COMPLEX RESEARCH LABORATORY
Daily from global think tanks
(the analyzes here recalled do not necessarily correspond to the geostrategic thinking of The Global Eye)
Australia
(Samuel Bashfield – Lowy The Interpreter) Australia is yet to adequately grapple with the unique challenges that critical seabed infrastructure protection poses to its defence and national security.
Cable ties: Defending seabed lines of communication | Lowy Institute
Azerbaijan – Armenia
(Vasif Huseynov – The Jamestown Foundation) The United States has expressed that it is willing to support the peace process between Azerbaijan and Armenia, highlighted in US Deputy Secretary of State James O’Brien’s recent visit to the two countries. Washington views the peace process between Baku and Yerevan as a wider geopolitical issue as prolonging the process could prompt other powers to use the conflict to act in their own interest. US diplomats propose an initiative of economic connectivity via transit routes passing through Azerbaijan and Armenia to the surrounding region as a proposed motivator for a quick peace between Baku and Yeravan.
United States Encourages Armenia and Azerbaijan to Sign Peace Treaty ‘Without Delay’ – Jamestown
Caspian Sea Region
(Sergey Sukhankin – The Jamestown Foundation) The Caspian Sea region looks to become an international energy hub as the European Union seeks alternatives to its energy dependence on Russia through the export of natural gas from littoral Caspian Sea states. Moscow is concerned about the prospect of the Caspian region becoming a facilitator of EU energy security, potentially strengthening political-military cooperation between the historically Russian-leaning littoral Caspian states and Russia’s adversaries. Russia and Iran’s goals of bolstering north-south transit routes and increasing energy exports are at risk if the Caspian Sea region is successful in strengthening connections to Europe and prioritizing east-west routes.
Transformation of Caspian Sea Region Into Energy Hub Gaining Momentum (Part Two) – Jamestown
Central Asia – Iran
(Bruce Pannier – Middle East Institute) Since the early days of independence in late 1991, the governments in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have pointed to the map to show Central Asia’s potential as a major transit hub for east-west and north-south trade.
China
(Megha Shrivastava – ASPI The Strategist) The latest round of state investments in China’s semiconductor industry reveals an evolving approach by the Chinese government characterised by greater state involvement and strategic oversight. This introduces notable adjustments to the model that has applied to China’s semiconductor industry since 2014, one in which state agencies have featured as key investors. The evolution we’re seeing is a response to US-led sanctions on China’s chip sector. Another factor is the disappointing performance of the state-entrepreneurship model, due to fraud and corruption.
Democratic Republic of the Congo
(Andrew McGregor – The Jamestown Foundation) The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) continues to struggle to remove M23 rebels from its eastern provinces despite military aid and the assistance of UN troops and European mercenaries. The current UN peacekeeping mission is expected to withdraw by the end of 2024, likely ushering in a period of greater instability in the historically troubled state of Nord-Kivu. Incompetence on the part of the DRC’s army has led to a renewed reliance on European mercenaries and multilateral military operations. This has also opened the door to greater Russian involvement, with Moscow signing a military cooperation agreement with the DRC in March.
European Union
(Daniel Hegedüs – German Marshall Fund of the United States) Prime Minister Viktor Orbán kicked off Hungary’s six-month Presidency of the Council of the EU with diplomatic moves that shocked the country’s EU and NATO partners. He began by going to Kyiv for his first bilateral meeting with President Volodymyr Zelensky since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. There were no tangible results on disputes between the two countries, but Ukraine pledged to address Hungary’s concerns related to the status of the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia and the treatment of Hungarian companies. This led to cautious optimism regarding a rapprochement and a moderate pro-Western turn in Hungary’s foreign policy.
(Vassilis Ntousas, Adam Hsakou – German Marshall Fund of the United States) The white smoke that emerged from the European Council over their preferred candidates for the bloc’s top jobs appeared quickly—just three short weeks after an impactful European election—which clearly speaks to the moment in which Europe finds itself: citizens are requiring a stronger and more resilient EU at a time of great strategic and social insecurity. The three names put forward—the incumbent Ursula von der Leyen as president of the European Commission, Portugal’s António Costa as president of the European Council, and Estonian prime minister Kaja Kallas as the EU’s next foreign policy chief—show a confident mix of executive experience and institutional adeptness, given the need to balance geographical representation, gender diversity, and the relative strength of European political forces. But the real test lies ahead: Europe’s new leaders will have to steer the bloc’s fortunes through challenges that will be anything but usual.
European Union – USA
(Emma Ashford, MacKenna Rawlins – Stimson Center) Political dynamics in the United States and the rise of China have increased the likelihood of U.S. retrenchment from European defense in coming years. But the form and timing of that retrenchment — along with the ways in which European states might respond — are still unclear. This paper examines the dynamics of U.S. retrenchment from Europe by exploring three hypothetical, yet plausible scenarios for U.S. retrenchment from Europe over the next decade. The scenarios suggest something that is already understood implicitly by most: that there are better ways and worse ways for the United States to retrench from Europe, and that advance planning may help to mitigate some of the worst outcomes.
American Roulette: Scenarios for US Retrenchment and the Future of European Defense • Stimson Center
Global Order
(Frederick Kempe – Atlantic Council) The split screen was the devastating work of Vladimir Putin. On one side, a barrage of Russian missile strikes hit Ukraine, and rescue workers search for survivors at Kyiv’s finest children’s hospital. On the other side, heads of state and government arrive in Washington for NATO’s seventy-fifth anniversary summit, the world’s most powerful alliance being shown by Putin as unable to save Ukrainian children.
India – Russia
(Ian Hall – Lowy The Interpreter) Narendra Modi’s recent summit with Vladimir Putin was met with understandable outrage. Pictures of the Indian Prime Minister bearhugging the Russian President and receiving Russia’s highest award, the Order of St Andrew the Apostle, were widely shared and widely criticised. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy spoke for many when he called the meeting, which took place on the same day Russia bombed a Kyiv children’s hospital, a “huge disappointment”.
Modi’s Moscow miscalculation | Lowy Institute
Iran – Pakistan
(Kiyya Baloch – The Jamestown Foundation) Recent activity by Baloch separatists since the start of 2024 in both Iran and Pakistan has drawn international attention, especially after the actions of Iranian Baloch Islamist group Jaish al-Adl led to a brief, surprising exchange of missile and air strikes between the two countries. While Pakistani Baloch militants are more secular than their cousins in Iran, increasing oppression from their respective countries has combined with the after-effects of the Taliban’s success in Afghanistan to result in insurgencies that are better armed, more capable, and more popular with the Baloch civilian population than in years past. It is possible that Iran and Pakistan are playing their respective Baloch separatist groups against each other. Regardless, both states’ failure to satisfy the Baloch people’s fundamental demands has turned the region’s youth into a fertile recruiting ground for separatist militants.
Israel – China
(Tuvia Gering – Institute for National Security Studies) The China–Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF) was held this year, marking the twentieth anniversary of its establishment. Over the years, the forum has become a platform for China to increase its influence over Arab countries at the expense of the United States and the West. However, it has also led to Arab countries influencing China to adopt increasingly extreme positions in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The joint statement this year, which was made in the midst of the war in the Gaza Strip, is the most hostile and one-sided toward Israel to date and represents the low point that China-Israel relations have reached. Even if it strains ties between the two nations, China might decide to “use Israel as a stick to beat America” as long as the Gaza War rages on and the rivalry between the superpowers grows. In order to address these negative trends, Israel needs to set clear boundaries with China behind closed doors and encourage direct and open communication with the Chinese leadership.
Israel–China Dialogue Is Required to Prevent Further Deterioration of Relations | INSS
Kazakhstan
(John C. K. Daly – The Jamestown Foundation) Kazakhstan is looking to bolster trade relations beyond Eurasian Russia to the European Union and the United States partly due to Moscow’s war against Ukraine and sanctions imposed against Russia, limiting economic opportunities. The rich natural resource deposits in Kazakhstan will likely attract many foreign investors from the United States and European Union who are looking to decrease their dependence on China for rare-earth exports. Moscow and Beijing are unlikely to react to Astana’s efforts due to Russia’s deteriorating economic ties with Europe and China’s continued use of transportation links through Kazakhstan to reach Europe.
Kazakhstan Expands Trade Relations With United States and Europe – Jamestown
Mediterranean, Middle East, and the Gulf
(Kathryn Tyson, Kelly Campa, Annika Ganzeveld, Siddhant Kishore, Alexandra Braverman, Katherine Wells, Johanna Moore, and Brian Carter – Institute for the Study of War) Hamas: Hamas is threatening to end ceasefire negotiations with Israel in response to Israeli raids targeting Hamas fighters in Gaza City. This effort may seek to trigger increased international pressure on Israel to stop the raids – Hamas in Iraq: Hamas has begun transporting unspecified equipment to Baghdad International Airport in preparation for relocating its political leadership to Iraq, according to an unspecified senior Shia Coordination Framework member – Lebanon: Hezbollah released drone footage on July 9 reportedly showing various Israeli military sites in the Golan Heights.
Iran Update, July 9, 2024 | Institute for the Study of War (understandingwar.org)
(Raz Zimmt – Institute for National Security Studies) The ongoing campaign in Gaza and its spread to other fronts, including the direct confrontation in April 2024 between Iran and Israel, could bring about significant changes in the security conception of the Islamic Republic. These changes could affect the features of its policy and its strategic perceptions, including how it manages its regional network of proxies and its nuclear doctrine. Although Iran’s conduct since the start of the war does not currently indicate any strategic U-turns by the Iranian leadership, it is clear that due to internal, regional and international developments—along with the lessons from the ongoing regional war—Tehran increasingly estimates that the strategic balance is tipping in its favor. This perception could lead to significant changes in its policy, specifically a greater willingness to take risks and adopt a more aggressive approach, including towards Israel. This trend obliges Israel to prepare for the new Iranian strategy and for more intense conflict with Iran and the Shiite axis it leads.
Reassessing Fundamental Concepts in Iranian Policy Against the Background of the War in Gaza | INSS
(Hesham Alghannam – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) Bashar al-Assad’s regime has used the drug partly as a means of ensuring that Syria is reintegrated into the Arab world, allowing its leadership to reinforce its position after years of isolation and conflict.
(Jacob Zenn – The Jamestown Foundation) On May 23, an Afghan Taliban delegation traveled to Tehran to meet with the emir of Qatar and the head of Hamas’s Political Bureau, Ismail Haniyeh. In an effort to downplay bad press as it continues to seek diplomatic recognition, Hamas appears to be trying to minimize its association with Iran and the Taliban as much as possible. Previous meetings between the Taliban and Hamas were well-publicized by both parties, whereas focusing on an alliance with global pariahs today would make Hamas less sympathetic on the international stage at a critical juncture. Moreover, it could cut into pro-Hamas support in the West, especially among individuals on the left, who tend to oppose ultra-orthodox Islamic regulations on social matters.
Brief: Hamas Downplays Political Bureau Head’s Meeting with the Taliban and Iran – Jamestown
(Foundation for Defense of Democracies) In another indication of Iran’s increasingly aggressive stance, Reuters reported on July 7 on satellite images showing that Tehran has expanded two facilities to increase the production of ballistic missiles. Taken by the commercial satellite firm Planet Labs, the images revealed 30 new buildings at the Modarres military base and Khojir missile production complex. Both sites are overseen by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and produce Iran’s short- and medium-range weapons as well as rockets for the IRGC’s space program.
Iran Expands Ballistic Missile Facilities as NATO Meets in Washington (fdd.org)
(Foundation for Defense of Democracies) U.S. concern over Qatar’s relationship with Hamas is reflected in the Senate Armed Services Committee’s draft of the 2025 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), released on July 9. Specifically, section 1287 of the bill would require the secretary of defense to “submit a report and provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees on the operational value of al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar, taking into consideration the relationship of the Government of Qatar with Hamas and other terrorist organizations.” Hosting an estimated 10,000 U.S. troops, al-Udeid is the largest U.S. military base in the Middle East and the location of U.S. Central Command’s forward headquarters.
Citing Hamas Links, Draft Defense Bill Pushes for Review of U.S.-Qatar Relations (fdd.org)
(Bradley Bowman, Lydia LaFavor, Cameron McMillan – Foundation for Defense of Democracies) Hezbollah launched dozens of rockets into northern Israel on Sunday. That attack followed a July 4 assault in which the terror group fired approximately 200 projectiles and over 20 aerial objects into Israel. These incidents come amidst a deteriorating situation on the northern front of Israel’s multi-front war, where Hezbollah has launched at least 2,900 attacks since October, and tens of thousands of civilians have been displaced from their homes.
A greatly expanded arsenal means this is not the Hezbollah of 2006 (fdd.org)
(Ana Palacio – ASPI The Strategist) The second round of Iran’s presidential election unfolded with little fanfare last weekend. But, with reformist candidate Masoud Pezeshkian defeating his hardline anti-Western opponent, Saeed Jalili, the world should be paying attention. At a time of deep tensions and shifting alliances, these results will reverberate across the region and beyond.
The global implications of Iran’s election | The Strategist (aspistrategist.org.au)
(Daniel Byman and Katherine Trauger – Center for Strategic & International Studies) The election of Masoud Pezeshkian as the president of Iran creates an opportunity, albeit only a limited one, for Iran to move away from its absolutist anti-Western foreign policy. Pezeshkian, a cardiologist, former health minister, and member of the Iranian parliament, defeated the ultraconservative former nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili in the July 5 runoff election to replace President Ebrahim Raisi following his fatal helicopter crash in late May. Amid an economic downturn and political disenchantment, Pezeshkian’s win signals the Iranian public’s desire for change. In addition to social and economic promises, Pezeshkian’s campaign focused in part on a new foreign policy for Iran, prioritizing the removal of sanctions, which in turn means cutting a deal with the United States. Overtures from Iran’s new president should not be rejected even though expectations should be limited given the president’s continued subjugation to the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who has long seen the United States as hostile to Iran and mostly favored a hardline stance.
Can Iran’s New President Change the Regime’s Confrontational Foreign Policy? (csis.org)
(Ray Takeyh – Council on Foreign Relations) President-Elect Masoud Pezeshkian campaigned as a moderate regarding issues such as the hijab law and nuclear negotiations, but the regime is unlikely to allow any sweeping changes.
What Could Change Under Iran’s New ‘Reformist’ President? | Council on Foreign Relations (cfr.org)
(Aniseh Bassiri Tabrizi – Chatham House) A largely unknown reformist lawmaker from Tabriz, cardiac surgeon Masoud Pezeshkian, defied the odds in a snap election to beat five conservative contenders and become Iran’s ninth president. He succeeds Ebrahim Raisi, the hardliner president who died in a helicopter crash on 19 May. Pezeshkian’s victory and the dynamic of the electoral race provide important insights into Iran’s political landscape and the country’s likely trajectory.
NATO
(Alix Frangeul-Alves, Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer, Adam Hsakou, Gesine Weber – German Marshall Fund of the United States) Amid a confluence of global crises, including the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and the heightened polarization of domestic politics, the survey reveals robust public support for a three-pronged approach to European security, articulating NATO’s collective defense capabilities, the United States’ sustained engagement, and a stronger EU.
Russia
(Paul Globe – The Jamestown Foundation) The population of the Russian Far East has fallen by almost a third since 1991, a decline that is accelerating again despite Putin’s efforts to stop it. One-third of those remaining say they want to leave, and another third likely share those plans. The region’s population is becoming not only smaller but less ethnically Russian. Ethnic Russians in the region are far more likely to leave than other groups, with migrants from Central Asia, North Korea, and China forming increased shares of the remaining inhabitants. This demographic shift is fueling fears in Moscow that the Russian Far East is becoming less Russian and more restive and that it may fall under outside, likely Chinese, control or alternatively pursue an independent future.
Population Flight Leaving Russia’s Far East Increasingly Less Russian – Jamestown
(Jacob Zenn – The Jamestown Foundation) Russia is seeking to augment the ranks of its Africa Corps by recruiting militants from African separatist groups. More broadly, it appears that countries are increasingly turning to private military organizations to secure their interests in Africa. Other countries are also following Russia’s path, including Türkiye, which is supplementing its forces in Africa with veterans of the Syrian Civil War, as well as China, which relies on a network of private security companies.
Brief: Russia’s Africa Corps Appears to Be Recruiting African Militants – Jamestown
(Chatham House) Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, now into its third year, has confounded many assumptions – both in Moscow and in the West – about the effectiveness of Russian military capabilities, organization and tactics. Russian forces have suffered heavy losses at times, prompting the military leadership to embark on a programme of regeneration and modernization. Moscow seeks to reform its force structure, recruit more troops, and replace or improve weapons and equipment, both to make up for losses incurred in combat and to address shortcomings in capabilities that the war has exposed.
Assessing Russian plans for military regeneration | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
Russia’s War of Aggression in Ukraine
(Karolina Hird, Nicole Wolkov, Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, and Fredrick W. Kagan – Institutev for the Study of War) Russian President Vladimir Putin and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi issued a joint statement on July 9 about strengthening mutually beneficial political, economic, energy, and military-technical cooperation between Russia and India – Putin has been intensifying efforts to strengthen Russian relations with non-Western countries through individualized appeals, although he is likely emphasizing Russo-Indian cooperation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS as part of a wider Russian effort to create an alternative “Eurasian security architecture” leveraging existing Eurasian multilateral organizations – Modi tacitly supported the Kremlin’s false narrative that Russia is interested in a peaceful, negotiated resolution to the war in Ukraine, likely in exchange for deepening economic, energy, and technological cooperation with Russia – Putin may have pledged to return Indian volunteers fighting in Ukraine during a private dinner with Modi in Novo-Ogaryovo, Moscow Oblast on July 8 – Some unnamed US government officials appear to believe that Ukraine does not need to liberate its occupied lands and people to win the war, despite Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent clear statements that Russia will not accept a negotiated ceasefire on any terms other than Ukrainian capitulation and will not abandon its goals of the total destruction of the entire Ukrainian state–not just the lands it currently occupies – Several independent investigations, including one conducted by the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU), concluded that a Russian missile struck the Kyiv City Okhmatdyt Children’s Hospital on July 8 amid continued official Russian denials and deflections – Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Russian energy and military infrastructure in Belgorod, Kursk, Rostov, Astrakhan, and Volgograd oblasts overnight on July 8 to 9 – Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed new military prosecutors on July 8, likely in support of ongoing, long-term Russian military reforms – Newly-elected Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian reiterated Iran’s continued willingness to enter a comprehensive strategic partnership with Russia, emphasizing the continuity in Iran’s support for Russia even under a new presidential administration – The US Department of Justice (DoJ) released affidavits on July 9 for several hundred X (formerly Twitter) accounts and domain names used by Russian state media and security services to operate a bot farm aimed at spreading disinformation in the US and abroad – Russian forces recently made confirmed advances southeast of Chasiv Yar, near Avdiivka, and southwest of Donetsk City, and Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Kharkiv City – Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed a decree ordering the reestablishment of the Saratov Higher Artillery Command School on July 8, likely as part of ongoing efforts to build out a cadre of Russian officers – Russian authorities continue to deploy Rosgvardia contingents to occupied Ukraine to serve law enforcement functions.
Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques) La semaine passée, l’Organisation de coopération de Shanghai (OCS) se réunissait à Astana pour son sommet annuel. Outre l’adhésion du Bélarus, l’agenda politique fut très chargé pour l’institution, de la coopération en matière de criminalité et terrorisme à la guerre en Ukraine, en passant par le projet de réconciliation entre la Turquie et la Syrie. Engagée contre l’hégémonie des Occidentaux sur la scène internationale, l’OCS incarne une vision du monde multipolaire, en témoigne la présence de l’Iran, de l’Inde et du Pakistan aux côtés de la Russie et de la Chine et de 14 États partenaires. Quels sont les objectifs stratégiques de cette institution ? Comment cohabitent les intérêts russes ou chinois dans l’espace eurasiatique ? Que traduit l’entrée du Bélarus dans l’OCS ? Éléments de réponse avec Jean de Gliniasty, directeur de recherche à l’IRIS, ancien ambassadeur de France en Russie et spécialiste des questions russes.
South Korea
(Sheena Chestnut Greitens – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) On July 14, South Korea will commemorate its inaugural North Korean Defectors’ Day. The new holiday, established by the administration of President Yoon Suk-yeol earlier this year, marks the twenty-seventh anniversary of the North Korean Defectors Protection and Settlement Support Act, the legislation that governs South Korea’s policies toward the community of over 34,000 North Korean defectors who have resettled in the Republic of Korea (ROK). Despite some debate over the holiday’s timing and merits, it marks a noteworthy inflection point in South Korean policy.
What’s Behind South Korea’s New Defectors’ Day Holiday? – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Sudan
(Herbert Maack – The Jamestown Foundation) April 2024 marked the first anniversary of the Sudanese civil war, with the risk of Sudan re-emerging as a hub for jihadist terrorism in Africa on the rise. Some elements of the Sudanese Armed Forces under General al-Burhan are believed to have close ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, and Islamic State has already seen success in using Sudan as a recruiting and logistics hub. Islamist-leaning militias are growing more prominent locally, and foreign fighters from radicalized members of the Sudanese diaspora already involved with jihadist groups abroad may travel to Sudan to gain combat experience.
One Year On, Civil War Risks Reviving Jihadism in Sudan – Jamestown
Türkiye
(Gönül Tol, Seda Demiralp, Edgar Şar, Evren Balta, M. Murat Kubilay – Middle East Institute) At a time when there is widespread anxiety around the world about the fate of democracy but not enough debate on the future of autocracy, Turkey presents an interesting case for scholars and policy-makers. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan spent two decades in power taking steps to build his one-man rule. 2023 was the year when many thought it would finally come to an end. The government’s poor response to the devastating earthquake in February 2023 and Turkey’s mounting economic problems strengthened popular discontent with Erdoğan’s rule. Yet he still managed to win another term as president in the May 2023 elections thanks to the disarray among the six-party opposition coalition and its uninspiring candidate.
UK – Australia
(Alex Bristow – Australian Strategic Policy Institute) Britain has a new prime minister, Keir Starmer, leading its first Labour government in 14 years. Key questions for us now are how Britain under Labour will approach the security partnership with Australia and whether London will remain committed to investing defence resources in the Indo-Pacific. This report provides vital context for addressing these questions. In this series of articles, originally published in ASPI’s The Strategist this year, ASPI authors review the historical underpinnings and future course of Britain’s strategic recoupling with Australia and this region, especially the Pacific Islands, from perspectives ranging from deterrence to climate resilience. The report makes some recommendations for how to strengthen the Australia-UK defence partnership and shape Britain’s approach to our region.
UK – China
(Jaya Pathak and Bob Seely – RUSI) Handling the challenges posed by China will require a cross-party agreement in the UK. Here are some suggestions for how this could be done comprehensively.
The UK and China: A Call for Cross-Party Consensus | Royal United Services Institute (rusi.org)
USA – China
(Bonnie S. Glaser, Sam Howell – German Marshall Fund of the United States) Quantum computing uses quantum mechanics to perform fast and complex calculations. It is often defined as a disruptive technology and is among the advanced technologies at the forefront of US-China competition. Although the US has been in the lead in the development and applications of quantum technology, China is making rapid strides. Earlier this year, China’s independently developed quantum computer, Origin Wukong, named after the Monkey King (a famous character from Chinese mythology) made the country the third in the world to develop this state-of-the-art machine.
Quantum Computing in US-China Competition | German Marshall Fund of the United States (gmfus.org)
Vietnam
(Robert Law – Lowy The Interpreter) Investors looking at Vietnam know that the risks are higher than in developed countries. The key question is whether investments will generate higher risk-adjusted returns.
Vietnam’s recent challenges shouldn’t deter savvy investors | Lowy Institute
