From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye
Today’s about: Africa, Arctic-US-Japan, Australia-Southeast Asia, Bangladesh-India-China, Canada, China, Europe, Europe-China-India, India, Iran-Syria, Koreas, Myanmar, Russia, Singapore-US, Syria, Türkiye, United Arab Emirates, US, US-India, US-Indo Pacific, US-Iran, US-Southeast Asia, US Tariffs, US-Vietnam
Africa
(Davis Makori – Observer Research Foundation) One-third of all the armed inter- and intra-state conflicts across the world since 1946 have taken place in Africa. Today, at the quarter mark of a new century and following a brief period of optimism, the scourge of armed conflict continues to haunt the continent. While there was an overall reduction in armed conflict at the turn of the century, African states such as Libya, Sudan, Ethiopia, Mali, Mozambique, and numerous other countries all witnessed either a protraction or escalation of deadly conflicts in 2024. The humanitarian consequences of these conflicts show that it is civilians who bear the brunt. – Protecting Civilians from Armed Conflict in Africa
Arctic – US – Japan
(Yuki Tatsumi – Stimson Center) The Trump administration has recently and dramatically elevated the level of U.S. strategic attention toward the Arctic. While the blunt rhetoric coming out of the administration regarding the status of Greenland dominates media headlines, the growing geostrategic importance of the Arctic is quickly being realized, suggesting that the North Pacific—once the area of close U.S.-Japan defense cooperation during the Cold War—may re-enter the strategic debate between Tokyo and Washington. – Back to the Future? The Implications of Growing Strategic Competition in the Arctic for the US-Japan Alliance • Stimson Center
Australia – Southeast Asia
(Cahyani Widi Larasakti – East Asia Forum) While Australia is a significant supplier of fossil fuels to Southeast Asia, it is moving towards decarbonisation and increasing its free trade agreements with regional partners. Recognising the importance of regional collaboration amid the current fractures in globalisation, Australia and Southeast Asian nations can leverage existing institutional frameworks to pursue collaborative solutions for their energy transitions. – Australia can help flip the switch on Southeast Asia’s energy transition | East Asia Forum
Bangladesh – India – China
(Harsh V. Pant, Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy – Observer Research Foundation) Muhammad Yunus seems to be on a mission. Bit by bit, he seems intent on destroying carefully nurtured Delhi-Dhaka ties. During his visit to China last month – and just days before the Bangkok Bimstec summit tomorrow, in which Bangladesh is set to take over as the next chair and may meet Narendra Modi – the chief adviser has positioned Bangladesh as China’s gateway to South Asia. There’s nothing wrong with the ambition. But the argument he made could have consequences. Yunus suggested that since India’s northeastern states are landlocked, Bangladesh is the only ‘guardian of the ocean for this region’ and ‘could be an extension of the Chinese economy – building, producing and marketing goods for China and the world’. As India and Bangladesh struggle to find a new working equilibrium after Sheikh Hasina’s ouster, it may seem like China’s moment. Domestic politics might also be incentivising Dhaka to woo Beijing. But the diplomatic shuffling underlines the new reality. For India, it’s going to be a difficult period ahead. – Yunus Tangles with Delhi: Bangladesh’s China pivot raises eyebrows
Canada
(Kenneth Holland – East Asia Forum) As Canada weighs multilateralism against alignment with Trump, the country faces a pivotal decision in defining its future direction. US trade tariffs, demands for defence spending and pressure to align against China threaten Canada’s economy and foreign policy. Canadians will vote for the country’s trajectory and identity in the impending federal election. – Canada walking the tightrope between Trump and tradition | East Asia Forum
China
(Antara Ghosal Singh – Observer Research Foundation) The Panama port incident has taken the Chinese strategic community by storm. On 4 March 2025, Cheung Kong Hutchison, owned by Hong Kong tycoon Li Ka-Shing and family, currently operating important ports at both ends of the Panama Canal, announced a huge deal to sell all of Hutchison Port assets outside mainland China and Hong Kong—spanning 45 ports in 20 countries— to the BlackRock-TiL consortium for US$ 22.8 billion. The starting point of this deal can be traced back to January when the United States (US) President Donald Trump raked up the issue of Chinese control of the Panama Canal during his inauguration speech. In the following months, under pressure from the US top brass, the Panamanian authorities launched a financial audit of Hutchison Ports’ Panama subsidiary in late January. Following the US Secretary of State Mark Rubio’s visit in early February, pressure from Panamanian officials escalated. As a result, Cheung Kong Holdings found itself at risk of losing all its Panama port assets, leading to the deal’s conclusion. – The Chinese Debate on ‘Patriotic’ Enterprises
Europe
(Velina Tchakarova – Observer Research Foundation) In 2025, Europe stands at a “make-it-or-break-it” moment, confronting a multitude of challenges unprecedented in their complexity and scope. Around 100 years ago, following an era of geopolitical stability, Europe plunged into deep uncertainty painfully mixed with nostalgia. The period of prosperity, during which Europe’s cultural and societal ideals flourished, was swiftly replaced by a dark transformation. In the works of Proust in In Search of Lost Time and Spengler in The Decline of the West, this upheaval is depicted as the end of a cultural golden age and the harbinger of decline. In The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914, it becomes clear how Europe’s political elites, blind to the looming dangers, almost sleepwalked into the First World War. Only twenty years later, the world Stefan Zweig knew collapsed in collective shock, and the future, once filled with hope and enthusiasm, was replaced by a grim reality of war and destruction. The old stability was irretrievably lost, and the world had changed forever. – Europe Under Trump 2.0: In Search of an End to its Slow Agony
Europe – China – India
(Agatha Kratz – Observer Research Foundation) As the world watched the Trump administration impose 10-percent additional tariffs on China’s exports to the United States and threaten yet more action to contain China’s supply chain and technological rise, it is easy to forget that European Union-China relations have also gone through a sea change over the past decade. Perceptions of China in Brussels and other European capitals have changed fast following mounting concerns over China’s unfair trade practices, a more assertive Chinese foreign policy, and rising tensions between China and its neighbours. China’s “no limits” partnership with Russia, despite and amidst its war of aggression against Ukraine, have marked an inflection point in Europeans’ view of their main Asian economic partner, and pushed the relationship out of its economics-first tracks. More recently, worries over China’s overcapacities and their global trade spillovers have heightened too, and turned Europe’s long-lasting concerns over China’s distortive economic practices into a much more existential worry. – The Outlook for E.U.-China Relations and the Implications for India
India
(Deepanshu Mohan, Najam Us Saqib – East Asia Forum) The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) secured a significant victory in the 2025 National Capital Territory of Delhi elections, successfully capitalising on anti-incumbency sentiments, corruption allegations against the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) and a focus on urban infrastructure and economic improvement. The opposition’s failure to effectively counter the BJP’s electoral strategy, combined with the AAP’s diluted focus due to their national expansion, suggests the need for revised, persuasive tactics that appeal to a broader voter base — particularly in light of upcoming 2029 general elections. – India’s opposition in disarray after BJP’s Delhi victory | East Asia Forum
Iran – Syria
(Mohammad Alzghool – Emirates Policy Center) Iran viewed the fall of the Assad regime as a major setback and a severe blow to its strategic deterrence system, largely built on the Tehran-led regional “Axis of Resistance.” It also undermined Iran’s regional project, leaving it fragmented and vulnerable. Since the downfall of the Assad regime, Iran has worked to re-enter Syria through proxy groups and militias. This return aims to achieve “negative gains,” including thwarting the alternative Turkish project and perpetuating chaos in a post-Assad Syria. Iran’s current goals in post-Assad Syria largely align with Israel’s objectives: preventing Syria’s recovery, blocking the rise of a strong new regime and countering Turkish ambitions. Any viable solution to the current Syrian situation must address external interference – particularly from Iran and Israel – and empower the Syrian people to forge a genuine internal consensus to ensure long-term stability. – Emirates Policy Center | Sneaking from the Window: Assessing Iran’s Efforts to Return to Post-Assad Syria
Koreas
(Khang Vu – The Interpreter) South Korea’s Constitutional Court has today unanimously upheld the impeachment of President Yoon Suk-yeol and removed him from power. This marks Yoon as the shortest serving democratically elected president in South Korea’s history and follows his abortive attempt in December to declare martial law. The country will hold a special election within 60 days to choose a new president. Lee Jae-myung of the liberal Democratic Party is the front runner after an appeal court acquitted him from a one-year prison sentence for violating election law last month. If elected, Lee will not only adopt a pro-engagement approach vis-à-vis North Korea but also assume power in a geopolitical context like that of his liberal predecessor, Moon Jae-in. Moon was elected after conservative President Park Geun-hye was removed by the Constitutional Court in March 2017, when Donald Trump was the sitting US President, and when North Korea’s Chairman Kim Jong-un was uninterested in dialogue. Moon was expected to lift inter-Korean relations out of a nadir by means of engagement. Instead, Trump and Kim exchanged nuclear threats and North Korea carried out its sixth nuclear test in September 2017. For the first six months of his term, Moon’s plea for dialogue fell on deaf ears. North Korea’s decision to participate in the 2018 Winter Olympics, hosted in the South Korean city of PyeongChang, was the breakthrough that Moon was looking for to jumpstart his engagement bid. History may be repeating for Lee. But he will face a much longer way back to inter-Korean engagement compared to Moon. – After Yoon’s impeachment: The steep path to get the Koreas talking again | Lowy Institute
Myanmar
(Steve Ross – Stimson Center) Myanmar was rocked by a devastating magnitude 7.7 earthquake, the strongest earthquake in Myanmar in at least 100 years, with the epicenter just 10 miles outside of Mandalay, Myanmar’s second largest city. Significant impacts were also felt in the capital Naypyidaw; a state of emergency was declared there as well as in Sagaing, Magwe, and Bago Regions and Shan State. Tremors were felt hundreds of miles away, including by all of Myanmar’s neighboring countries, with the quake toppling an under-construction high rise in Bangkok. Friday’s earthquake did not occur in a vacuum but on top of a crisis that has continued to accelerate in the wake of the February 2021 military coup. Following the November 2020 elections, win hich Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) party swept in a landslide, the Myanmar military leveled unsubstantiated allegations of fraud against the NLD, which they used as justification to launch the coup. Opposition to military rule that started with peaceful protests and nationwide strikes turned to armed resistance after the military opened fire on demonstrations. – In Myanmar, A Tragedy Atop A Crisis • Stimson Center
Russia
(Angela Stent – Brookings) When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s immediate aim was regime change in Kyiv and Ukraine’s subjugation to Russian domination. But Putin had much broader goals too. He viewed victory over Ukraine as the first step in undoing the post-Cold-War order which had deprived Russia of its Soviet republics and sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. He sees the Ukraine war as a battle between Russia, NATO, and the “collective West.” Moscow’s victory over Kyiv would, he is convinced, start the process of dismantling an international order that he believes has ignored Russia’s national interests and belittled its position in the world. Three years after Russia invaded Ukraine, Putin has yet to achieve these goals. But Russia has increased its influence in parts of the Global South and has allied itself with three revisionist powers—China, Iran, and North Korea—which share its commitment to a “post-Western” order. The advent of the second Trump administration—which is committed to upending America’s alliances and robustly engaging in great power politics—has introduced a new element of uncertainty about how Russia might parlay its war with Ukraine into raising its global standing. From Putin’s point of view, the reestablishment of U.S.-Russian relations under President Donald Trump and the prospect of restoring economic ties are bonuses that were not available before November 2024 and could offer new opportunities for him on the global stage. – How the war in Ukraine changed Russia’s global standing
Singapore – US
(Joanne Lin – FULCRUM) While most of Southeast Asia appears to be warming to the return of Donald Trump to the White House, Singapore appears to be an outlier, according to the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute’s State of Southeast Asia 2025 Survey (SSEA 2025). One of the US’ closest partners in the region since the end of World War II, Singapore – as represented by the SSEA 2025’s respondents – exhibited a clear decline in their trust in and optimism toward Washington’s role in Southeast Asia under Trump’s second administration. The SSEA 2025 survey was conducted between 3 January and 15 February, straddling President Trump’s inauguration on 20 January 2025. The largest share of Singapore’s respondents was from academia and think tanks (28.9 per cent), followed by the government (26.4 per cent); the private sector (24.8 per cent); civil society, NGOs or media (12.4 per cent); and regional or international organisations (7.4 per cent). For Singapore, a country that balances economic pragmatism with a firm commitment to an international rules-based order, the US is more than just an economic partner. – Singapore is Not Buying into Trump 2.0 | FULCRUM
Syria
(Emirates Policy Center) Violent developments on the Syrian coast marked a dangerous turning point in Syria’s transitional process. Massacres targeting Alawites deepened the mistrust between the new administration and other groups, particularly the Druze and Kurds. They also exposed fundamental contradictions in the policies of interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa. The Syrian coast events slowed international efforts to lift sanctions on Syria and influenced the US administration’s review of Syria. Meanwhile, Russia exploited the crisis to strengthen its influence in Syria and pressure the Sharaa administration to soften its position regarding negotiations on the two Russian bases. The massacres triggered intense international pressure on Sharaa’s administration and prompted major powers engaging with Syria to prioritize the issue of foreign fighters. The events also served Israeli and Iranian interests by deepening chaos and sectarian divisions, further undermining the legitimacy of the new Syrian administration. The Syrian coast crisis underscored the immense challenges to national reconciliation and state-building in post-Assad Syria. While most international and regional powers seek stability in Syria, they may reconsider their policies toward Sharaa’s government if it fails to control factions and lead a comprehensive transitional phase. – Emirates Policy Center | Unrest on the Syrian Coast: Domestic and External Implications for Sharaa’s Rule
Türkiye
(Ahmet Erdi Öztürk – RUSI) As of today, Turkish domestic politics is primarily driven by foreign policy dynamics. On the morning of 19 March the Mayor of Istanbul Ekrem İmamoğlu was taken into custody, along with his close associates, on charges of corruption and alleged links to terrorist activities, immediately before İmamoğlu was set to participate in the primary election within his party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), for the presidential candidacy. – Turkey: Rough at Home, Essential on the Global Stage | Royal United Services Institute
United Arab Emirates
(Samriddhi Vij – Observer Research Foundation) Abu Dhabi and Dubai have led the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) economic transformation. Other emirates have witnessed recent progress, but disparities persist. While Abu Dhabi and Dubai account for 85 percent of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), emirates like Umm Al Quwain (UAQ) are estimated to contribute less than 1 percent. The limited national contribution of these emirates is often attributed to their lack of oil and small landmasses. Abu Dhabi boasts of having a per capita GDP of US$ 81,000, while UAQ’s is estimated at US$ 11,000. Further, Dubai contributes about 25 percent to the UAE’s GDP despite having 4 percent of its oil reserves and 5 percent of its land mass. – Strategies for UAE’s Future Development: Promoting Equitable Growth Across Emirates
US
(Manish Vaid – Observer Research Foundation) ‘The Earth is a shared resource that connects us all.’ This idea encapsulates the relationship between a nation’s progress and environmental sustainability. But it appears that in his second term, the president of the United States of America, Donald Trump, is poised to intensify the nation’s thirst for fossil fuel production, particularly shale oil and gas, thereby prioritising economic growth over ecological health. This raises some pertinent questions: does environmental security align with national interest? By withdrawing from climate agreements, is the Trump administration endangering national security? Traditionally, national interest has been defined by economic strength, military capability, and geopolitical influence. However, the 21st century has expanded this definition to include environmental security, as climate change, resource depletion, and ecological degradation pose existential threats to national stability. – Red over green
(Ayleen Cameron – German Marshall Fund of the United States) On the evening of March 25, Rumeysa Ozturk, a PhD student studying at Tufts University on a Fulbright scholarship, was suddenly detained by masked ICE agents on a street corner in Somerville, Massachusetts. Despite explicit court orders requiring 48 hours’ notice before her removal from the state, Ozturk was moved to a processing facility in Louisiana. Her F-1 student visa has been terminated. Secretary of State Marco Rubio suggested in a news conference on Thursday that Ozturk was detained due to her pro-Palestinian student activism. She co-authored an op-ed calling for Tufts to divest from companies with ties to Israel, but no evidence has been provided of her involvement in any illegal activity. Since her detention, Senators Elizabeth Warren, Ed Markey, Bernie Sanders, and other senators and congresspersons have signed a letter calling for due process in her case. – Straight from the Autocratic Playbook | German Marshall Fund of the United States
US – India
(Manish Vaid – Observer Research Foundation) The energy relationship between India and the United States has long been characterised by a blend of strategic collaboration and policy fluctuations. Historically, while both nations have engaged across various energy sectors, clean energy partnerships have often faced challenges due to shifting political priorities in Washington and New Delhi. This brief examines the key areas of divergence and convergence in India-US energy ties and the potential pathways for future collaboration. – Growing Energy Ties Between India and the US
US – Indo Pacific
(Mizumi Dutcher – Stimson Center) With uncertainty surrounding U.S. diplomatic strategy toward China, Washington and Tokyo must work together to define a shared strategic vision. Congress is instrumental in this effort. While it is often said that the current administration operates independently of legislative input, Congress still holds powerful levers of influence—budget control, oversight, and the ability to shape long-term policy direction. How it exercises these powers will determine the future of U.S. leadership in the Indo-Pacific. – The Advocate and the Anchor: Congress and the Future of the U.S.-Japan in the Indo-Pacific • Stimson Center
(Pratnashree Basu – Observer Research Foundation) Washington’s ties with the Philippines and Japan are critical pillars of its Indo-Pacific strategy in two key ways—countering China’s assertiveness and ensuring regional stability. The United States-Indo-Pacific Command (US-INDOPACOM) plays a major role in operationalising these partnerships through military cooperation, joint exercises, and strategic deployments. Prima facie, Trump’s unpredictable foreign policy decisions are perceived as straining traditional alliances and creating global uncertainty, leading to apprehensions about the reduced US engagement in global security. His second term as President begins amid protracted crises in Ukraine and Gaza, alongside uncertainties about his plans to downsize defence and other diplomatic engagements. This has fuelled speculation about the continuity of US commitments in the Indo-Pacific, amid rising geopolitical tensions, especially with China. – US Defence Strategy in the Indo-Pacific: Hegseth’s Push under Trump 2.0
US – Iran
(Manoj Joshi – Observer Research Foundation) At the beginning of last month, United States (US) President Donald Trump sent a letter to Iran’s Supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei through the United Arab Emirates (UAE) expressing his desire to negotiate a nuclear deal with Iran. This request followed Trump’s Executive Order in early February threatening “maximum pressure” to ensure that “Iran be denied a nuclear weapon and intercontinental ballistic missiles.” The order also tightened all sanctions and other measures against Iran. The Iranians responded formally through Oman suggesting that they did not want direct negotiations, but would be open to indirect talks. On 30 March 2025, in response to the Iranian rejection, Trump warned that if Iran did not reach a nuclear agreement with the US, it could face military action, specifically bombings, alongside the imposition of secondary tariffs like those enacted during his previous administration. On Monday, Iran delivered a message from Khamenei to the US through the Swiss embassy which represents US interests in Iran, warning that Iran will respond “decisively and immediately” to any US action. – Trump, Iran, and the Nuclear Deal: A Slow-Motion Crisis
US – Southeast Asia
(Sharon Seah – FULCRUM) One of the most striking findings of the latest State of Southeast Asia survey is that Southeast Asians have largely taken the actions of the new Trump administration in their stride, as measured by their preference for a Trump-led US over China and their assessment of their countries’ relations with the US. It is not difficult to guess what Southeast Asia wants. It wants to maintain a balance of power between the major powers so that the region does not revert to spheres of influence of the past and so that it can continue to pursue its peace project of economic development and progress. But the trade war between the US and China, which began under the first Trump administration, is now intensifying with possible spillover repercussions on Southeast Asia. This, together with the geopolitical turbulence caused by two major ongoing conflicts in Europe and the Middle East is making Southeast Asia’s desired balance of power very difficult to achieve. A volatile and unpredictable Trump 2.0 only adds to the uncertainty and subtracts from what the region knew worked before. – Taking Southeast Asia’s Pulse on Geopolitics | FULCRUM
(Joanne Lin, William Choong – FULCRUM) The return of Donald Trump to the White House has triggered a sense of consternation around the world, including in Southeast Asia. The president and his team have demonstrated an inclination towards transactionalism, a preference for tariffs over multilateral trading frameworks, and neglect of US commitment to long-standing alliances. Ironically, this was not reflected in the State of Southeast Survey 2025. The US scored higher than in 2024 on many questions: US engagement with Southeast Asia, its economic and strategic influence in the region, and respondents’ choices between China and the US. The Trump effect may well be attributed to his robust leadership, affinity for brokering deals with major powers, and expectation that he might pay more attention to the Indo-Pacific. Among the respondents, 40.7 per cent expect US engagement with Southeast Asia to increase under Trump 2.0. This is quite a marked change from the 2024 survey conducted in the final year of the Biden administration when 25.2 per cent of respondents felt that US engagement with the region had increased. – Betting on the Bulldozer: Why (Most of) Southeast Asia is Warming Up to Trump 2.0 | FULCRUM
US Tariffs
(Stephen Olson – FULCRUM) “Liberation” day has arrived in the US, and as promised, the Trump administration has unveiled its plans for an unprecedented swath of tariff increases. Declaring the lack of reciprocity in its bilateral trade relationships to be an “unusual and extraordinary threat” to the national security and economy of the US, President Trump has announced a 10 per cent across-the–board tariff on all countries and double-digit “reciprocal” tariffs on those countries deemed to be the worst offenders. China’s tariff rate is 34 per cent while the EU was hit with a 20 per cent tariff. In Southeast Asia, Vietnam was assessed a 46 per cent rate, Thailand at 36 per cent, Indonesia at 32 per cent, Malaysia at 24 per cent, and Cambodia at 49 per cent. The wealthiest country in the region, Singapore, got off relatively lightly, with only the baseline 10 per cent being applied. Of note for at least some countries in Southeast Asia, semiconductors will be exempted from the reciprocal tariffs. – Trump’s ‘Liberation’ Day Unlikely to End Well for Southeast Asia — or Anyone | FULCRUM
(Michael Froman – Council on Foreign Relations) When future generations ask how the rules-based international economic order came to an end, I’ll tell them that it happened slowly and then all at once. The final blow may have come this Wednesday, when, in the Rose Garden, against a backdrop of American flags, President Donald Trump proudly signed the “declaration of economic independence”—a presidential action that imposed a baseline tariff of 10 percent on nearly all countries and raised the United States’ overall average import tax to 22.5 percent, the highest level in 115 years. – Liberation and Its Discontents | Council on Foreign Relations
(Chatham House) President Trump has unveiled sweeping new trade tariffs – but what happens next? Bronwen Maddox explores the global reaction, the economic fallout, and whether this marks the beginning of the end for globalization. She is joined by Jason Furman, former chair of the Council of Economic Advisers under President Barack Obama, alongside Dame DeAnne Julius and David Lubin from Chatham House’s Global Economy and Finance Programme. – Independent Thinking: Are Donald Trump’s tariffs the end of globalization? | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
US – Vietnam
(Le Hong Hiep – FULCRUM) On 2 April 2025, US President Donald Trump unveiled a sweeping set of reciprocal tariffs targeting over 180 countries, with Vietnam facing a steep 46 per cent duty on its exports to the US, effective 9 April. The announcement builds on a 10 per cent baseline tariff applied to most trading partners starting 5 April, with additional reciprocal rates tailored to countries with significant trade surpluses. For Vietnam, this 46 per cent tariff — among the highest imposed — applies to all goods entering the US, a market that absorbed US$142 billion of Vietnamese exports in 2024, according to US statistics. This tariff comes as a shock to Vietnam, but Hanoi would likely lean on diplomacy instead. For a time, officials had reportedly nurtured cautious optimism about dodging the worst of Trump’s trade policies. Hanoi had assumed its proactive engagement with the Trump administration would soften any blows. For example, during Industry and Trade Minister Nguyen Hong Dien’s visit to Washington last month, Vietnam inked US$4.15 billion in deals with US firms, including LNG sourcing agreements with Excelerate Energy and ConocoPhillips, as part of a broader US$90.3 billion trade package for 2025–2030. CPV General Secretary To Lam’s swift post-election call to congratulate Trump further underscored Hanoi’s diplomatic outreach. These efforts, coupled with Vietnam’s tariff cuts on various US products announced on 31 March, were seen as pre-emptive moves to align with Trump’s demands for balanced trade. – How Will Vietnam Deal With President Trump’s Shocking Tariffs? | FULCRUM
