From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye
Today’s about : Australia, China-India, France-Africa, Greenland, India-Armenia, India-Russia, India-UK, Quad-Indonesia, Russia-North Korea-China, Singapore, USA-Canada, USA-Pacific, USA-Panama Canal, Democracy
Australia
(Peter Briggs – ASPI The Strategist) Australia’s plan to acquire Virginia-class submarines from the United State is looking increasingly improbable. The US building program is slipping too badly. This heightens the need for Australia to begin looking at other options, including acquiring Suffren-class nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) from France. – Virginia, we have a problem | The Strategist
(Gareth Evans – East Asia Forum) Middle powers like Australia can wield significant influence on the global stage if they can harness enough will, resources and credibility. Australian middle power diplomacy has historically been effective and can continue to make a real difference in several areas of international relations today, including in tempering the overreach and US–China strategic competition in the Asia Pacific region. Middle powers should not be counted out for their lack of economic and military might. If middle powers harness their potential, middle powers can have an important impact on the safety, sanity and prosperity of the Asia Pacific region and the wider world. – Australia’s middle power diplomacy matters | East Asia Forum
China – India
(Kalpit A Mankikar – Observer Research Foundation) Sun Tzu’s treatise on war offers many stratagems to deal with the enemy. He emphasises deception and patience, cautioning that the general who makes many calculations like a chess player is more likely to win. Unfortunately, endurance is in short supply when it comes to India-China dynamics, especially in the era of 24/7 news cycles. In December 2024, the 23rd meeting of the Special Representatives (SRs) between India’s National Security Advisor, Ajit Doval, and China’s Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, took place after a hiatus of nearly five years. The SRs mechanism was constituted in an agreement in 2003, which mandated that ways to resolve the boundary question should be looked into from a political perspective. In the Indian readout, both Doval and Wang Yi underscored the overall India-China bilateral relationship was dependent on the maintenance of peace and tranquillity in border regions. Decks are being cleared for the Kailash Mansarovar pilgrimage in Tibet, trade in border areas, and data sharing on trans-border rivers. – Behind the India-China talks: Unravelling Beijing’s deceptive long-term strategy
(Harsh V. Pant, Kalpit A Mankikar – Observer Research Foundation) China’s tendency to spring a surprise at every juncture in the tortuous trajectory of its dynamics with India is redoubtable. There was a perception that ties were on an upswing after China and India agreed to disengage and resume patrolling in Depsang and Demchok in October 2024, and which was followed by both sides trying to normalise their relationship after a straining four-year military stand-off. – The tortuous road to Sino-Indian normalisation
France – Africa
(Abhishek Mishra – Manohar Parrikar Institute) Over the last few decades, Africa’s Sahel has emerged as one of the most coup-prone regions of the world owing to several reasons. Ineffective systems of governance that lack public credibility and capacity to prevent violent conflicts, ineffective democratic systems, endemic poverty, foreign interference, harsh climatic conditions and unconstitutional extension of presidential term-limits, have all contributed to the region’s deteriorating security conditions. Extremist groups continue to flourish in the region and new plurilateral arrangements like the Alliance of Sahelian States (AES) between Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso have emerged. – France’s Pivot towards Anglophone Africa after Sahelian Exit – MP-IDSA
Greenland
(Donald R Rothwell – Lowy The Interpreter) Acquiring Greenland would now appear to be a foreign policy priority for the incoming Trump administration. Reviving his 2019 proposal for a US takeover of the territory, an idea thought to have been shelved following his 2020 election loss, Trump last week made his ambition for Greenland plain. – The legal options for Trump to acquire Greenland | Lowy Institute
(Carl Bildt – ASPI The Strategist) In 2019, when Donald Trump first proclaimed that the United States should buy Greenland, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen rightly dismissed the idea as absurd. Greenland is not for sale, she noted. While Denmark manages the territory’s foreign and security policies, Greenland sees to its own domestic affairs. – Trump’s Greenland grab | The Strategist
India – Armenia
(Manohar Parrikar Institute) Historically, Armenia relied heavily on Russia for arms procurement. According to SIPRI, from 2011 to 2020, Russia was the main supplier of arms to Armenia accounting for 93.7 per cent of its imports.1 However, Russia’s inability to meet supply commitments due to the Ukraine war has exposed the risks of overdependence on a single ally.2 As a result, Armenia had to look for other sources for defence procurement. – The India–Armenia Defence Partnership: Strategic Drivers – MP-IDSA
India – Russia
(Ivan Shchedrov – Observer Research Foundation) In Russia, 2024 was perceived as one of the most eventful years in the modern history of bilateral relations. Against considerable odds, the Indian prime minister, Narendra Modi, made a double visit to Russia. His first visit was in July as a part of the agreements within the 2000 Declaration on Strategic Partnership, followed by a second one in October to participate in the 16th BRICS summit in Kazan. While repeated visits are not rare—former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Russia twice in 2009 and 2013, and Narendra Modi in 2015—this time, however, this gesture holds significance. It indicates India’s commitment to secure traditional political ties and is thus considered to have more value than ever before. – India and Russia at a crossroads
India – UK
(Shairee Malhotra – Observer Research Foundation) This primer offers a comprehensive overview of the current state of the India-United Kingdom (UK) bilateral relationship. It describes India-UK cooperation in the key policy areas of trade and investment, security and defence, technology and innovation, and migration and people-to-people ties. The paper also explores the divergences and tensions in this multifaceted partnership while forecasting a bright future for the bilateral. – India and the UK in 2025: A Primer
Quad – Indonesia
(Prakash Panneerselvam, Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto – ASPI The Strategist) Indonesia’s underwater domain awareness (UDA) is a critical gap that the Quad security partners—Australia, India, Japan and the United States—can and should fill. UDA includes detecting and monitoring underwater activities, including tracking submarines and protecting underwater resources against espionage. – The Quad should help Indonesia achieve underwater domain awareness | The Strategist
Russia – North Korea – China
(Mayuri Banerjee – Manohar Parrikar Institute) The surge in Russia–North Korea relations has been one of the major highlights of international geopolitical developments in recent times. With high-level state visits and the signing of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement in June 2024, Pyongyang and Moscow have rapidly expanded their cooperation in trade, technology, defence and security. They have most importantly committed to mutual assistance in an event of aggression against the other. Commentators in the West have speculated that the strengthening of the North Korea–Russia ties has irked Beijing which sees Russia’s expanding influence in the Korean Peninsula at China’s cost. They note that Beijing may be concerned about consolidation of South Korea–Japan and US alliance as a response to this development. The Chinese Foreign Ministry has however refrained from expressing disapproval, asserting it to be sovereign right of the two countries to cultivate diplomatic ties. Discussions in Chinese media (heavily controlled by the party-state), meanwhile, offer an additional glimpse of interpretation by analysts of this evolving dynamic. Analysts posit that the strengthening of North Korea–Russia relations is driven by the current international situation rather than signifying convergence of long-term strategic interests. Also, it is noted that although Russia–North Korea have upgraded their ties, the cooperation between the two powers remains limited and does not threaten China’s position in the Korean Peninsula. – Surge in North Korea–Russia Relations: Chinese Reactions – MP-IDSA
Singapore
(Michael Barr – East Asia Forum) In 2024, Singapore’s political landscape saw significant changes as after two decades as prime minister, Lee Hsien Loong handed power to Lawrence Wong. While this transition brought positive change, the year was marked by controversy. S Iswaran’s corruption conviction, Cabinet ministers suing Bloomberg over property reporting and the ongoing Lee family feud dominated headlines. Although Wong has tried to establish a semblance of independence, he faces challenges in consolidating his leadership while Lee remains in Cabinet as Senior Minister. – Singapore’s new prime minister entangled in old politics | East Asia Forum
USA – Canada
(Grant Wyeth – Lowy The Interpreter) Donald Trump’s proclamation about reshaping North America and having Canada become “the 51st state” is but one land grab by the soon-to-be returned president. This may just be another of Trump’s distractions, more attention-seeking, or a negotiation tactic. Or maybe he sees annexing Canada as a simple real estate transaction. Yet as a demonstration, it’s worth considering how complex it would be to incorporate Canada into America’s political institutions. – The practical obstacles to Canada as the 51st state | Lowy Institute
USA – Pacific
(Michael Walsh – Foreign Policy Research Institute) Under the Biden administration, there have been a number of extraordinary events that have had a significant impact on US diplomatic relations with the Cook Islands, New Zealand, and Niue. Among other things, the Pacific Partnership Strategy changed the higher-level planning priorities of particular relevance to the Cook Islands, New Zealand, Niue, and Tokelau, while the establishment of US diplomatic relations with the Cook Islands and Niue fundamentally changed the delegated responsibilities of the US Embassy and Consulate in New Zealand, the Cook Islands, and Niue. It is, therefore, remarkable that the Integrated Country Strategy for New Zealand has never been updated to account for these major changes in the operating environment of the US Embassy and Consulate in New Zealand, the Cook Islands, and Niue. That oversight not only raises questions about the performance of the country team; it also underscores the widely held criticism that the Biden administration has insufficiently delivered on its commitment to reform and modernize the US Department of State and the US Agency for International Development. Prior to the second inauguration of President-elect Donald Trump, members of Congress may therefore want to consider the issues raised by recent developments in the US bilateral relationships with the Cook Islands and Niue. – Pacific Island Affairs and US Diplomatic Relations – Foreign Policy Research Institute
USA – Panama Canal
(Selwyn Parker – Lowy The Interpreter) Chinese soldiers do not operate the Panama Canal. And the Panama government is not ripping off the consumers of the United States through inflated shipping rates. That’s the only possible conclusion from an impartial look at how this historic waterway works. Yet on the basis of these claims by US president-elect Donald Trump, he is threatening to annex the 80-kilometre canal that joins the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, connects more than 140 shipping routes and 1,700 ports worldwide, and provides the transit for about three percent of global trade. – Trump goes deep into the Panama Canal | Lowy Institute
Democracy
(Niranjan Sahoo – Observer Research Foundation) 2024 was billed as the biggest election year in history. More than 70 countries, representing nearly half of the global population, went to polls in 2024. From India’s multi-day general elections—the largest electoral exercise in the world—to Indonesia’s presidential poll, the high-stakes presidential polls in the United States (US) to the very consequential elections in the United Kingdom, 2024 witnessed high-voltage campaigns across the globe. What was significant was that a dozen democracies went to polls against the background of intensifying conflicts and geopolitical challenges. While Taiwan held its presidential polls under intense pressure and provocations from Beijing, Russia, which is at war with Ukraine, held its presidential elections in mid-March. Similarly, several African countries including South Africa, Algeria, Ghana, Namibia, Mozambique, Senegal and conflict-ridden South Sudan, conducted their elections amidst escalating conflicts and tensions. – Super election year 2024: Lessons for democracy rebuilding
