From global think tanksderweb
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye
Today’s about: Europe; India-Pakistan; Indonesia-OECD Anty Bribery Convention; Poland; Russia; South Korea; Taiwan’s Tibetan community; Ukraine-Operation Spiderweb; US; US-China; US Tariffs; Vietnam-US-China
Europe
(Soufan Center) Far-right political parties in Europe are having something of a moment and their electoral success threatens to eclipse that of traditional conservative parties in some countries. Right-wing populists are now in government or supporting ruling coalitions in Belgium, Croatia, Finland, Hungary, the Netherlands, Slovakia, and Sweden. Karol Nawrocki, a conservative nationalist, narrowly won the Polish presidency this week in Europe’s latest election. Though Nawrocki won by a small margin, his victory highlights the continuing trend of far-right populist leaders enjoying electoral success throughout Europe. Bolstered by U.S. President Donald Trump’s re-election, the normalization of the far-right is characterizing European politics more broadly. Nawrocki’s victory is emblematic of a more robust right-wing in Europe, which outperformed expectations last year in European parliamentary elections. Far-right parties have made gains in Portugal, Germany, and Austria more recently, while efforts in both Romania and France came up short. – Right-Wing Parties in Europe Get a Boost from Recent Political Developments – The Soufan Center
India – Pakistan
(Neeraj Singh Manhas – The Strategist) A disputed India-Pakistan border in Kashmir isn’t the only threat to stability on the subcontinent. One that’s often overlooked is water security. India and Pakistan should incorporate transboundary watery cooperation into broader security dialogues to deescalate tensions, build cooperation and resilience, and ensure that water-sharing agreements are insulated from geopolitical fictions. This can help the region safeguard against future tensions just as climate impacts strain access across the Indus River Basin. – Overshadowed by border dispute, India-Pakistan water security risks grow | The Strategist
Indonesia – OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
(Reginaldi, Amanda Savira Monica – East Asia Forum) Accession to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention offers Indonesia a vital opportunity to strengthen its anti-corruption framework. The OECD Convention explicitly criminalises foreign bribery, an area not fully addressed under current Indonesian law. While challenges are expected, aligning with OECD standards can enhance transparency, attract investment and help build trust in Indonesia’s financial system at home and abroad. – Indonesia could combat cross-border bribery with OECD accession | East Asia Forum
Poland
(Katarzyna Williams – Australian Institute of International Affairs) Poland’s new anti-EU and pro-Trump president is good news for neither Poland nor Europe. While currently Poland is a frontline state for NATO, a rising strategic European player, and an important partner for Ukraine, Germany, and France, this may not be the case moving forward. – Make Poland Great Again: Poland’s Presidential Elections – Australian Institute of International Affairs
Russia
(Maria Snegovaya, Nicholas Fenton, Tina Dolbaia, and Max Bergmann – Center for Strategic & International Studies) The Russian economy has lived many lives since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. After the initial shock of the invasion wore off, the country experienced a dramatic sugar high thanks to historic hydrocarbon revenues and the government’s surging military spending. However, the economy now appears to have entered its post–sugar high hangover, with its internal reorganization settling down. Drawing on comprehensive research conducted over the preceding months, including an intensive workshop and series of interviews with leading international experts on the Russian economy, this report examines current challenges to Russian macroeconomic stability stemming from, or exacerbated by, the war, sanctions, and soaring military expenditures. These include an acute labor shortage, inflation, and a recent slowdown in growth. The report also identifies key future bottlenecks that have the potential to pose significant threats to Russia’s adaptation strategy, such as uncertain oil revenues, a diminished current account, an economic overreliance on China, and a potential credit crisis. The report ends with a discussion on three potential scenarios for the Russian economy and its military reconstitution drive in the next three years, depending on the future of Western sanctions policy: (1) status quo sanctions, (2) partial relief, and (3) sanctions reinforcement. In the scenario where the sanctions regime remains as is, Russia will be able to continue its war in Ukraine, at least at the current level of intensity, over the next three years. If there is a partial removal of sanctions, the Russian economy will gain some breathing space and additional resources for its war effort, but the overall macroeconomic position of the country will not radically shift. Lastly, if additional sanctions are added or the enforcement mechanisms of the current sanctions are strengthened, Russian revenues would contract, forcing more tradeoffs in the allocation of spending, and potentially reinforcing Ukraine’s position both on the battlefield and at the negotiating table. In all three of these scenarios, barring unforeseen factors, Russia’s domestic economic position remains constrained but not overwhelmed. In this context, the Kremlin, while eager for sanctions relief, is unlikely to make major concessions to Ukraine and its partners at the negotiating table based on economic considerations alone. Western governments, whose goal is to support Ukraine’s sovereignty, contain Russian power projection, and ultimately deter further aggression from Moscow, must be clear-eyed in their engagement with a Russian leadership that remains committed to long-term confrontation with the Western-led international order. – The Russian Wartime Economy: From Sugar High to Hangover
South Korea
(Chae Jeong – The Strategist) South Korea’s presidential by-election, triggered by the impeachment of Yoon Suk-yeol over his short-lived effort to impose martial law in December, has elevated Democratic Party figurehead Lee Jae-myung to the Blue House. Known for his populist economic agenda and confrontational political style, Lee assumes the presidency at a delicate moment internationally – and his early foreign policy signals suggest a pragmatic, and potentially risky, shift in Seoul’s regional posture. – The transactional worldview of South Korea’s new president | Lowy Institute
Taiwan’s Tibetan community
(Dolma Tsering – East Asia Forum) Taiwan’s Tibetan community demonstrates how diaspora populations often sacrifice cultural identity for economic integration. Political participation has plummeted, with fewer than 20 Tibetans attending annual uprising commemorations and only 12 per cent maintaining financial contributions to the Central Tibetan Administration. Language loss accelerates as parents speak Chinese rather than Tibetan with children. Even monks limit their roles to religious functions. The situation raises important questions about the sustainability of diaspora identities in the absence of robust institutional support and intergenerational commitment. – Taiwan’s Tibetan diaspora’s dilemma between culture and political engagement | East Asia Forum
Ukraine – Operation Spiderweb
(Mark J. Massa – Atlantic Council) In the days since Ukraine’s brazen special forces attack inside Russia, analysts have breathlessly argued that the operation, captured in spectacular detail in videos, significantly changed the character of military conflict—or even “rewrote the rules of war.”. Maybe so. There were plenty of novel elements to Ukraine’s “Operation Spiderweb,” which destroyed a dozen or more large Russian military aircraft—including bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons—across the length and breadth of Russia, using drones launched from containers positioned near Russian airfields. But in my field of nuclear deterrence, the attack was enlightening in another way: It reinforced principles that have been hiding in plain sight for years. For US nuclear strategists, the attack yielded at least four crucial lessons. – Ukraine’s drone strikes offer four big lessons for US nuclear strategists – Atlantic Council
US
(Diana Roy – Council on Foreign Relations) International students play a vital role in the U.S. higher education system, with more than one million enrolled during the 2023–24 academic year. They contribute tens of billions of dollars to the economy each year, support job creation, and advance cutting-edge research and innovation efforts. But in the early months of his second term, President Donald Trump has intensified scrutiny of international students and visitors studying in the United States, as well as the academic institutions that host them—with Harvard University becoming a primary target. The administration’s focus on the Ivy League school is part of a larger strategy to clamp down on political activism and dissent, with implications for academic freedom, the U.S. economy, and the United States’ standing as a global leader in education. – International Students Are Critical for U.S. Innovation. Why Are They at Risk? | Council on Foreign Relations
(Adarsh Badri – Australian Institute of International Affairs) Once defined by its missionary zeal to “make the world safe for democracy,” US foreign policy has increasingly shifted away from messianic rhetoric. The rise and decline of America’s interventionist idealism is more evident now than ever, particularly under Donald Trump’s inward-facing “America First” doctrine. – Reflections on Messianic Rhetoric in US Foreign Policy – Australian Institute of International Affairs
US – China
(Pete Millwood – The Interpreter) The first 52 Chinese students to come to the United States arrived on 27 December 1978, less than two weeks after the two countries announced the establishment of diplomatic relations. By last year, the number of Chinese studying in America had grown to 277,000. Last week’s announcement that the Trump administration will aggressively revoke the visas of those with ties to the Chinese Communist Party or that are studying in “critical fields” threatens to sharply reduce that number, as does a plan to vet future student visa applicants’ social media. China would clearly lose from these policies – but so will the United States. – What the US could lose by closing its universities to China | Lowy Institute
US Tariffs
(Brian Janovitz – Atlantic Council) US President Donald Trump’s tariff regime hit a legal stumbling block last week, with rulings by the US Court of International Trade in New York and the US District Court in Washington, DC. The rulings invalidated tariffs Trump has imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), though those tariffs remain in place for now after the court injunctions were stayed. Some US trading partners may be tempted to celebrate and retreat from or slow the pace of negotiations with the United States, perhaps to wait and see how appellate courts rule. But these US partners should not breathe easy, as Trump can impose substantial tariffs under other authorities that are less susceptible to legal attack—with Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 likely foremost among these authorities. And, importantly, if tariffs are imposed under this authority, then they will be more difficult to reduce or remove in response to positive negotiations. Therefore, trading partners should see the recent court decisions as an opportunity to reach a more stable agreement with perhaps a more eager counterpart, rather than a justification to escape engagement with the Trump administration. – Even as courts step in, Trump still has plenty of tariff options. US trading partners should intensify negotiations. – Atlantic Council
Vietnam – US – China
(Asher Ellis – East Asia Forum) In April 2025, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Vietnam to strengthen ties amid escalating US–China trade tensions. Vietnam, heavily reliant on exports to the United States and Chinese supply chains, faces significant economic risks from President Trump’s threatened tariffs. While deepening economic cooperation with Beijing, Hanoi is also advancing trade and security ties with Washington, including defence cooperation and major commercial deals. Navigating a careful balancing act, Vietnam avoids formal military alliances while strategically engaging both powers. Its pragmatic approach may serve as a model for other Southeast Asian nations managing great power rivalry in an increasingly polarised Indo-Pacific region. – Vietnam’s careful US–China balancing act | East Asia Forum
