Asia Forum
(Benedicta Nathania, Aisha Kusumasomantri – ASPI The Strategist) Indonesia has recognised that security affairs in its region are no longer business as usual, though it hasn’t completely given up its commitment to strategic autonomy. Its biggest step was a Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) signed with Australia in August 2024. The agreement acts as a de facto status-of-forces agreement, providing for the presence of foreign forces in Indonesian territory, traditionally an uncomfortable idea for the country. – Indonesia steps up defence relationships, but stays non-aligned | The Strategist
Iran
(Patrick Clawson – The Washington Institute for Near East Policy) As Iranians prepare for Nowruz on March 21—traditionally a season of celebration and shopping—the national mood is sour. The scale of the complaints was on display during Majlis debates on March 3, which led to the dismissal of economic minister Abdolnaser Hemmati by a vote of 182 to 89. Because reformist politicians like Hemmati and President Masoud Pezeshkian have proven unable (or unwilling) to tackle the country’s deepest problems, they have become just as discredited as the hardliners. This reality undercuts the country’s willingness to listen to reformist proposals about foreign policy, including potential talks with the United States. – Iran’s Sour National Mood Could Complicate U.S. Engagement | The Washington Institute
Russia’s War of Aggression on Ukraine
(Andrew A. Michta – Atlantic Council) The increasingly fraught endgame to the Russia-Ukraine war reflects a larger ongoing debate in the US policy community about who is ultimately responsible for the conflict. US President Donald Trump has asserted on several occasions that the war happened mostly because of the incompetence of the Biden administration. Several commentators have stepped forward, opining that the United States is ultimately responsible for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine because, allegedly, Washington broke the promise given to Moscow in the waning months of the Cold War that if the Soviets agreed to the unification of Germany, there would be no NATO presence east of the German border. – The real reason Russia invaded Ukraine (hint: it’s not NATO expansion) – Atlantic Council
Syria
(UN Security Council) Today morning, the Security Council will hold an open briefing, followed by closed consultations, on the Syria chemical weapons track. The meeting is the regular meeting on the implementation of resolution 2118 of 27 September 2013, which was adopted unanimously by the Council and requires the verification and destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons stockpiles. High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Izumi Nakamitsu is the anticipated briefer. – Syria (Chemical Weapons): Briefing and Consultations : What’s In Blue : Security Council Report
(Gregory Waters, Ferhad Ahma, Sawsan Abou Zainedin, Rahaf Aldoughli – The Washington Institute for Near East Policy) Now that the Assad regime is gone, Syria’s new transitional leaders are working to shed their perceived association with Sunni extremist ideology and launch an inclusive national dialogue process. At the same time, their efforts to consolidate political and military control in various parts of the country have led some minority communities to worry about their future, while officials abroad remain uncertain about the nascent government’s longer-term intentions. – Inside the New Syria: The First Three Months | The Washington Institute
(Ibrahim Al-Assil – Middle East Institute) For many Syrians, the sight of hundreds of their fellow citizens walking through the People’s Palace in Damascus as they gathered to attend the national dialogue conference was surreal. Once a symbol of authority and exclusivity, only seen through rare and carefully curated state-released photographs, the palace was now the venue for what was billed as one of the most significant political processes in the country’s history. With Bashar al-Assad gone, this national dialogue was intended to chart Syria’s future, one that would have been unthinkable just three months earlier. However, the process and outcomes of the dialogue were flawed, left critical questions unanswered, and raised new concerns. While the process is still in its initial phase with mixed outcomes, more red flags are being raised about its potential to achieve a cohesive Syria. The urgency to move forward without addressing essential foundational steps risks undermining the prospects of an inclusive and representative state. These challenges could be mitigated by creating inclusive groups to deliberate and draft a constitution, delegating authority to them, and ensuring that the process of debating the constitution and government structure is treated as an essential step in state-building. Public debate about constitutions and their modalities is widely regarded as a critical component in successful state-building efforts, helping to establish legitimacy, inclusivity, and long-term stability. – The national dialogue in Syria: A step forward or a concerning trajectory? | Middle East Institute
Syria – US
(Matthew Levitt – Washington Institute for Near East Policy) America’s sanctions policy for Syria is broken, but the answer is not to pretend existing licenses and waivers are working or to summarily terminate all sanctions. Instead, Washington should quickly take steps to allow financial transactions for key sectors such as electricity, food, and rubble removal, and begin to assess the conditions under which sanctions could be rolled back more broadly. The Syrian people are desperate, and within weeks, they could take to the streets to protest the country’s dire conditions, possibly leading to collapse for the interim government, led by Ahmed al-Sharaa. This would be in no one’s interest, including America’s, in large part because it could allow Iran and the Islamic State to reassert themselves in Syria and across the region. In this Policy Note, former Treasury official Matthew Levitt explains how the United States can facilitate urgently needed investment in Syria by extending sanctions waivers, opening up a banking channel, and considering steps like delisting Hayat Tahrir al-Sham as a foreign terrorist organization. – Navigating the Syria Sanctions Conundrum | The Washington Institute
Türkiye
(Anna Borshchevskaya – The Washington Institute for Near East Policy) An expert testifies on Turkey’s new position in Syria and shifting power relations with Russia, explaining how Washington can use both to help resolve the Ukraine war and shift U.S. strategic investments toward the Indo-Pacific. – Bridging the Gap: Turkey Between East and West | The Washington Institute
UK
(Melissa Conley Tyler, John Blaxland – ASPI The Strategist) Britain’s decision to cut foreign aid to fund defence spending overlooks the preventive role of foreign aid. It follows the pause and review of USAID activities and is an approach to foreign aid that Australia cannot afford to consider. In late February, Britain said it would cut foreign aid. Prime Minister Keir Starmer said the decision was extremely difficult and painful. Foreign Secretary David Lammy described it as a hard choice. Both said it was necessary to keep Britain safe. But foreign aid does help keep Britain safe. – Britain’s cut to foreign aid undermines threat prevention | The Strategist
US
(Daniel Byman – Lawfare) The Trump administration’s recent decision to cut off intelligence sharing with Ukraine will get less attention than its halting of military aid, but it will also be consequential. If anything, the United States should be increasing intelligence cooperation not only with Ukraine, but also with other key partners. Intelligence sharing is a cornerstone of U.S. efforts to ensure its own security and that of key allies and partners. Effective sharing enhances strategic coordination, enables timely responses to threats, and strengthens trust between nations. Despite its importance, intelligence sharing does not live up to its potential. As Sean Corbett and James Danoy—former senior British and U.S. intelligence officials, respectively—have written, “With few exceptions, and despite the best of intentions, intelligence sharing is uneven, remains the exception rather than the norm, and the prospect of simultaneity at the point of need is remote.” Drawing on a larger research project that drew heavily on interviews with U.S. and allied officials and experts, this piece critically examines the current state of U.S. intelligence sharing, identifies key challenges, and proposes solutions to improve the effectiveness of these partnerships. – Improving U.S. Intelligence Sharing With Allies and Partners | Lawfare
(Scott R. Anderson – Lawfare) One of President Trump’s first acts upon his return to the White House on Jan. 20 was to implement a 90-day pause on all U.S. foreign assistance and supported activities, subject to limited exceptions, while his administration conducted a review to ensure that “no further United States foreign assistance shall be disbursed in a manner that is not fully aligned with the foreign policy of the President of the United States.” After several weeks, two groups of U.S. implementing partners who had been set to receive those funds—and in some cases were owed funds for work already performed—brought suit in federal district court in Washington, D.C., on the grounds that they were suffering not just pecuniary losses but potentially irreparable organizational, operational, and reputational harm as a result of the sudden and unexpected disruption. The two resulting matters—AIDS Vaccine Advocacy Coalition (AVAC) v. Trump and Global Health Council (GHC) v. Trump—were joined before Judge Amir Ali. Just last night, another plaintiff launched a third lawsuit—National Endowment for Democracy v. United States—advancing several similar arguments. – Foreign Assistance Is Not an Article II Power | Lawfare
US – Iraq
(Michael Knights – The Washington Institute for Near East Policy) The Biden administration’s last 120-day sanctions waiver that permits the export to Iraq of Iranian gas and electricity will expire on March 7, 2025. The Trump administration has signaled its intention to not sign the waivers again in the February 4, 2025 National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 (NSPM-2), which restarts the maximum pressure. Washington should let the waiver expire, because Iraq is now much closer to energy independence, and Iran is serially shutting off energy supplies to Iraq due to shortfalls within Iran. The U.S. should help Iraq stand on its own feet for the first time in the summer of 2025. – Make Iraq Independent of Iranian Energy | The Washington Institute
US – Middle East
(Brian Katulis – Middle East Institute) President Donald Trump’s joint address to Congress on March 4 doubled down on his disruptive and contentious domestic policy agenda, signaling full steam ahead despite a possible US government shutdown looming later this month. Foreign policy, including Trump’s approach to the Middle East, was mostly an afterthought. Though he said little about it in his speech last night, Trump’s team has continued to shape its Middle East policy, including moves to back the current Israeli government’s approach on Palestinian issues and sending further mixed signals on the important Iran policy front. On these twin issues of Israel-Arab ties and Iran, which are intertwined in ways often not recognized in US policy circles, the Trump administration is taking an irregular approach that may not produce the stability and prosperity it seeks. As with his domestic policy agenda, the initial signs are that Trump is uninterested in assembling lasting, sustainable coalitions to get big things done in the Middle East. Instead, he seeks to go his own way to disrupt the status quo, increasingly straining traditional US alliances and partnerships to their breaking point. The main challenge with this approach is that it is much easier to tear things down than to build things anew – A chaotic foreign policy on overdrive risks alienating key US partners in the Middle East | Middle East Institute
US – Ukraine
(Jonathan Masters, Will Merrow – Council on Foreign Relations) Since Russia’s invasion in February 2022, Ukraine has become by far the top recipient of U.S. foreign aid. This marks the first time that a European country has held the top spot since the Harry Truman administration directed vast sums into rebuilding the continent through the Marshall Plan after World War II. Yet 2025 appears to mark a potential turning point, with President Donald Trump in early March pausing all aid to Ukraine as he presses the country to move forward on peace talks with Russia. – Here’s How Much Aid the United States Has Sent Ukraine | Council on Foreign Relations
(Brett Holmgren – Just Security) The Trump administration said on March 5 that it has paused intelligence sharing with Kyiv, a significant step in light of other recent actions to halt or reduce overall security assistance to Ukraine. The decision appears to be part of a broader effort to put pressure on Ukrainian President Volodomyr Zelenskyy to negotiate a peace deal with Russia to end the war that President Vladimir Putin started. Senior U.S. officials have suggested the pause is temporary, however, and that sharing could resume, ostensibly if Ukraine takes unspecified steps. Pausing intelligence sharing with foreign partners is not unprecedented. It can occur for various reasons, including counterintelligence concerns, human rights violations, or—as appears to be the case in this instance—material changes to US policy. What are the national security and foreign policy implications? – What Just Happened: Pausing Intelligence Sharing with Ukraine
